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ABSTRACT 
 
This study focused on governance and financial sustainability of NGOs in South 
Africa.  The primary objective of the study was to evaluate existing governance and 
financial arrangements of NGOs, CBOs and CSOs with the view to developing 
alternative approaches to governance and financial arrangements with specific 
reference to lessons of experiences for South African NGOs.   
 
The secondary objectives of the study were to firstly develop a historical perspective 
on trends and tendencies of NGO funding in South Africa.  A second objective was to 
provide a theoretical overview of the financial management and governance 
arrangements of NGOs.  The study thirdly examined options for funding 
arrangements for NGOs in South Africa.  Research findings forwarded were used to 
develop a set of conclusions and recommendations for the improved funding and 
governance of NGOs in South Africa in general.  The research objectives were 
directly linked to the composition of the chapters.   
 
The study largely employed qualitative evaluation as this research tool allows for 
interpretative research.   A comparative case assessment of selected NGOs was 
provided. Case studies included the Centre for the Study of Higher Education 
(University of the Western Cape), Oxfam International Great Britain and the 
Sustainability Institute on the outskirts of Stellenbosch.  Following the findings of the 
case assessments, a practical appraisal framework for the sustainability of South 
African NGOs was forwarded. 
 
One of the study’s research findings suggests that the long-term sustainability of the 
non-profit sector is linked to the legislative framework of the country in which the 
NGO operates.  In South Africa, the Non-Profit Organisations Act (Act 71 of 1997), 
lays out in great detail a framework for the creation and operation of civil society 
organisations.  Literature reveals that local and international funding organisations 
increasingly demand that funding recipients be registered as non-profit organisations 
as evidence of compliance with the basic criteria of authenticity as bona fide 
organisations. 
 
 ii
The study recommends for example that NGO self-financing strategists/specialists, 
within the confines of South Africa’s legal and tax legislation, train NGOs, CBOs, 
CSOs and NPOs in the area of self-financing initiatives to enable and assist these 
organisations with the generation of a sustained income.  A further recommendation is 
that the proposed appraisal framework for the sustainability of NGOs in conjunction 
with the recommendations mentioned be considered as a framework for use by 
relevant authorities and interested parties.  This may include the South African 
Revenue Service (SARS), Master of the High Court, the Minister of Social 
Development, the Registrar of Companies in terms of Section 21 companies, the 
NGO/CBO/CSO sector, government, donors, private social responsibility funders, the 
National Development Agency (NDA) and development banks.  The framework 
should be regarded as imperative for improved governance and financial sustainability 
of NGOs in South Africa.  Areas for future research such as the role of the National 
Development Agency in post-apartheid South Africa were also highlighted.   
 
The study was undertaken in support of research in the area of governance and 
financial sustainability of NGOs in South Africa and, if effect is given to the 
recommendations it forwards, and the appraisal framework it devised, then the 
structuring, functioning and overall management and governance of NGOs will 
improve in the interest of the country in general and communities specifically. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A Government of National Unity elected by South Africans under the leadership of the 
African National Congress came into power in 1994 (Dangor, 1995).  As a consequence, 
the 1990s saw new priorities being placed on the state’s development agenda, especially 
those driven by the needs of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).  
The government was now required to take up the space that non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) occupied in communities previously denied resources by an 
oppressive government (Harding, 1994).  The role and identity of NGOs became a 
critical issue beyond 1994 where NGOs were required to position themselves at the 
cutting edge of developmental thinking and practice in their field if they were to stay 
active (Hollowes, 1999).   Former comrades-in-arms, having moved from positions in the 
NGO sector into government, were questioning the role of NGOs and were requesting 
them to redefine themselves (Financial Mail, 1994).   In addition to this state of 
uncertainty, foreign governments and international donors were increasingly channelling 
funding through the state, further weakening the position of South African NGOs 
(Hollowes, 1999; Pereira, 1999).  
 
This study traced governance and the financial sustainability of South African non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) for the period 1990 to 2002 with the intention of 
developing improved options for the future regarding the sustainability of the NGO sector 
in South Africa, especially with regard to financial management and governance.  This 
chapter will provide a conceptual clarification of key terms, and thereafter, the problem 
statement will be discussed, followed by the research objectives and literature review. 
 
 
 
 
1.2 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 
The terms non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations 
(CBOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) will be used throughout this study.  When 
reference is made to “NGO”, “CBO” or “CSO” the following definitions are implied: 
 
NGOs are understood to be formal, legally constituted, professional development 
organisations, which are linked into the international aid system.  In the South African 
context, the focus is on what, pre-1994, might have been called “anti-apartheid” or “anti-
governmental” organisations, which provided research, policy, advocacy and various 
developmental or welfare services intended to support the struggle against apartheid and 
assist the victims thereof (Smith, 2001b).  During the last ten years, many of these NGOs 
played a role in development efforts.  Examples include some of the more traditional 
names in international NGO development such as:  Oxfam, Save the Children, World 
Vision, Christian Aid, HelpAge International and Habitat for Humanity as well as local 
institutions such as The Built Environment and Support Group, the Centre for the Study 
of Higher Education (formerly the Education Policy Unit) and People Opposing Women 
Abuse (Smith & Bornstein, 2001; Smith, 2001a; Vetten & Khan, 2002).  
 
Community-based organisations (CBOs) are non-profit, grassroots organisations that 
have their base in particular communities and which are often formed to carry out 
specific developmental projects or fulfil particular needs (Amner & Vergnani, 1995).   
They are formalised representative structures which champion the interest of their 
members (Smith, 2001b). Staffed largely by volunteers, they are accountable to a 
particular community or constituency (Amner & Vergnani, 1995).   Unlike CBOs, 
contends Smith (2001b), NGOs are not membership-based, but instead perform functions 
intended to benefit a wider group of people in society.  Examples of these more formal 
community-based organisations, which have a distinct leadership and membership, are:  
the Treatment Action Campaign, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, the Concerned 
Citizens Group, the Salvation Army, the South African Red Cross Society and the St 
John Ambulance Foundation (Habib, 2003; Kihato & Rapoo, 1999). 
 
Civil society organisations (CSOs) are varied and perform a myriad of roles in society.  
The traditional definition of civil society, according to Govender (n.d.), is that it 
comprises all organisations and institutions upwards of the family, up to the state 
(national, provincial and local government).  Where CSOs have a virtually unlimited 
range of associational purposes, NGOs may be thought of as CSOs created to change 
society in ways which reduce poverty and injustice and improve quality of living 
(Andersson, 1995).  Civil society organisations will range from the South African 
National Civics Organisation (SANCO) to a football club or a stokvel (Govender, n.d.; 
Smith 2001a). 
 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
During the time when apartheid ideology prevailed in South Africa, it was imperative to 
have a strong and vibrant civil society as a counter to the white government.  As the state 
at the time abdicated its service delivery responsibility towards a large sector of the 
population, civil society organisations created alternative structures of powers such as 
street committees, people’s courts and, above all, service delivery mechanisms (Motala & 
Husy, 2001).  A peculiar type of civil society thus existed (Reitzes & Friedman, 2001).  
Most NGOs, particularly anti-apartheid organisations, had definite direction and purpose, 
and access to funds for carrying out their objectives were easily accessible (Kihato, 
2001).  Aid within South Africa, flowed freely to NGOs and CBOs, specifically those 
conducting grassroots development projects.  Sweden, for example, contributed 
approximately US$400 million between 1970 and 1993 towards the anti-apartheid cause.  
Countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Germany, Denmark, 
Norway and the European Commission actively promoted civil society as a popular 
alternative to the state, and responded with creative aid programmes that featured 
flexibility and consultation rather than red tape.  As recipients of funds could not fully 
document where funds had been spent, ‘struggle’ (struggle in this context refers to the 
struggle against apartheid where limited control measures for accounting and spending 
were required) accounting systems were permissible (Bratton & Landsberg, 1999). ‘Local 
actors’ were allowed to identify recipients of international donor aid, thus employing a 
bottom-up approach to funding  (Rammutle, 2003).   
Beyond 1994, there were dramatic changes to foreign aid policies (Rammutle, 2003).  
International governmental donors, hold Reitzes and Friedman (2001), accorded priority 
to the South African government and expected civil society organisations to work in 
tandem with the state.  The government was regarded as the conduit for the disbursement 
of donor funds (Rammutle, 2003; Smith, 2001a).   
 
In 1995, reports on a survey by the Independent Development Trust appeared in the 
media, signaling that many CSOs were in serious financial difficulty, and that a number 
had collapsed (Kihato & Rapoo, 1999; Amner & Vergnani, 1995).  As a consequence, in 
1996, the South African government established the Transitional National Development 
Agency.  Its mandate was to receive applications from and disburse government and 
donor funding to CSOs throughout the country (Kihato & Rapoo, 1999).  This institution 
proved to be ineffective and major backlogs in the disbursements of funds to NGOs was 
observed (Rammutle, 2003).  The National Development Agency (NDA) and the Lottery 
Commission were subsequently established with a mandate to fund legitimate non-profit 
activity (Habib, 2005).  Gardner and Macanda (2003) contend that the NDA did not learn 
any lessons from its predecessor, the Transitional National Development Agency, as it 
too was struggling to conceptualise its functions.  The authors maintain that the NDA’s 
location in relation to government and civil society was not clearly defined, as its 
operational endeavours threatened the financial sustainability of many civil society 
organisations (CSOs). 
 
Kraak (2001) maintains that whilst the NGO sector has a vital role to play in representing 
and servicing the poor and marginalised, in shaping public policy and as watchdog for 
democracy, negative trends in the sector persist years after the first democratic elections.  
He attributes the problems to: 
- the paucity of research on the NGO sector, which negatively impacts on 
effective policy formulation for the sector; 
- the problem of the longer term sustainability of the sector (including the 
perennial issue of reduced donor funding and the absence of effective 
strategies to counter this trend);  
- the difficult legislative and fiscal context in which the sector operates; 
- an apparent deteriorating relationship with the government.  The 
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a community-based organisation for 
example, constantly engages the state and other social actors around the 
implementation of neo-liberal social policies (Habib, 2005). 
- problems within SANGCOCO in providing national leadership and 
direction for the sector and its alleged neglect of the provinces; and  
- poor leadership and the lack of organisational capacity in many 
organisations. 
 
Poor leadership, which presented a challenge, as alluded to by Kraak (2001) in the above 
text, can be ascribed to the advent of a democratic and legitimate state which freed those 
who were unwilling to be associated with the apartheid state, to now work for the new 
state.  NGO, CBO and trade union human resource capacity became depleted.  A new 
generation of leadership struggled to build its expertise (Andersson, 1995). 
 
Since 1997, the Cooperative for Research and Education (CORE) annually conducted a 
survey of NGO governance in South Africa to probe issues such as an NGO’s 
constitution, codes of conduct, employment practices, management and leadership.  
Results of a composite survey (survey period: 1997 to 2001) published in 2002 revealed 
that democratic governance of NGOs was not widespread.  The survey concluded that 
NGO board members in many instances lacked management, legal, fundraising and 
technical skills commensurate with the work of the organisation (Camay and Gordon, 
2004).  These skills, the aforementioned authors maintain, could be acquired through 
training.  In this way, the NGO governing boards will be capacitated to deal effectively 
and efficiently with organisational change, ensuring sustainable organisations.  
 
The central problem addressed in this research investigation is the lack of adequate 
governance arrangements and financial funding to ensure the sustainability of NGOs in 
general and South African NGOs specifically.  In particular the lack of government 
arrangements in the South African context included: inadequate policies, a lack of 
delivery by the NDA, and insufficient governance arrangements and financial planning 
by NGOs themselves as well as poorly structured relationships between government and 
donors. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Given the above problem statement, this research investigation focused in particular on 
options for funding and governance of NGOs in South Africa.  This section addresses the 
primary and secondary objectives of the study. 
 
1.4.1 Primary objective: 
The primary objective of the research study was to evaluate existing governance and 
financial arrangements of NGOs, CBOs and CSOs with the view to developing 
alternative approaches to governance and financial arrangements with specific reference 
to lessons of experience for South African NGOs. 
 
1.4.2 Secondary objectives: 
The secondary objectives of this research study were to: 
• develop a historical perspective on trends and tendencies of NGO funding in 
South Africa; 
• provide a theoretical overview of the financial management and governance 
arrangements of NGOs; 
• examine options for funding arrangements for NGOs in South Africa; 
• provide a comparative case assessment of selected NGOs in South Africa; 
• develop research findings and to apply the preferred financial and governance 
arrangements to the case studies; 
• motivate and develop an appraisal framework for NGOs and to test this 
instrument on the selected cases, and to 
• develop a set of conclusions and recommendations for the improved funding of 
NGOs in South Africa 
It should be noted that all secondary objectives have been formulated in support of the 
primary objective and that these have been directly linked to the composition of the 
chapters in the study.  (See Section 1.8 of this chapter). 
 
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on international aid and global funding trends, South 
African NGOs pre and beyond 1994 and NGO governance. 
  
1.5.1 International Aid and global trends 
 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, much of the global South continues to face 
significant economic, social and political challenges.  Policies and programmes designed 
to address these, undertaken by government, inter-governmental organisations, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) over the past few decades, have resulted in some 
notable achievements (Warkentin, 2001).   The reason for NGOs appearing to be the 
favoured vehicle in the delivery of economic, social and political objectives can be 
attributed to their ability to attract funding for various causes like the proverbial “magic 
bullet” (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).  But who are these donor agencies and what are they 
prepared to fund? 
 
International and regional donor agencies, holds Fehnel (1997:  369 – 370), come in 
many forms.  The author maintains that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), represent many nations.  Other donor agencies, such as the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Swedish International Development 
Agency (SIDA), and the British Overseas Development Agency (BODA), embody a 
single nation.  The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, in contrast symbolise private 
organisations.  They vary in the forms and levels of assistance provided.  These funding 
agencies are to be found in most ‘developing’ countries.  Their assistance may take the 
following forms: 
- Funding is provided by them through grants or loans;  
- They provide technical assistance in the form of development experts; 
- They provide ideas on how to solve development problems; 
- They provide important access to international information and experience, 
and 
- They provide commodities needed to get the development jobs done.   
 
Whilst the generosity and need for financial assistance put forward by numerous foreign 
donors are recognised, Epprecht (n.d.) maintains that such assistance is generally 
predicated upon the assumption that the West and North, having developed themselves, 
can now help other nations and people to make a similar transition.  These funding 
agencies, contends the author, may believe, rightly or wrongly, that it has development 
wisdom and experience to offer South Africa.  Despite the perceived ‘generosity’ of the 
Northern and Western funders, recently, much attention has been focused on the roles 
and agendas of these international agencies, which support NGO development 
programmes in South Africa.  Questions such as who sets the agenda for policies and 
programmes - donors, the government, or the NGOs - were raised in the media by former 
President Nelson Mandela (Smith, 1998).  A further concern expressed by Fani (1997: 1) 
was around the sustainability of NGOs should Northern donors suddenly change their 
funding priorities.  He holds that: 
Western donors do not ask:  “What do you know? What do you 
need?”  They focus on what contracted developers determine is 
good for communities.  CBO funding proposals are expected to be 
formulated in terms of what donors are known to be prepared to 
fund rather than in terms of what communities themselves have 
determined to be their priorities.  CBOs have been forced to 
capitulate to a set of rules which favour Western donors.  Much of 
the broader non-profit sector has in turn framed its outlook and 
principles in this way.  What was a coherent driving force, the 
CBOs, have become fragmented and disempowered.  Western 
donors favour organisations which conform to their requirements.  
CBOs, coerced into changing and linking themselves to efficient 
but ineffective foreign trends, have lost their original purpose and 
identity. 
  
 Thompson (2001) contends that foreign aid is not necessarily bad or superfluous.  She 
maintains that those involved in the provision of aid on the part of Northern states 
should be more attentive to the ways in which the perceived problems faced by 
developing nations, or the missions that they set for themselves, are constructed.  In 
Afghanistan, for example, instead of NGOs being capacitated to implement the agendas 
of donors, a wider dialogue is called for based on shared values and ethics.  Where 
Afghan NGOs had to conform to donors in the past, mechanisms are required to 
empower organisations within civil society to help set the development agenda 
(Goodhand & Chamberlain, 2000).    
 
 In the above context, Collier (2000), after examining an NGO project in Zambia, 
similarly propagates the incorporation of indigenous skills in NGO projects thereby 
ensuring sustainability; NGOs enhancing instead of reducing local government’s 
responsibility in respect of service delivery, and the abandonment by NGOs of short-
term projects which seek the fulfilment of physical output by the donors.  
 
1.5.2 South African NGOs’ financial arrangements prior to 1994 
Due to the hostile environment in which NGOs had to operate pre-1994, many donors, 
sympathetic to the struggle, did not strictly control the administration and expenditure of 
funds.  Kihato (2001) in a paper entitled:  “Shifting sands:  The relationship between 
foreign donors and South African civil society during and after apartheid”  found that 
few recipient NGOs were required to keep books, or undergo independent audits or even 
report back to donors on how money had been spent.  The relationship between donors 
and civil society during apartheid was extremely flexible with donors assuming a highly 
accommodating attitude to local demands.  South African NGOs were fortunate and 
received funding amounting to R2 billion from the European Commission for the period 
1980 to 1991.  Funded activities and organisations varied greatly, from poverty relief to 
education grants for black South Africans to direct contributions to liberation movements 
(Kihato, 2001).  This situation did not continue unabated.  Kihato (2001: 10) reports that: 
 
For all its merits, including its contribution to the demise of 
apartheid, the magnitude of donor funding during the 1980s as well 
as the lack of donor controls created an enormous dependence on 
aid within civil society.  This helped escalate the widespread 
collapse of CSOs in the 1990s, when they failed to cope with funding 
cut-backs and increasingly stringent donor conditionalities and 
controls.  The 1980s created complacency within the civil society 
about its sustainability and future survival; as a result, it was 
inadequately prepared for the shifts in donor strategies that 
occurred in the mid-1990s. 
 
 
The dependence on funding from various quarters by the South African NGO sector prior 
to 1994 impeded its ability to formulate long-term strategies to ensure its survival with 
any degree of confidence.  
 
1.5.3 NGOs in post-apartheid South Africa 
Beyond 1994, South Africa’s transition to democracy left NGOs in a state of disarray as 
one NGO after the other went under due to lack of financing.  More and more donors 
started regarding the new government and the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) as recipients of funds (Financial Mail, 1994).  Donors thus selected to 
form bilateral aid agreements with government, hoping that some of the funds would be 
channelled back to NGOs (Smith, 2001a; Govender, n.d.).  Challenges facing NGOs 
proved complex and Dangor (1994: 17) in a journal article argued that: 
 
[N]GOs come from a value base and have engaged with 
communities mainly because they wanted to address the issues of 
poverty and empowerment.  Now voluntary activists are pitched 
against consultants and their survival is threatened as development 
gets privatised.  Organisations that took on predominantly state 
functions, at a time when the Apartheid state failed to carry out its 
responsibilities, may have to revisit their role and contribution.  
However, the state, NGOs and donors must bear in mind the limited 
capacity of the state and the time lag before the state can adequately 
harness its capacity and expertise in taking up some of the functions 
which it regards as its own.  …[t]he tasks and responsibilities of 
government increase with the closure of each organisation whose 
work has had measurable impact on communities. 
 
Smith (2001a) maintains that a number of South African NGOs have employed measures 
such as the provision of training, project management services, consulting, contracting to 
other NGOs, the government and private sector companies, and the selling of products 
such as educational materials to generate income.  The author further found in a survey 
he embarked upon in November 2000, as part of his research towards a Masters degree 
entitled:  South African NGOs in Transition and the challenge of participatory 
development, that a number of NGOs had to wait 2 to 6 months after completing 
assignments before receiving any kind of compensation from government, putting NGOs 
in a compromising position financially. 
 
As a consequence of NGOs having to remain relevant and to survive financially in the 
dynamic post-apartheid South Africa, the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of 
Disputes (ACCORD), according to Reddy (2004), commercialised its activities.  The 
NGOs claim that they are able to sustain themselves by engaging in income-generating 
activities.  They also argue that they are more productive than non-commercialised NGOs 
because they utilise business practices in their operation.   Commercialisation, however, 
has changed the mindset of this NGO from being guided by a social mission and set of 
values to becoming a for-profit entity.  As such, they have become contractors to the 
international system and agenda and consultants by another name.  Their status as an 
NGO is severely compromised (Reddy, 2004).  This elicits the question of whether 
NGOs should sell their services to the public and private sector in order to survive, 
compromising the reasons why they were initially established - for example, working 
closely with communities on development-related activities, or whether it would be best 
if alternative funding were sourced.  
 
A further example of an NGO having to conform to the requirements of foreign donors to 
ensure its existence is the one put forward by Dr Bev Thaver, Deputy-Director of the 
Education Policy Unit at the University of the Western Cape (Thaver, 2002).  She asserts 
that their research in higher education policy has in many instances, been adjusted to 
meet the expectations of the donors (Thaver, 2002). 
 
Despite financial dilemmas faced by NGOs pre- and beyond 1994, additional challenges 
facing NGOs were not confined to South African NGOs only.  Countries such as 
Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, India, Zimbabwe, Pakistan and Cote D’Ivoire reported to the 
Canadian Council for International Co-operation at meetings conducted during January 
and February 1996 that Northern NGOs continued to set the development agenda for 
Southern NGOs without sufficient consultation where: 
- projects are based on Northern perceptions of what  the South need; 
- there is often a top-down approach by Northern NGOs and donors; 
- Southerners do not have the moral courage to challenge the perception of the 
North, resulting in failure of projects, which discourages further investment;  
- the North will not understand the South without taking up residence in the 
South and experiencing the South first hand (and vice versa); 
- Northern NGOs must stop competing against one another about who is having 
the greatest impact.  They should work to complement the work of other 
NGOs as coordination of activities will lead to greater impact; 
- Northern donors suddenly change their funding priorities, seriously impacting 
on the work of Southern NGOs (Conversations with Southern Partners:  The 
search for Meaningful Partnerships, n.d. ). 
 
In the above context, research conducted by Smith and Bernstein (2001) concurs that 
Northern NGOs such as the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation and the Charities Aid 
Foundation set the development agenda for South African initiatives.  Northern NGOs 
tend to focus on capacity-building and technical support instead of direct funding to local 
NGOs, apparently in response to the pressures local NGOs face in terms of funding and 
more arduous donor requirements.   
 
The search for answers to questions around the financial sustainability of NGOs pre- and 
post 1994 is what this study will pursue.  Such evaluative research will lead the 
researcher to determine why some South African NGOs flourished, and why others met 
an early demise within the 1990 to 2002 timeframe. 
 
1.5.4 Governance and NGOs 
Good governance, in referring to both the strategic management as well as operational 
feasibility of NGOs, is of critical importance to NGOs.  Good governance is essential for 
order and equality, efficient delivery of goods and services, accountability in the use of 
power, protection of human rights and freedom, and the maintenance of an organisational 
framework within which each person can contribute fully towards finding innovative 
solutions to common problems (Implementing ICPD in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001).   
 
Good governance seeks to promote efficient, effective and sustainable organisations that 
can contribute towards development endeavours.  It is about fair, efficient and transparent 
administration of organisations to meet well-defined objectives. Systems and structures 
of operation and control need to be in place so that the organisational mission and 
objectives are achieved while complying with legal and regulatory requirements. There 
should be an efficient process where the roles of the board and management are clearly 
defined with appropriate structures in place. The board should make strategic decisions 
and be transparent, responsible and accountable. There should be adequate disclosure of 
information and the organisation should remain relevant, legitimate, competitive, viable 
and sustainable (Abromov, 2002; IMF, 2003; Reforming Public Institutions and 
Strengthening Governance, n.d.; Modernizing Accountability Practices in the Public 
Sector, n.d.; Implementing ICPD in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001).  
 
In South Africa, changes in the political context or shifts in donor policies towards more 
stringent lending practices, in conjunction with difficulties within CSOs, CBOs and 
NGOs - for example, corruption, lack of financial management, inadequate planning: 
failure to prioritise, duplication of services and programmes, inadequate leadership 
capacity; lack of professional fundraising endeavours, and poor governance - are but 
some factors quoted by commentators, which contributed to the demise of many civil 
society organisations (Kihato & Rapoo, 1999;  Kraak, 2001; Rammutle, 2003). 
 
In the context of good governance, the overarching challenge confronted by all civil 
society organisations in South Africa, according to Camay and Gordon (2002), is the 
need for governing boards to effectively and efficiently adapt to, and manage, 
organisational change.   A number of boards were unable to steer NGOs through the 
democratic transition where the review of the vision and mission of an organisation, 
which would guide it into a new paradigm, were neglected.  The transformation of 
organisations, to keep pace with changes in the external environment and the 
improvement of cost-efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation are but two further 
challenges faced by boards in their attempts to govern CBOs, NGOs and CSOs (Camay 
and Gordon, 2002).   
 
The arrival of democracy in South Africa, saw the depletion of  NGO, CBO and trade 
union human resource capacity as activists took up positions in the legitimate state.     A 
new generation of leadership floundered in the new organisational context and struggled 
to build its expertise.   Unseasoned managers, for example, focused on the need to 
harness meagre resources and tried to cope with the new emphasis on cost-recovery for 
services, instead of fulfilling their development endeavours (Andersson, 1995).   Because 
of these conditions, the tenets of good governance were constantly compromised. 
 
Leadership vacuums, financial insecurity, confused strategic focus, the change in target 
groups and the tensions between the role of NGOs and the role of the state in service 
delivery led to the demise of numerous NGOs.  Calls for realising good governance on 
the part of NGOs and a financial framework which will ensure the sustainability of 
existing and future NGOs have been put forward as viable solutions by a number of 
commentators (Camay and Gordon, 2002; Kraak, 2001). 
 
 In concluding the literature review, the researcher surmises that whilst the need for aid 
to South African NGOs remains, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness, donor 
intentions should ideally be aligned to African community needs as the imposition of 
western mindsets will produce new failures (Landsberg et al, 1997).  Against the 
background of ongoing socio-political difficulties, room exists for interventions by 
Northern NGOs and donors while the need for a new aid order is making itself felt.  The 
problem of long-term sustainability of the NGO sector attributed to inadequate 
governance strategies, legislative and fiscal dilemmas, to name but a few negative 
trends, calls for effective governance and financial sustainability arrangements, which 
this research will formulate. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study will largely employ qualitative evaluation as this research tool encompasses a 
broad variety of approaches to interpretive research.  The study will also use comparative 
case assessment and the application of a funding framework flowing from a theoretical 
assessment.  Qualitative research can be historical, sociological, political, educational, 
and much more, providing an apt tool for a study of this nature (Leedy, 1997).  A 
qualitative approach will provide a theoretical assessment of governance and financial 
arrangements of NGOs.   A further reason for choosing “evaluation” as a research 
method is that it allows for “…[t]he systematic acquisition and assessment of information 
to provide useful feedback about some object be it a programme, policy, technology, 
person, need or activity.  (Introduction to Evaluation, n.d. found at:  
http://trochim.human.cornell.edu/kb/intreval.htm).  Another reason for this method of 
research is that the researcher will be allowed to use her judgment and experience to 
ultimately select a preferred governance and financial framework for NGOs. 
 
This research study makes use of multiple-case studies. A case study is characterised by: 
- ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions; 
- more than one case study is investigated, but the total number is limited; 
- a contemporary phenomenon over which the researcher does not have 
direct control is studied within its real-life context;  
- it is aimed at collecting qualitative data and in-depth knowledge about a 
phenomenon, not at collecting quantitative data to generalize on one 
aspect of the phenomenon; and 
- multiple sources of evidence are used. 
(Arts, 1998:  37). 
 
Swanborn in Arts (1998: 38) contends that the study of two cases instead of one, would 
yield knowledge through comparison.  However, whilst this research seeks to trace and 
compare governance and the financial sustainability of South African NGOs for the 
period from 1990 to 2002, three organisations were selected, namely, the Centre for the 
Study of Higher Education at the University of the Western Cape, formerly known as the 
Education Policy Unit, Oxfam International, Great Britain and  the Sustainability Institute 
in Lynedoch on the outskirts of Stellenbosch.  Though they differ fundamentally in terms 
of service sectors, two of the NGOs existed prior to the 1994 democratic elections and all 
are, and have been, recipients of international and domestic aid.   A brief description of 
each NGO follows. 
 
The Centre for the Study of Higher Education, formerly known as the Education Policy 
Unit, began operations in January 1992.  Its immediate function was to provide support to 
the democratic movement and to the African National Congress government-in-waiting 
in formulating a post-secondary education policy framework for the new South Africa.  
During 2001, it was decided to change the name of the Education Policy Unit to the 
Centre for the Study of Higher Education in order to reflect its focus on higher education 
and its function as a centre for scholarly research, analysis and teaching in this field 
(Centre for the Study of Higher Education, 2005).  
 
Oxfam International (Great Britain) has characterized itself as “a development and relief 
agency working to put an end to poverty worldwide,” a grand project based on the belief 
that poverty is not inevitable;  it can be tackled and must be ended.  Using its trademark 
approach to development of working with poor people to help them help themselves,  
Oxfam’s strategy of responsively helping people empower themselves has important 
implications for the development and maintenance of a global civil society.  In its efforts 
to relieve poverty, distress and suffering in any part of the world, Oxfam supports a 
variety of social development, health, agricultural, and humanitarian projects, and 
emergency programs.  It also aims to educate the public concerning the nature, causes, 
and effects of poverty, and engages in advocacy, education and campaigning work on 
issues that are central to the achievement of Oxfam’s charitable objectives (Kalema, 
2001).   
 
The Sustainability Institute in Lynedoch is an international living and learning centre, 
situated on the outskirts of Stellenbosch.  Founded in 1999, the Sustainability Institute, 
according to its website, provides a space for people to explore an approach to creating a 
more equitable society that lives in a way that sustains rather than destroys the eco-
system within which all society is embedded.  It provides residential accommodation for 
visiting writers, artists, activists, volunteers and scholars, and a learning space for 
participants in the Institute’s various educational programmes 
(www.sustainabilityinstitute.net). 
 
To be able to meet the research objectives on the basis of a multiple-case study, specific 
information and knowledge should be collected, for example, on the historical trends and 
tendencies of NGO funding in South Africa for the period 1990 to 2002, and the financial 
management of NGOs in particular.  Therefore relevant and multiple sources of 
information and knowledge will be selected and perused.  Some of the main primary and 
secondary sources of information for this study are people and documents specifically 
NGO and governmental role-players, international donors, policy documents, Internet 
searches, annual reports, legislation and numerous other relevant literature.   
 
An in-depth structured questionnaire was completed by the managers of the selected 
NGOs. 
 
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study has a significant contribution to make as a systematic assessment of historic 
trends and future options on a case study basis has not been attempted in this context 
before.  The study includes a survey of the literature on governance and the financial 
sustainability of South African NGOs prior to and beyond 1994.  A paucity of 
information has been revealed in this area.  This research augments the current literature 
available on this subject, as the current gaps in the knowledge of the NGO sector 
negatively impact on effective policy formulation.   A historical analysis of financial 
frameworks employed by NGOs will contribute to the formulation of an improved 
funding framework for NGOs in South Africa.  In this context, the development of an 
appraisal instrument, assessing the sustainability of NGOs, makes a distinct contribution 
to knowledge of and insight into the subject.  The appraisal instrument devised will be 
disseminated as widely as possible as it has the potential of becoming a useful tool that 
would assist a variety of stakeholders related to the world of NGOs. This study has 
developed a set of conclusions and recommendations for improved governance options.   
 
1.8 COMPOSITION, STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
This study consists of two parts.  The first part is a theoretical exposition on governance 
and the financial sustainability of NGOs in general.  In this context, information was 
drawn from published books, official publications, magazine articles, reports, official 
documentation and statutory legislation.  This contextual framework provided the basis 
for the second part of the study which includes the case studies, explanation of the 
research results and the presentation of the findings. 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction and background to the study 
This chapter focuses on an introduction to the study, the problem statement, research 
objectives, a literature review and the significance of the study.   Attention is also given 
to the research methodology employed and the composition, structure and organisation of 
the study. 
 
Chapter 2:  Historical perspectives of NGO governance and funding in South Africa 
In this chapter an overview is provided of the historical trends and tendencies of 
governance and financial arrangements of NGOs over the last ten years.   In particular, 
attention is given to sustainable aspects of financial arrangements and assistance received 
by NGOs from international and other donors.  Historical trends such as the decline in 
international funding to South African NGOs is analysed in detail.   A study was made of 
the survival strategies NGOs employed to ensure their sustainability.  This historical 
theoretical exposition provided valuable lessons of NGO experiences.  
 
Chapter 3:  Theoretical overview of governance and sustainability arrangements of 
NGOs 
This chapter provides a theoretical overview of governance arrangements and 
sustainability arrangements.  An overview of theories, frameworks and paradigms, in 
particular those regulating the governance of international institutions and NGOs, is 
given and deliberated upon.   
 
Chapter 4:  Theoretical focus on sustainability and financial management of NGOs 
Given the overview of the conceptual framework of governance and financial 
sustainability in the previous chapter, this chapter investigates specific frameworks in the 
area of financial management and sustainability practices within NGOs in general.  
Various concepts of funding arrangements from international donors, and independent 
scholars were addressed.  Academic literature on the principles of financial arrangements 
for NGOs was examined.  The chapter investigates issues pertaining to income and 
expenditure of NGOs with the view to establishing whether global funding mobilisation 
practices could be replicated in South Africa.  Conclusions were drawn based on these 
frameworks. 
 
Chapter 5:  Case studies:  An assessment of selected NGO case studies in South 
Africa 
The decision was made to record three selected case studies, namely Oxfam, the 
Sustainability Institute and the Centre for the Study of Higher Education, from which 
lessons regarding governance and financial sustainability could be drawn.  One of the 
cases represents the large international NGO sector, a second focuses on higher education 
policy and a third has a developmental orientation.  As these NGOs receive funding from 
international, national and private sources, a comparative analysis was done, which 
facilitated an understanding of the nature of sustainable financial and governance 
arrangements.  
  
Chapter 6:  Research results and findings:  An application of the preferred 
framework 
This chapter provides an analysis and the conclusions of the qualitative research 
undertaken in order to meet the research objectives.  An application of the preferred 
framework in terms of governance and financial sustainability will be provided. 
 
Chapter 7: Towards an appraisal framework for the sustainability of NGOs  
This particular chapter aims to develop an appraisal framework for the sustainability of 
NGOs.  An appraisal form will be forwarded to policy makers, NGOs, CBOs, CSOs, 
government, donors, private sector social responsibility funders and the National 
Development Agency.  Users of the appraisal instrument will be advised on how it should 
be applied. 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and recommendations. 
This chapter provides a summary, recommendations and the conclusion of the study. 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES OF NGO 
GOVERNANCE AND FUNDING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa’s history is rooted in an apartheid ideology where racial prejudice and 
discrimination prevailed.  Camay and Gordon (2000: 107) postulate that: 
 
The concept of racial discrimination and segregation has figured 
throughout South African history and its impact has been seen since the 
17th century, in society as a whole and in the evolution of civil society 
organisations.  It has divided communities and affected their relative 
economic, political and social power and influence, as well as their 
respective ability to address community development issues.  It has led to 
extreme disadvantage and suffering for South African people of colour, a 
consequence, which will take generations to be remedied.  Not only was 
racial discrimination applied by successive governments as a means of 
maintaining political control and economic exploitation, but it also led to 
huge disparities in the availability of financial and human resources 
which could be put to use by communities through their civil society 
organisations.  It has therefore accentuated their differential access to 
services such as education, health, and other aspects of human welfare. 
 
 
Before 1994, many South African institutions were constructed in an effort to counter the 
country’s racially motivated discriminatory policies.  The apartheid government assigned 
resources for various services along racial lines. Accordingly, in the health care sector, 
for example, where the government provided inadequate services, non-governmental 
organisations stepped in.  The Black Peoples Convention is one such organisation which 
provided mobile clinics where trailers were equipped with medical instruments and 
volunteer medical doctors to help poor service-deprived black communities.  The 
development and operation of NGOs in South Africa, including international NGOs, is 
thus closely linked to the country’s political history  (Mazibuko, 2000).  
 
Developmental non-governmental organisations are mostly a funded sector, depending on 
funds from the community, businesses, government or from foreign governments, 
foundations and businesses (Mazibuko, 2000; Kihato, 2001; Fehnel, 1997).  Despite their 
dependence on donations, NGOs appear to have a reputation for offering specific 
advantages over more bureaucratic government structures in the delivery of a range of 
social, economic and political objectives.  It would appear that NGOs are better able to 
reach the poor, that they are flexible and responsive and that they can offer tailored and 
innovative service delivery interventions  (Martin, n.d.; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Bourne 
& Seager, 2000).  On the other hand, potential weaknesses of NGOs as espoused by 
Liebenberg (quoted in Bourne and Seager, 2000) range from: 
- inadequate planning, organisation and management; 
- inadequate staff training; 
- inability to replicate projects and ensure sustainability; 
- inability to collaborate with other role-players effectively; 
- a lack of coordination in the efforts of NGOs. 
These weaknesses, however, may not necessarily be true of all NGOs (Bourne & Seager, 
2000). 
 
The relationship between donors and civil society during apartheid was highly flexible 
and characterised by high levels of trust, where local actors in many instances decided 
which endeavours were to be funded.  Foreign funding before 1994 was anti-state and 
couched in anti-apartheid rubric (Kihato, 2001; Rammutle, 2003).  Civil society 
organisations that countered separate development policies or who mobilised against 
apartheid were favoured by international donor organisations.  Countries such as 
Denmark and Sweden supported liberation movements while the United States and 
Britain preferred to provide education grants (Kihato, 2001). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the historical trends and 
tendencies of governance and financial arrangements of South African NGOs over the 
last ten years. In particular, attention will be given to sustainable aspects of financial 
arrangements and assistance received by NGOs from international and other donors.  
Historical trends such as the decline in international funding to South African NGOs will 
be analysed in detail.  A study will be made of the survival strategies NGOs employed to 
ensure their sustainability.  This historical theoretical exposition will provide valuable 
lessons of NGO experiences over the last four years. 
 
2.2 BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVE ON NGOs IN A ‘NEW’ DISPENSATION 
(BEYOND 1994) 
South Africa’s transition to democracy brought with it fundamental changes to the form 
and function of the state which entailed the restructuring of intergovernmental relations 
and a redefinition of the responsibilities of the different spheres of government (Levy and 
Tapscott, 2001).  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa in particular calls for 
the establishment of structures and institutions to promote and facilitate 
intergovernmental relations which in turn will facilitate effective and efficient service 
delivery (South Africa, 1996).  Intergovernmental relations, defined as co-operative 
governance by the South African Constitution, thus impact on civil society.  Swilling, as 
quoted in De Coning (2004), contends that governance can be described as the role of the 
state, the nature of the state and the relationship between the state and civil society.  
Chidester, Dexter and Wilmot (2004) contend that: 
 
If the values, principles and aims of the South African Constitution are to 
be realised it is imperative that social dialogue strengthens 
intergovernmental relations.  Social dialogue is the national process of 
discussion, consultation and negotiation that goes on in a society in an 
organised and systematic manner to ensure that, in governing, those in 
positions of power incorporate the views and wishes of other more or less 
powerful social forces and interests into the policy and administrative 
processes…. [t]he view taken here is that social dialogue in the broad 
sense is both a necessary and desirable feature of modern governance. 
 
The World Bank as quoted in Fowler (1992) intimates that NGOs in Africa: 
 
[as] intermediaries have an important role to play; they can create links 
both upward and downward in society and voice local concerns…In doing 
this they can bring a broader spectrum of ideas and values to bear on 
policy making.   
 
In the above context Hlophe, Mothoho and Reitzes (2001) contend that the historical 
exclusion of black people from mainstream social, political and economic activities in 
South Africa led to the construction of organisations which formally orchestrated assaults 
on the apartheid regime.  During South Africa’s apartheid rule era, assert Motala and 
Husy (2001), it was essential to have a strong and vibrant civil society as a counter to the 
state.   The African National Congress and progressive civil society organisations built a 
cohesive popular movement against oppression.  Local grievances were linked to highly 
politicised campaigns where the struggles of people in the factories, villages, urban 
townships and schools were combined in an effort to destabilise the apartheid regime 
(Mohamed, 2001).   
 
The 1980s and early 1990s saw international donors enter the country to fund local 
development initiatives causing a dramatic increase in the number of local NGOs 
(Pieterse, 1997; Habib and Taylor as quoted in Smith, 2001).     The services offered by 
the NGOs to the constituencies that an apartheid state refused to render ranged from 
organisational support to civic or trade union formations, undertaking research to assist 
their client organisations to better understand the obstacles they faced in negotiating with 
an ‘illegitimate’ state (Govender, n.d.).  Other civil society structures, for example, took 
the form of street committees and people’s courts (Motala and Husy, 2001).  Numerous 
NGOs provided legal, welfare and developmental services to oppressed communities 
(Kotze as quoted in Smith, 2001).  South Africa saw a proliferation of organisations 
dealing with adult basic education, life skills, vocational and small business skills, career 
guidance and others related to job creation (Camay and Gordon, 2000). 
 
The struggle against apartheid compelled religious communities, whether Christian, 
Muslim, Hindu or Jewish, to establish organisations which promoted their own 
communities’ interests and provided protection against various forms of repression and 
control (Camay and Gordon, 2000).   
 
Prior to 1994, NGOs were able to attract high calibre human capital wishing not to be 
associated with the apartheid state (Govender, n.d.).  NGO leaders were committed, 
altruistic and selfless at the time (Dollar, 1998).   Numerous leaders of civil society 
organisations emanated from religious communities (Camay and Gordon, 2000).   Others, 
particularly in the early 1980s, came in the form of university students and graduates 
politicised by the activities of the 1970s, and political prisoners, many of whom were 
released in the early 1980s.  These individuals came together in many ways to organise 
political activities and the community (Habib, 2003).   
 
The advent of democracy saw politically conscious individuals move from NGOs, CBOs 
and CSOs to assist with transformation in the new state (Govender, n.d.).  Strategic NGO 
leadership repositioned itself in national and provincial government, the parastatals and 
the corporate sector (Harding, 1994).   Another group of CSO leadership moved into 
local government following the 1995/6 local government elections (Camay and Gordon, 
2000).  This brain drain left a huge gap in civil society leadership, particularly in 
organisations which had been part of the mass movement against apartheid (Camay and 
Gordon, 2000).  NGO, CBO and CSO capacity weakened.   A cynical line doing the 
rounds at the time suggested that the acronym NGO stood for ‘next government official’ 
(Harding, 1994).   
 
The human resource skills capacity problem within NGOs, reports Cooper (as quoted in 
Camay and Gordon, 2000), pertains specifically to negotiation and fundraising skills.  
The skills deficit in these areas can be attributed to the legacy of apartheid where, even 
today, a large portion of the black population continues to face difficulties upgrading 
various types of skills essential in NGO management (Cooper as quoted in Camay and 
Gordon, 2000).  
 
Dollar (1998), in research conducted around NGO organisational culture, reports that 
South African NGO leaders were required to set organisational direction, lead strategic 
planning, foster staff development, engage with cultural diversity and affirmative action, 
introduce participative management structures and deal with other administrative 
functions.  While NGO leaders sought to reclaim the political space lost after 1994, it 
proved difficult to provide direction to the sector particularly around sustainability, 
building new capacity and leadership (Kraak, 2001).  A huge challenge for the NGO 
sector therefore is to rebuild leadership and its skills capacity to ensure its continued 
existence (Camay and Gordon, 2000; Kihato & Rapoo, 1999).     
 
When developing new NGO leaders, leadership styles would prove crucial.  McLaughlin 
as quoted in Dollar (1998) argues that an NGO leadership style should be situational.  
This proposed NGO leadership style, contends the author, should be guided by the 
organisation, the staff and the environment.  Harding and Meintjies as quoted in Dollar 
(1998) supports charismatic leadership the ultimate form of NGO leadership.  They 
perceive charismatic leaders as individuals able to initiate change and set organisational 
direction.  Bass (1990) contends that a charismatic leader exhibits confidence, 
dominance, a sense of purpose, and the ability to articulate goals.  The author further 
suggests that a charismatic leader is an exceptional person and highly esteemed.  Raelin 
(2003) concurs with Harding and Meintjies where he says that by definition, charismatics 
sway people and shape the future by their sheer presence and personality.  
 
2.3 SURVIVAL STRATEGIES:  NGO APPROACHES IN THE 1990s     
According to Allwood (1992) the character, objectives and modus operandi of NGOs in 
South Africa have largely been influenced by the political conditions which prevailed in 
the country in that decade (1992) and the one before. Some commentators suggest that it 
was the vitality of CSOs which enabled a peaceful transition following the mass 
organisation epoch of the eighties (Andersson, 1995).  From this statement one can derive 
that South Africa has a strong civil society, estimated at around 54 000 NGOs according 
to Harding (1994).  Camay and Gordon (2000) however quote SANGOCO’s estimate at 
around 17 000 and attribute this number to the different definitions assigned to 
organisations.  Despite these debatable figures, many different kinds of CSOs with a 
variety of roles exist (Camay and Gordon, 2000).  These organisations can be local, 
national or international.  They may have different roles and functions as the list below 
put forward by the aforementioned authors postulates: 
• Relief CSOs provide humanitarian assistance to victims of famine and other natural 
disasters as well as wars and other conflicts; 
• Welfare CSOs provide basic services (health, education, housing and so on) to 
individuals and/or communities in need; 
• Service CSOs provide training and technical assistance to other NGOs or community 
organisations; 
• Technical innovation CSOs operate their own projects to pioneer new or improved 
approaches to problems, such as appropriate technologies for fuelwood conservation; 
• Traditional community-based CSOs run as burial societies, savings groups and so on; 
• Cooperative or other non-profit but income-producing CSOs formed at the local level 
collect resources from group members to invest jointly in a specific economic 
activity. Members derive income from the organisation, but profits are reinvested in 
the organisation and/or activity; 
• Religious service CSOs created by religious organisations, sometimes at local level, 
sometimes national or international, often with an emphasis on providing welfare 
services, sometimes combined with religious preaching, sometimes provide services 
only to members of their specific religious organisation and others focus on the 
community at large; 
• Economic interest associations group people with similar economic interests such as 
ratepayers associations or professional associations such as unions, doctors, lawyers, 
farmers, traders; 
• Human rights CSOs are formed to monitor abuses of human rights, to lobby against 
such abuses, and to protect and assist the victims of abuse;  
• Civic education CSOs concentrate on public education with regard to civic rights and 
responsibilities, especially in countries which are newly democratised, and 
democratic participation 
• Community development, rural and urban based, self-help CSOs formed at the 
community level, sometimes with links to a wider association of such CSOs, are 
aimed at promoting the development of their community through service provision, 
income-generating projects, savings clubs and so on, and at the same time, with 
strengthening overall communication and collaboration within the community; 
• Advocacy CSOs often have no field projects, but form alliances with other CSOs to 
educate and lobby on specific policy issues. 
• CSO networks provide information and education services to other CSOs, including 
newsletters, training workshops, seminars on specific interest issues and so on 
(Camay and Gordon as quoted in Camay and Gordon, 2000: 101-102) 
 
The historical period in which a CSO was established, contend Kihato and Rapoo (1999) 
in a survey on civil society organisations in South Africa, had an impact on its nature, 
type, business or role as espoused by Camay and Gordon above.  South Africa’s political 
history signifies that ‘older-generation’ CSOs, for example, were established during the 
apartheid era (1948 – 1979).  These organisations pursued welfare activities and they 
represented churches and other ecclesiastical bodies, child and family welfare 
organisations, organisations dealing with disabilities, literacy associations, homes and 
support associations for the aged, women and children (Kihato and Rapoo, 1999).  The 
authors surmise that ‘new generation’ CSOs emerged during the era of intensive political 
protests/campaigns against the apartheid state during the mid-1980s, political 
transition/constitutional negotiations/pre-election era (1990 to 1994) and the immediate 
post-election era (1995 to 1997). These CSOs enjoyed the status of Section 21 companies 
or trusts obtaining funds from foreign and domestic sources in the form of consultation 
fees, service charges, tenders for contracts and private donations.   
   
Significant changes in the South African NGO sector occurred since 1994 (Smith, 2001b) 
and, according to Andersson (1995), much has been said about the potential roles of the 
NGO sector.  Professor Merlyn Mehl, chief executive officer of the Independent 
Development Trust in 1995, in a journal article in Leading Edge, put forward a few 
arguments (Mehl, 1995).  Mehl questioned: “Is there a future for South African non-
governmental organisations?”  He contends that the answer to this question at the time 
was not a resounding “yes”, despite the fact that many parliamentarians and ‘new’ 
bureaucrats at that time spent a large proportion of their working lives in the NGO sector 
when it was the only way to oppose apartheid.  Many felt that the democratically-elected 
government should provide “all” that was necessary (Mehl, 1995: 39).   Andersson 
(1995) suggests otherwise.  The author maintains that, in economic terms, it is impossible 
for the state to act alone to provide for the social well-being of the entire population. 
Large parts of South African society have systematically been impoverished over 
generations and financial resources well beyond the fiscus of the country were required to 
remedy the situation. NGOs which could provide social services suspended and diluted 
their normal activities in the months immediately following the 1994 elections 
(Andersson, 1995).  One of the factors quoted by Andersson (1995) causing NGOs to 
become preoccupied with internal problems, and therefore the suspension of their work, 
can be attributed to their lack of expertise to construct new roles and comprehensive 
strategic plans for their institutions.   A need arose to nurture and strengthen the 
competence of the non-profit sector, as most NGOs required new roles and legitimacy 
(Andersson, 1995; Smith, 2001b). 
 
Camay and Gordon (2000) hold a different view around the suspension of NGO activities 
prior to 1994.  These authors contend that, at the time of the political transition beginning 
in 1990, CSO leadership began to reassess their organisations’ mission and activities in 
the light of expected changes in the political environment. The overtly political role of 
NGOs, contends Smith (2001b), became less relevant in the post-apartheid area. A move 
from resistance to reconstruction was required (Marais as quoted in Smith, 2001b).  
Accordingly, local advice centres, for example, which provided crucial assistance to 
disadvantaged communities in dealing with oppressive laws and policies of the apartheid 
regime began to think about what kinds of assistance they might offer once those laws 
were repealed (Camay and Gordon, 2000).  Other anti-apartheid NGOs repositioned 
themselves with a complementary role to the state, in the form of undertaking policy 
formulation or service delivery functions on a contract basis to government departments 
(Habib and Taylor as quoted in Smith, 2001b).   The NGO sector aspired to 
professionalism and commercialisation and adopted a new language where concepts such 
as efficiency, strategic planning, cost-effectiveness and results-based management 
prevailed, at times to the detriment of the poor to whom services were provided 
traditionally (Du Toit, 1994; Smith, 2001b; Kihato & Rapoo, 1999).    
 
The following section will look at examples of commercialised activities undertaken by 
NGOs.  Commercialised activities undertaken by NGOs took the form of consultations, 
contracts, the selling of services and products and the introduction of user charges for 
services delivered to the poor (Smith, 2001b).  The African Centre for Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), as mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, affirms the 
notion of commercialisation of NGO activities where services offered by them were sold 
to the public and private sectors to ensure the organisation’s sustained existence (Reddy, 
2004).   
 
The Cape Town-based Social Change Assistance Trust (SCAT) involved in a range of 
grassroots development projects, funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation, expects rural communities to contribute financially towards the construction 
of capital works such as schools, clinics and roads.  These communities have to draw on 
traditional saving clubs and burial societies to raise their financial contribution (Kraak, 
2001).     
 
The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) presents an organisation which has 
been able to continually reinvent itself, as well as its relationship with government, in 
response to changes in the political opportunity structure and the strategies of foreign 
donors.  It was founded in 1986 by Alex Boraine and Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, 
members of Parliament who believed that extra-parliamentary action was needed to end 
apartheid.  It played a significant role in fostering negotiation between the white 
establishment and the ANC.  By 1991 its focus had shifted to economic justice, 
education, human rights, media and grassroots involvement.  In 1993, it concentrated its 
activities on the 1994 election, training domestic observers, party election agents and 
voter educators.    In 1994 it began reinventing itself under the new leadership of Wilmot 
James to address the challenge of making democracy work, and responding to the threat 
of financial withdrawal (Reitzes & Friedman, 2001: 16). 
 
The NGO sector changed substantially after 1994.  Donors channelled funds to the ANC 
government’s reconstruction and development programme (RDP) and a number of 
commentators suggested that the government should forge new partnerships with NGOs 
and CBOs to facilitate and assist with the implementation of this programme (Dangor, 
1994; Manley, 1994; Harding, 1994).   
 
Kraak (2001) contends that the longer-term sustainability of the non-profit sector is often 
linked to that of improving the institutional environment in which the sector operates.   
Barry Smith in an article in the Finance Week (1994) reckoned that NGOs stuck in an 
anti-apartheid struggle mode, relying more on political skills than technical ability to 
deliver services, might not survive in the new political dispensation (Smith, 1994). 
 
2.4 TRENDS AND TENDENCIES IN THE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
OF NGOs OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS 
Kihato (2001) contends that the rapid growth of civil society organisations occurred in a 
highly constrained policy and legal environment, which sought to control activities and 
funding in the sector.  Fundraising during the apartheid era, postulates Kihato (2001: 6), 
occurred within the parameters of the following pieces of legislation: 
- The Prohibition of Political Interference Act (Act 51 of 1968) which, in 1985, was 
amended to become the Prohibition of Foreign Financing of Political Parties Act, 
aimed at preventing any organisation which the Minister deemed ‘unfit’ for 
receiving foreign funding; 
- The Affected Organisations Act (Act 31 of 1974), which prevented any 
organisation involved in anti-apartheid activities from receiving funds from 
outside South Africa; 
- The Disclosure of Foreign Funding Act (Act 26 of 1989), which required that 
organisations report all funds received by the government, and 
- The Fundraising Act (Act 107 of 1978), which prevented organisations from 
receiving funds from the public, both within and outside South Africa, unless they 
had a fundraising number obtained from the government. 
 
These laws, contends Kihato (2001) were specifically constructed to contain the 
operations of the anti-apartheid organisations.  Most established South African CSOs 
were also expected to register under one of the following laws:  
- Section 21 of the Companies Act (Act 61 of 1973), provided for the incorporation 
of an association not for gain as a “company limited by guarantee”. 
- Section 13 of the National Welfare Act (Act 100 of 1978) on welfare 
organisations provides for the registration by regional welfare boards of 
fundraising organisations which were “contemplating the rendering of social 
welfare services in the region, which the said board had been established”. 
- The Trust Property Control Act (Act 57 of 1988) provided for registration as 
trusts, defined as “the arrangement through which the ownership in property of 
one person is by virtue of a trust instrument made over or bequeathed to another 
person or to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument”.  Trustees must 
use “care, diligence and skill” to manage the affairs of the trust in accordance 
with the stipulated objectives and beneficiaries.  
- The Fundraising Act (Act 107 of 1978), as described above. 
(Camay & Gordon, 2000:  88) 
 
Despite the aforementioned stringent legislation within which NGOs had to function, 
funds for carrying out CSO objectives were easily accessible as donors regarded CSOs as 
legitimate vehicles for channelling funds to apartheid victims (Kihato, 2001).  Prior to 
1994, the nature of the anti-apartheid struggle meant that many donors adopted a less- 
than-stringent attitude towards the way in which their beneficiaries accounted for and 
spent the monies they received (Habib & Taylor as quoted in Smith, 2001b).  The 
absence of sound accountability structures proved problematic as was proven when the 
Danchurch Aid, a donor organisation, took legal action against an NGO and its 
leadership, led by Allan Boesak, for the misuse and misappropriation of funds (Camay 
and Gordon, 2000).   
 
The “struggle-accounting” practices, contends Marais (as quoted in Smith, 2001a) were 
replaced by a much tighter stance on the part of donors towards financial accounting and 
programme reporting requirements for NGOs.  In this context, Smith (2001a: 27) reports 
that: 
- Donors expect more specific and qualitative feedback and planning of projects; 
- New reporting formats as a requirement for managing efficiently has been put into 
place; 
- Donors demand tighter control over financial accounts; 
- Lengthy tendering processes are attached to many internationally funded projects 
and 
- Donors request the use of particular management tools. 
The author found in research undertaken that a number of local NGOs surveyed lacked 
the necessary capacity to comply with the requirements stated above. 
 
Camay and Gordon (2000: 3- 4) argues that good governance is the key to ensuring 
effective adjustments to changing circumstances within CSOs and the environments in 
which they operate.  They assert that: 
 
Sound governance is a key determinant of effective management and 
performance.  Regular self-assessment of the organisation led by the 
board with participation from all stakeholders is an important mechanism 
to monitor both governance and performance against measurable 
indicators.  Where such assessment does not occur, management and 
governance tends to coast along, eventually resulting in crises, which 
could have been avoided.  Assessment against rules and standards 
imposed from the outside, for example, by government or by an 
appropriate umbrella organisation, is another way to measure sound 
governance. 
 
 
Governance has become an issue of worldwide importance.  The efficiency and 
accountability of organisations is a matter of public and private interest.  With a 
significant increase in the number of NGOs, funding and other collaborators have 
identified governance as a key issue in organisational effectiveness and efficiency 
(Centre for African Family Studies, 2001).  Accordingly, the next section will explore the 
role of the board of directors in NGOs governance. 
 
2.4.1 Transformation of NGOs post-election 
NGOs should take responsibility for effective, accountable and democratic internal 
governance, which will enhance its credibility, legitimacy and impact on its constituents 
(Camay and Gordon, 2000).  Governing bodies in the form of a board of directors play a 
crucial role in organisational governance as evidenced by a number of authors (Petra, 
2005; Sussland, 2005; Spanos, 2005).   
 
NGOs generally require a governing body to provide strategic direction.  Governing 
bodies are either called boards, trustees, executive committees or councils.    Governing 
bodies may have executive or advisory powers.  In some instances, boards are 
accountable to a wider constituency while, in others, accountability of the board is not 
defined.  NGOs which have a membership will conduct annual general meetings where 
representatives to the governing boards are selected.  Criteria for appointment to a board 
may range from integrity, skills, commitment, availability, personal qualities and so on.  
Legislation in some African nations governs the operation of boards (Centre for African 
Family Studies, 2001). 
 
Camay and Gordon (2002:2) concur with the above exposition of a governing board and 
put forward a formal definition.  The authors contend that a governing board is: 
 
A group of people representing the diverse interest of an organisation 
who are elected or appointed to guide and make policy for the 
organisation.  The nature of the board membership, its powers and 
terms of reference are outlined in the organisation’s constitution.    
 
 
Furthermore: 
 
The governing board is the body ultimately responsible for ensuring 
sound governance within a CSO.  It is the final decision-maker and the 
legal link between the organisation and society.  The individual 
members of a board also have a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that 
legal and financial norms are maintained and supported. 
 
In an international context, the board of directors traditionally acted as referees in private 
sector organisations.  Sussland (2005) contends that this situation has changed.   The 
author argues that today’s business requires the board of directors to assume the role of 
proactive coach where governance emphasises, firstly, procedures, telling it what to do or 
not to do. Secondly, emphasis is placed on a comprehensive process of governance that 
ensures the effectiveness of its activities and, thirdly, the application of psychology to 
understand the attitudes of the top-managers, are called for. 
 
Many boards of directors use committees to carry out their duties. In larger NGOs 
committees would deal with finances, programmes and recruitment of board members 
and specific staff positions (Centre for Family Studies, 2001). In firms, boards utilise 
audit, compensation and nominating committees to assist it in its functions (Petra, 2005).  
The board of directors in a number of instances fulfils an auditing, supervisory, coaching 
and steering role (Strebel quoted in Sussland, 2005). 
 
In Greece for example, family firms dominate the Greek capital market where a board of 
directors mostly act as a passive organ in the company where its follows the decisions of 
the management to the detriment of non-family stakeholders (Spanos, 2005).  Where 
board members are friends and family, particularly in NGOs, they cannot always act 
independently (Centre for African Family Studies, 2001). 
 
The responsibilities of a board contends Petra (2005), may include: understanding and 
approving the corporation’s long-term strategies: understanding the issues, forces and 
risks that define and drive the company’s business, and overseeing the performance of 
management.     
 
Turning to the South African NGO sector, with specific reference to the role of the board 
of directors in its activities, the Co-operative for Research and Education (CORE) in a 
countrywide survey of NGOs conducted between 1997 to 2001, probing NGO 
governance in South Africa, found that democratic internal governance within NGOs was 
not widespread (Camay and Gordon, 2004).   The survey found that whilst governing 
boards were comprised of highly skilled people with relevant technical skills and 
knowledge as well as NGO experience, many boards appeared not to have the capacity 
necessary to govern institutions which they had to serve.  Some board members had a 
legal background or fundraising skills and others had technical skills. However, in some 
cases, these skills were irrelevant in the context of the business of the specific NGO 
(Camay and Gordon, 2004).     
 
Whilst board meetings are infrequent, relatively short, and feature a compact agenda 
(Sussland, 2005), many South African NGOs complained about uneven attendance of 
board meetings and a lack of sustained board member involvement in the organisation 
(Camay and Gordon, 2004).   
 
The board is responsible for oversight of ethical and appropriate behaviour in and by the 
corporation (Petra, 2005).  Camay and Gordon (2004) concur with this characterisation 
of boards and contend that South African NGOs surveyed considered their boards to 
display independence, integrity, loyalty, maturity, a team spirit, self-reliance, principled 
behaviour based on moral and ethical values, and skills to drive the organisations to the 
achievement of its mission.   
 
A number of weaknesses exhibited by CSO governing boards in South Africa were 
recorded by Camay and Gordon (2002: 49-50).  Weaknesses are, for example: 
- Lack of commitment or interest:  Many respondents despaired of the lack of 
commitment of some individual board members, who were felt to be over-
committed to a variety of activities, uninvolved in the organisation, or to have 
other priorities. 
- Attempts to micro-manage the organisation:  This occurs particularly in the case 
of founder-members who displayed a misplaced sense of ownership. 
- Poor time management:  Board members proved unable to devote time to their 
board duties.  They regularly failed to attend meetings or were ill-prepared for 
meetings. 
- Inadequate funds and fundraising:  There was a lack of fundraising experience  
amongst the board members, staff and director. 
- Lack of capacity:  Boards displayed an insufficient understanding of CSO 
governance, had little networking capacity and its age and size at times negatively 
affected its ability to function properly. 
- Insufficient or inappropriate representation:  A diverse group of board members 
found it difficult to concur on a strategic direction.   The target population is not 
always well presented. 
- Absence of common vision:  There seem to be an inability of the board to agree 
on a common direction for the organisation due to diverse agendas, interpersonal 
rivalries, and people who are pro tradition versus new trends. 
- Inadequate attention to governance:  There is extensive reliance on the chief 
executive officer to take decisions,  the boards “rubber-stamps” those decisions. 
 
Upon seeking information pertaining to alternative governance structures for NGOs, 
CBOs or CSOs, alternatives to board of directors that is, Phiroshaw Camay in an email 
dated 24 August 2006 responded: 
 
No.  There are no such alternatives in the literature or practice.  Boards 
per se need to be independent of staff and donors and a fiduciary have 
firming responsibility to protect public interest.  Where self-governance 
takes place, corruption inevitably follows.  Where donor or corporate 
interests manage the NGO/CBO/CSO’s their own interests remain 
paramount and funding is withdrawn if the organisation falls in 
disfavour.  This is the main disadvantage of a single donor approach 
and therefore multiple donors are preferred.  Donors should never be 
allowed to serve on a Board in my opinion (Camay, 2006). 
 
In concluding this section, Camay and Gordon (2002) contend that the challenges faced 
by the South African non-governmental sector prove complicated and propose that 
suitable solutions based on South African values, goals and contexts be devised.   
   
2.5 AN OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS OF NGOs 
(1994 – 2004) 
Swilling and Russell (2002) report that the non-profit sector derives funds from a 
complex range of bodies which include private donor funding from for example 
foundations such as Ford, Mott, the Open Society, Kellogg, Mellon, Rockerfeller and 
Carnegie; private sector funding in the form of for-profit organisations engaged in 
education, arts, music, drama, environmental activities and so on; government agencies 
such as Kagiso Trust in the early 1990s and from government and international donors.   
Since 1994, a number of trends have impacted on the South African NGO sector.  The 
most significant of these can be regarded as the shift in international funding away from 
the NGO sector to the ANC government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) which had as its main tenet the eradication of the inequalities of apartheid (Smith, 
2001a; Bratton and Landsberg, 1999; Reitzes and Friedman, 2001).  According to 
Bourne and Seager (2000) the government acknowledged the need to develop, change, 
improve and synchronise policies, frameworks and institutions, while simultaneously 
accelerating and broadening service delivery.  The RDP became the framework not only 
for government policy but for the allocation of aid (Bratton and Landsberg, 1999).   
 
The switch by international donor agencies to government-to-government relations did 
not auger well for a number of NGOs.  The South African media, during 1994, ran 
numerous stories on the perceived funding crisis experienced by NGOs, CBOs, CSOs, 
and the latter’s “undefined” relationship and “fit” with the ANC government’s 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (Arcand and Somson, 1994; Smith, 1994; 
Steyn, 1994; Strachan, 1994; Louw, 1994; Sole, 1994; Manley, 1994; Dangor, 1994; 
Harding, 1994; Diphofa, 1994, Collinge, 1994; Cohen, 1994; Zille, 1994; Davie, 1994). 
 
In context of the above, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for 
example, supported bilateral funding arrangements and contended that the “new” South 
African government should take responsibility for service delivery (Bratton and 
Landsberg, 1999).  USAID, on the other hand, contended that a plural civil society, 
including policy advocacy NGOs, was vital to democracy and continued along with other 
international donors to supply funds to numerous NGOs (Bratton and Landsberg, 1999).  
A common complaint doing the rounds within the NGO sector beyond 1994 was that the 
shift in donor support caused the collapse of many NGOs (Smith, 2001b). 
 
Amner and Vergnani in 1995 wrote a special report in the Leading Edge on the findings 
of a survey conducted by the Independent Development Trust (IDT) on the financial 
situation of 128 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based 
organisations (CBOs).  The now outdated survey suggests that the 128 NGOs and CBOs 
reflected that, by June of 1995, they had a shortfall of R209, 5 million which constituted 
two-thirds of their combined 1995/6 operating budgets of R343,3 million (Amner and 
Vergnani, 1995).  It can be concluded that the NGO sector suffered a significant decline 
in donor funding since 1994 (Smith, 2001a).  Smith (2001a) set out to prove this notion 
and conducted a survey where a 105 questionnaires were sent to NGOs involved in 
development work.  These NGOs were randomly selected by means of the Prodder 
Development Directory dated 2000.  One of the objectives of the survey was to assess 
whether a decline in international funding since 1994 was indeed experienced by the 
NGO, CBO and CSO sector (Smith, 2001a).  The author found that 56% of the NGOs 
surveyed have experienced some kind of decrease in donor funding over the period 
between 1994 to 2000.   The table below, adopted from Smith (2001a: 21 – 22), provides 
an illustration. 
 
Table 1.1:  Changes in the level of international donor funding 1994 - 2000   
Trend No. of NGOs Percentage 
Decreased steadily 9 39% 
Remained constant initially but declined in the last 
two years 
3 13% 
Remained roughly constant over the whole period 3 13% 
Declined initially but increased in the last two 
years 
1 4% 
Increased steadily 1 4% 
Only recently received donor funding for the first 
time  
2 9% 
Never received donor funding/not answered 4 17% 
TOTAL 23 99%* 
*Smith (2001a: 22) contends that the above totals may not add up due to rounding off. 
 
The aforementioned table, according to Smith (2001a), reflects that the majority of 
NGOs have experienced a steady decline in donor funding since 1994.  Some have 
experienced a decline over a two-year period and others experienced an initial decline 
followed by an increase in funding. 
 
Swilling and Russell (2002) interrogated information around Overseas Development Aid 
(ODA) during the period 1994 – 1999, as reported by the International Organisation 
Development.  The authors contend that: 
- The average level of ODA from all public sector donors for the period was R3 
million per annum, or roughly 1 per cent of the annual national government 
budget; 
- Contrary to popular perception, despite a dip in 1997/98, there has not been a 
decline in ODA since 1994, and there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that a 
substantial decline is imminent; 
- Although funding for NPOs declined after 1994 to a low point in 1995 as ODA 
switched focus from civil society to government, by 1999, the levels of ODA for 
NPOs had returned to their 1994 levels; 
- Roughly 15 percent of all ODA is directed at non-profit organisations, with the 
vast bulk of this being grants as opposed to loans (Swilling and Russell, 2002:  
59). 
   
Kraak (2000) concurs with the report of the International Organisation Development 
around the lack of a decline in donor aid (as quoted in Swilling and Russell, 2002) and 
labelled the “so-called” funding crisis reported by South African NGOs  “a myth” rather 
than a reality.  He argues that funding levels in the sector remained stable and some 
NGOs have reported an increase in funding.   
 
Govender (n.d.) reports on the funding scenario for the civil society sector and intimates 
that, for the period 1994 – 1999, it was estimated that about R18 billion in international 
donations was utilised in the form of grants, concessionary loans and technical 
assistance.  The author suggests that 50% of the funding went directly to government, 
25% to parastatals, 15% to the civil society sector and 10% to others, and concludes that 
there has been a decline in funding to civil society and an increase in bilateral funding to 
the government.  Some of the aid, however, directed at government reaches civil society 
through organs such as the National Development Agency (Govender, n.d.).   
 
In the period 1992 – 94, about 1000 largely welfare organisations, mostly catering for the 
needs of white communities, were on the brink of collapse as funding normally received 
from the Department of Welfare dried up.  After 1994, ODA assistance shifted to 
disadvantaged communities (Kihato, 2001). 
 
Kihato (2001) argues that: 
 
Problems such as mismanagement of funds, poor or non-existent financial 
record-keeping, lack of strategic planning and clear and cohesive goals, and 
the migration of skilled leaders from civil society to government all contributed 
to the collapse of many CSOs.  Foreign funding in the 1980s had therefore 
served to prop up organisations which would not have survived under normal 
circumstances. 
  
The aforementioned author notes that a more stable funding environment would create a 
more effective CSO sector (Kihato, 2001). 
 
2.6 TOWARDS A NEW ROLE FOR NGOs 
Habib (2003) in his writings on the State-Civil Society Relations in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa and Swilling and Russell (2002) in their deliberations on the size and scope of the 
non-profit sector in South Africa put forward a quote by Zola Skweyiya, Cabinet 
Minister responsible for the Department of Social Development, where the latter 
contends that: 
 
The basic twin expectations of government are that NGOs will, firstly, continue 
to act as monitors of the public good and safeguard the interests of the 
disadvantaged sections of society.  The performance of this social watch role 
requires both transparency and accountability on the part of the NGOs.  The 
government’s second expectation is that NGOs will assist in expanding access 
to social and economic services that create jobs and eradicate poverty among 
the poorest of the poor.  This requires cost effective and sustainable service 
delivery. 
 
Habib (2003) articulates the notion that three distinct blocs of civil society evolved in 
post-apartheid South Africa.  The first bloc, the author maintains, comprises political 
restructuring where the formal NGOs sector saw the repeal of repressive legislation 
ensuring a more enabling environment in which organisations could operate. The second 
bloc saw transformation in the legal environment where avenues for negotiation were 
opened up between the South African government and civil society.  Fiscal reform, as a 
third bloc, saw the establishment of an enabling environment where the financial 
sustainability of NGOs could possibly be insured through the creation of institutions such 
as the National Development Agency and the Lottery Commission. He further argued 
that civil society was reconstituted in two ways.  Firstly informal, survivalist community- 
based organisations, networks and associations evolved to enable the poor and 
marginalised communities to survive the implementation of neo-liberal economic 
policies.  These organisations receive no resources from government and have no formal 
relationship with it.  Secondly, Habib (2003) claimed that civil society reconstituted itself 
in the form of formal community-based organisations with distinct leadership, 
membership and a middle class support base.  These organisations mobilised the poor and 
marginalised against the state’s neo-liberal social policies.  They have an adversarial 
relationship with government where lobbying for change in government policies through 
court action and resistance can be witnessed constantly.  It can be concluded that civil 
society enjoys two distinct relationships with the state, one which is collaborative and the 
other adversarial.  
 
Swilling and Russell (2002) argues that survivalist NPOs may well increase in the face of 
inadequate service delivery on the part of government and that development NPOs will 
expand as new resource flows kick in.  Factors that may stimulate growth in the NPO 
sector include: 
- increased access to funding if NPOs develop the capacity to take advantage of 
these opportunities; 
- the institutional importance of NPOs as partners for an increasingly constrained 
public sector; 
- the ideological importance of NPOs for a private sector keen to fund the 
prevention of a neo-Keynesian solution by building and supporting depolitised 
NPOs, and 
- the increasing reliance of poorer communities on community-based NPOs for the 
bare essentials. 
(Swilling and Russell, 2002:  95). 
 
2.6.1 New role for government 
As has already been stated, the nature of donor-CSO relations during the apartheid era 
was largely defined by the apartheid state.  At the time, the exclusionary and inhumane 
politics of the apartheid regime drew CSOs closer to donors sympathetic to the fight 
against apartheid.  The advent of democracy saw a shift in the donor-CSO relationship, 
with funders forming bi-lateral agreements with the apartheid government.  A change in 
the nature of funding to CSOs was also introduced. (Kihato, 2001; Bratton and 
Landsberg, 1999).  Bi-lateral rather than multilateral ties was the preferred kind of 
relationship the South African government sought with international donors to defer 
dependence on external resources (Bratton and Landsberg, 1999). 
 
The chief constraint to development in South Africa is a dependence on government and 
the lack of local institutions to take forward the development endeavours of communities 
(Andersson, 1995).  Despite this notion, soon after coming into power, the ANC 
government made it clear that the NGO sector was unnecessarily large, and that only 
those NGOs who were able to compete with government and the private sector would 
survive (Stober quoted in Smith, 2001b).  The roles of NGOs in the new government was 
thus questioned (Mehl, 1994).   When the funding crisis, however, gripped CSOs in the 
1990s, an alarm was raised at both governmental level and in the NGO sector which 
prompted a debate on whether government should intervene to extend a lifeline to CSOs 
heading for an early demise (Kihato, 2001). Government sought to reconstitute a 
relationship with civil society which was largely adversarial during apartheid.  
Government in essence realised that civil society could play the role of a developmental 
partner that could enhance its capacity.  It therefore saw the CSO sector as performing a 
technical and apolitical role (Kihato, 2001).  “Social watch” and “service delivery” 
contend Swiling and Russell (2002: 5) are the neatly captured twin roles for South 
African NPOs in current government policy for the sector.  To make these roles possible, 
government and leading NPOs have co-created an elaborate legal and policy framework 
that has defined a new public space for managing relations between the state and civil 
society and for funding NPOs (Swilling and Russell, 2002).  The longer term 
sustainability of the non-profit sector is intrinsically linked to the improved legislative 
framework in which the sector operates (Kraak, 2001), a notion that will be explored 
next. 
 
2.6.2 Role of the National Development Agency and new legislation 
Legislative change and restructuring in South Africa is apparent through the 
establishment of a fiscal, legal and political environment that has facilitated the 
development of a collaborative relationship between the state and NGOs.  Institutions 
like the National Development Agency (NDA) and the Lottery Commission were 
established with a mandate to fund legitimate non-profit activity (Habib, 2003).  Tax 
regulations were promulgated in 2000/2001 to grant registered CSOs tax-exemption 
status and to encourage a philanthropic culture in the country (Habib, 2003; Kihato, 
2001). Legislation such as the Non-profit Organisations Act (Act 71 of 1997), for 
example, lays out in considerable detail a framework for the creation and operation of 
civil society organisations (Camay and Gordon, 2000; Camay and Gordon, 2004). 
 
The National Development Agency 
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) identified the need for a 
framework guiding the relationship between government and CSO to facilitate the 
involvement of CSOs in development activities.  The Office of the RDP was assigned to 
identify ways in which this relationship could be consolidated and two steps were 
highlighted: 
- The establishing of an agency to respond to the immediate needs of NGOs 
involved in development, and  
- Looking at setting up a longer-term institution to co-ordinate the funding of CSOs 
and promote a sustainable partnership between government and these 
organisations. 
This led to the establishment of the Transitional National Development Trust (TNDT) in 
October 1995.  The TNDT was formally registered in April 1996.  Its original mandate 
was to alleviate the financial crisis facing many CSOs during the transitional period and 
support those organisations whose activities contributed to the objectives of RDP Policy 
(Gardner and Macanda, 2003). In 1998, the government contributed funds to the TNDT 
to distribute to CSOs. R54 million were transferred to the TNDT for disbursement to the 
National Development Agency, once the latter became a permanent mechanism for 
government support to CSOs (Camay and Gordon, 2000). The two-year lifespan of the 
TNDT would end in October 1998.  
 
The establishment of the National Development Agency (NDA) can be linked to a report 
entitled Structural Relations Between Government and Civil Society Organisations, 
which was presented to the Office of the Deputy President in February 1997.  The 
advisory committee recommended that: 
- a statutory body dedicated to grant-making, called the National Development 
Agency (NDA), be established; 
- the Independent Development Trust be reconstituted to work in a facilitation role 
with government; 
- a significant lead-time be given to the establishment of the NDA to facilitate its 
enactment and its institutional and infrastructural development; 
- all systems should be in place for the NDA before it opened its doors to the 
public; 
- the Board and Executive Officer should be appointed by the end of January 1998, 
and  
- the institution should be in place by the end of July 1998. 
 
The NDA Bill’s broad objectives were to contribute to the eradication of poverty and its 
causes by granting funds, promoting debate and dialogue and undertaking research that 
would provide the basis for development policy.  The National Assembly finally passed 
the NDA Bill on 9 November 1998. The process of transition from the TNDT effectively 
started in September 1999 and was completed in April 2000.  The Ministry of Social 
Development took responsibility for the NDAs administration and power function 
(Gardner and Macanda, 2003; National Development Agency, 2003; Camay and Gordon, 
2004) 
 
National Lottery 
The National Lotteries Board was established as a statutory body in terms of the Lotteries 
Act (Act No 57 of 1997).  The board is accountable to Parliament.  The proceeds of the 
National Lottery are split, with approximately 50% going to prize money and 28% going 
to a distribution agency.  The board is responsible for the administration of the National 
Lottery Distribution Trust Fund whose funds will be divided between three sectors 
namely:  one charities (welfare organisations); two, art, culture and national heritage and 
three, sport and recreation.  These three categories each qualify for a minimum of 10% of 
the funds in the Distribution Trust Fund, and a fourth category of “miscellaneous” 
qualifies for a maximum of 5%.  Three distributing agencies, with members nominated 
by the public, oversee the actual adjudication of funding applications.  The National 
Lottery, however, have been plagued by accusations of delays in the selection of 
beneficiaries and subsequent pay-outs (Camay and Gordon, 2000; Camay and Gordon, 
2004). 
 
Tax regime 
As alluded to earlier, following the financial crisis that engulfed civil society after 1994, 
the government was intensively lobbied to amend the income tax laws in respect of non-
profit organisations and some changes have eventually been introduced.  Until February 
2000, companies could only make tax-deductible donations to formal, educational 
institutions and a narrow band of charities such as orphanages (Kraak, 2001).  The Katz 
Commission went on to recommend tax relief for NGOs.  Government thus realised the 
importance of creating an enabling environment in which NGOs could operate.  The 
Income Tax Act (Act 58 of 1962) was amended.  NGOs engaged in a number of public 
benefit activities, loosely defined as organisations carrying out activities of a 
philanthropic and benevolent nature, which would be eligible for tax relief at the 
discretion of the Minister of Finance in consultation with the South African Revenue 
Service (Kihato, 2001; Kraak, 2001; Camay and Gordon, 2000; Camay and Gordon, 
2004). 
 
The Non-profit Organisations Act (Act 71 of 1997) 
The creation of a legal framework for civil society organisations serves two purposes: 
- it enables civil society organisations to establish themselves as legal structures, 
and 
- it regulates the way in which such legal structures operate (Honey, n.d.) 
 
The Non-profit Organisations Act (Act 71 of 1997) repeals the Fund-Raising Act (Act 43 
of 1978) (with the exemption of its chapter 2 which deals with disaster and relief funds).  
The Fund-Raising Act was able to be misused by the apartheid government to control the 
fundraising endeavours of civil society organisations and often to close them down.  The 
NPO Act is the result of a lengthy policy and legal reform process in which civil society 
organisations and the state negotiated and made compromises.  It came into operation on 
1 September 1998 (Honey, n.d.). 
 
The key elements of the NPO Act are: 
a) Definition of an NPO 
The Act defines an NPO as a trust, company or other association of persons 
(i) established for public purpose; and 
(ii) the income and property of which are not distributable to its members or 
office-bearers except as reasonable compensation for services rendered 
(Section 1 (x)). 
 
 
b) The objectives of the Act 
The Act states that its objectives are to encourage and support non-profit 
organisations in their contribution to meeting the diverse needs of the 
population of the Republic by: 
(i) creating an environment in which non-profit organisations can 
flourish; 
(ii) establishing an administrative and regulatory framework within which 
non-profit organisations can conduct their affairs; 
(iii) encouraging non-profit organisations to maintain adequate standards 
of governance, transparency and accountability and to improve those 
standards; 
(iv) creating an environment within which the public may have access to 
information concerning registered non-profit organisations, and 
(v) promoting a spirit of co-operation and shared responsibility within 
government donors and amongst other interested persons in their 
dealings with non-profit organisations (Section 2). 
The above objectives would be met by creating a voluntary registration 
facility for NPOs. 
 
c) The state’s responsibility to NPOs 
Within the limits of the law, government departments should co-ordinate and 
implement their policies in a way that assists NPOs to carry out their work.  
The Act provided for the establishment of a Directorate for Non-Profit  
Organisations within the national Department of Welfare (Camay and 
Gordon, 2000; Honey, n.d.; Department of Social Development, 2001; Camay 
and Gordon, 2004). 
 
Codes of Good Practice for South African Non-profit Organisations 
The Department of Social Development has developed codes of good practice for South 
African NPOs in keeping with the requirements of the Non-profit Organisations Act of 
1997, after consultation with a representative number of non-profit organisations 
throughout South Africa.  The codes’ particular focus is on governance, administration, 
fundraising and the donor community.  It is hoped that by setting guidelines in place, 
each organisation that registers under the Non-profit Organisations Act will accept these 
guidelines and use them to their advantage and to the advancement of the South African 
non-profit sector (Department of Social Development, 2001). 
 
The Code of Good Practice focuses on three areas, namely: 
- Section A:  Non-profit organisations (NPO) leadership and management 
- Section B:  Non-profit organisation Fundraising and Resource Mobilisation 
- Section C:  Roles and responsibilities of Donors and Sponsors. 
(Department of Social Development, 2001). 
 
In concluding this section it is important to note that an organised, vibrant civil society is 
essential for participatory democracy and development.  It is important that everyone 
involved in the building and strengthening of NPOs understand the legal framework that 
apply to NPOs and that roleplayers within the NGO sector will be able to choose the 
appropriate legal structure applicable to their particular NPO (Honey, n.d.). 
 
2.6.3 New partnerships  
The demise of apartheid brought about a general perception that after 1994 government, 
would build strong partnerships with non-profit organisations in key areas of delivery 
(Kraak, 2001; Kihato, 2001).  Bourne and Seager (2000) concur with this notion and 
contend that it is crucial for governments to form partnership with NGOs in order to 
reach their constituencies effectively.  They maintain that a critical choice is necessary in 
governments reaching mutual consensus with NGOs through which issues, usually at 
grassroots level, can be addressed.  The alternative, which happens all too often, the 
authors suggests, is that governments fail to deliver to the poor, abdicate their 
responsibility and leave NGOs to fill in the gaps. 
 
MacRobert (1992) noted that there must be symbiosis or partnerships between the 
government, the corporate sector, and the NGOs.  The author suggests that it is 
impossible for NGOs to relieve all the needs of the disadvantaged people in South Africa 
and purports that government, donor agencies, the corporate world and other specialists 
needs to come on board with advice and assistance at the coalface.  For the potential 
symbiotic relationship to be effective in social service delivery, Mehl (1995) proposed 
that powerful provincial sub-structures be put in place which in turn, will depend on 
powerful local structures where all spheres of government interact with NGOs and CBOs 
to deliver the needs of the Reconstruction and Development Programme.  Mehl (1995: 
40) contends that this would lead to: 
- a democratisation of the processes of policy formulation and delivery 
mechanisms; 
- a far wider range of input than if government alone were charged with it; 
- a sharing of the fruits of success; 
- a joint responsibility for failing; 
- far more effective processes of monitoring and evaluation, and 
- the reality of supportive government, sharing with and being supported by its 
subjects. 
In the context of the RDP, the expectations on the part of NGOs to form partnerships 
with government were not unrealistic given the tenets of the government’s development 
programme.  Donor agencies redirected overseas development aid from the non-profit 
sector to government departments.  A proportion of this aid was designated for public-
private partnerships with NPOs and business (Kraak, 2001). 
 
Despite the scope for partnerships within the new policy framework, the incapacity of the 
public service, especially at provincial and local levels, implied that government 
consistently underspent and funds were rolled over from one financial year to the next.  
(Kraak, 2001).  A 1998 study by the Transitional National Development Trust, as quoted 
in Kraak (2001), highlighted other obstacles in the way of partnerships: 
- attitudinal and bureaucratic obstacles, manifested through distrust of NPOs by 
government bureaucrats; 
- institutional lack of clarity – failure of government, in the wake of the RDP’s 
demise, to formulate a coherent policy approach for NPOs; 
- institutional capacity constraints – lack of capacity in either NPOs or government 
departments to manage complex partnership arrangements, and 
- legal obstacles – legal constraints inherited from the apartheid era which hamper 
government, especially at provincial and local levels, and complicate development 
projects. 
 
Accordingly many Northern donors were prompted again to increase the level of funding 
to NPOs after 1997 (Kraak, 2001). The author also reports that NPOs found themselves 
increasingly at odds with government’s failure to deliver because of its continued 
adherence to the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy with its 
emphasis on the market and private investment.  
 
Nonetheless, the nature and the relationship between the state and NGOs according to 
Fowler, as quoted in Motala and Husy (2001), influence the manner in which support is 
provided.  A collaborative relationship was likely where the state and NGOs shared 
similar goals and strategies; if the state and NGOs shared goals but not the strategies to 
achieve them, then a complementary relationship was more likely to succeed. (Fowler 
quoted in Motala and Husy, 2001).  In a collaborative relationship, for example, NGOs 
seek support via grants and structural subsidies where the secondment of staff to non-
state schools or clinics are the order of the day and where the payment of welfare 
organisations for services rendered on behalf of the Department of Social Development 
would be commonplace (Motala and Husy, 2001).  In this context, NGOs engage in 
government-designed programmes and act as extensions of government line departments 
(Andersson, 1995). 
 
Swilling and Russell (2002) maintain that the role of local government will grow in 
importance over the next few years with profound implications for all dimensions of 
NPO activity.  Trends towards innovative local pacts, put together by small but powerful 
groups of visionary and creative leaders spanning local governments, NPOs and local 
businesses, will strengthen (Swilling and Russell, 2002). 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of the historical and 
contemporary trends and tendencies of governance and financial arrangement of South 
African NGOs over the last ten years.  In particular, attention was paid to NGOs 
functioning in a new dispensation where the demise of apartheid brought about 
fundamental changes in the form and function of the state which entailed the 
restructuring of cooperative governance within the different spheres of government and 
civil society.   
 
Survival strategies employed by NGOs beyond 1990 were explored where NGOs had to 
redefine their roles in relation to the delivery of services and to the state. The South 
African government realised that civil society can play the role of a developmental 
partner, assuming a technical and apolitical role, which in turn enhances the state’s 
service delivery capacity. In terms of funding strategies, it came to light that CSOs which 
emerged between 1990 and 1997 enjoyed the status of Section 21 companies or trusts and 
obtained funds from foreign and domestic sources in the form of consultation fees, 
service charges, tenders for contracts and private donations. Commercialised activities 
undertaken by NGOs took the form of consultations, contracts, the selling of services and 
products, and the introduction of user charges for services delivered to the poor.  Certain 
NGOs continually reinvented themselves as well as their relationship to government in 
response to changes in the political environment and the strategies of foreign donors.  
The long-term sustainability of NGOs appeared to be linked to that of improving the 
institutional environment in which the sector functions.  As donors took a much sterner 
stance towards financial accounting and programme reporting requirements for NGOs, 
the NGO sector adopted terms such as professionalism and commercialisation where 
concepts such as efficiency, strategic planning, cost-effectiveness and results-based 
management were embraced.   In addition to funding from international sources, the 
South African government established the National Development Agency and the Lottery 
Commission with the explicit mandate to fund legitimate non-profit activity. 
 
The chapter further explored the policy and legal environment in which NGOs operate.  
Here particular attention was paid to internal governance structures such as NGO 
governing bodies.  Sussland (2005) maintained that, in today’s economic environment, 
governing boards assume the role of proactive coach, where governance emphasises 
procedures.  Secondly, the board emphasises the process of governance and, thirdly, the 
board applies psychology to understand the attitudes of top-management.  Sound 
governance was mooted as a key determinant of effective management and performance.  
Regular self-assessment of the organisation led by the governing board against 
measurable specified criteria proved an important mechanism to measure sound 
governance.  One commentator, Camay (2006), indicated that a governing board is the 
only feasible governance structure for NGOs.   
 
Valuable historical and contemporary theoretical expositions of NGO experiences, as 
lessons for governance and funding arrangements for current South African NGOs, have 
been gleaned from this chapter.   
 
The next chapter will provide a theoretical overview of governance arrangements, 
sustainability and funding mobilisation and financial management arrangements within 
an international context.  
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY OF 
NGOs 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa’s transition to democracy has been a journey of almost mythical proportions 
(Calland, 1997).  Its adoption of a new Constitution in 1996 proved the prime symbol of 
its democracy (Camay and Gordon, 2004).  Citizens, CSOs and the for-profit sector 
became stakeholders with government in governance (Camay and Gordon, 2000).  In 
particular, civil society organisations, as occupants of the space between the individual 
and government, were now expected to keep a watching brief on maintaining and 
advancing the principles enshrined in the South African Constitution (Camay and 
Gordon, 2004).     
 
Around the world, citizens no longer accept the notion that governing societies is the sole 
responsibility of governments.  More and more discussions centre around co-governance 
where governance refers to a partnership venture between elected officials and the 
organisations and institutions formed by citizens acting in the interest of the public 
(Naidoo, 2004). 
 
In many ways, governance has always been a key development issue.  Various sectors of 
society, including multilateral and bilateral aid agencies call for governance and 
institutional reforms so that sustainable human development can be achieved. (Aldaba, 
2002).  Improving a country’s governance has to link with improving accountability and 
transparency (Van der Walt, 2004).  In the South African context, as numerous CSOs 
declared their commitment to the building of effective democracy and broad participation 
in South Africa’s social, economic and political endeavours, it became important for 
these organisations to govern themselves in a way which took responsibility for effective, 
accountable and democratic internal governance as this would indicate their commitment 
towards strengthening their credibility, legitimacy and impact as individual CSOs and as 
a sector (Camay and Gordon, 2004). 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical overview of governance and 
sustainability arrangements.  In particular, an overview of theories and paradigms which 
regulate the governance of international institutions and  NGOs will be provided.   
 
3.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT GOVERNANCE 
This section explores how the concept “governance” is conceptualised and defined. This 
task requires recognition, first, that “governance” has gained popularity at both practical 
and theoretical levels, and that different meanings have been attributed to the concept by 
different people (Hyden and Court, 2002).  These different interpretations, according to 
Hyden and Court (2002) have developed along two separate lines: The first views 
governance as being concerned with the rules of conducting public affairs;  the second  
views the concept as a mechanism which steers or controls public affairs. 
 
Olowu (2002: 1) contends that governance has become an important issue in 
development policy discourse and social science research in the last two decades.  Whilst 
a multiplicity of definitions around the concept of governance prevails, the most popular 
definition, maintains the author, is used by the World Bank and most other United 
Nations institutions where governance is defined as:  “the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social development” (United 
Nations Development Programme as quoted in Olowu, 2002).  In their conceptions of 
governance, leadership as a key factor is consistently emphasised by the aforementioned 
multilateral institutions  (Olowu, 2002).   
 
A second approach to defining governance focuses on sharing authority for public 
management between state and non-state organisations.  A third approach to defining the 
concept is where it is perceived as a generic term that can be applied to all forms of 
human organisations be it economic, cultural, religious, military or NGOs (Olowu, 2002). 
 
In the context of the above deliberations, the next section will provide a broader overview 
of the concept of governance where literature pertaining to constructs such as cooperative 
governance and corporate governance will be explored. 
3.2.1 Governance 
Many different meanings, as alluded to earlier, have been accorded to the concept 
“governance”. The English word “governance”, according to Wyatt (2004), comes from 
the Latin word meaning “to steer, guide or direct”.  The term, the author contends, 
generally refers to the way in which power is assumed, conveyed, and exercised within a 
society or an organisation.   
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggests that “governance” as a generally used 
term encompasses all aspects of the way a country, corporation, or other entity is 
governed (International Monetary Fund, 2003).  Governance by the state for example is 
defined, according to Camay and Gordon (2004:  13), as the manner, method or system of 
governing in a society.  It refers to the structure and assignment of offices and their 
respective areas of responsibility and authority, and how they relate to each other and to 
the governed.  It also relates to the accountability that needs to be exercised, especially of 
the state or government to the governed.  In a similar vein, the UNDP (1997) defines 
governance broadly as “an exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to 
manage a nation’s affairs”. 
 
In terms of the public sector, Van der Walt (2004: 3) applies the following definition for 
“governance”.  Governance, contends the author, is the acquisition and accountability for 
the application of political authority to the direction of public affairs and the management 
of public resources.  Governance is further concerned with the management of the 
development process, involving both the public and the private sector, as well as the rules 
and institutions that create the framework for the conduct of both public and private 
business, including accountability for economic and financial performance, and 
regulatory frameworks relating to companies, corporations and partnerships (Van der 
Walt, 2004). 
 
Another definition for governance put forward by Du Toit, Knipe, Van Niekerk, Van der 
Walt and Doyle (2002: 64) implies that governance pertains to the actions undertaken to 
improve the general welfare of a society by means of the services delivered.  It can 
further be defined as the connections and interactions between national, provincial and 
local authorities and the public they serve. 
 
Internal governance of civil society organisations (CSOs) on the other hand, contend 
Camay and Gordon (2004), refers to the relationship between stakeholders in an 
organisation and the arrangements arrived at to make the necessary decisions.  It involves 
the arrangements of the structure of the organisation and the inter-relationships within 
that structure as well as the structure’s external relationship to various stakeholders, for 
example, communities, beneficiaries and government (Camay & Gordon, 2004: 13). 
 
It becomes apparent that the concept “governance”, irrespective of the institutional 
context, implies to “steer, direct or guide”. The next section will deconstruct the concept 
“cooperative governance”. 
 
3.2.2 Cooperative governance 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act (Act 108 of 1996) was the 
culmination of multiparty negotiations which commenced in the 1990s.  It laid the 
constitutional framework for the ushering in of inter alia, human rights, democracy, 
peaceful coexistence and development opportunities for all citizenry.  It provides for the 
notion of a single government that seeks to promote good governance and the assurance 
of a better quality of life and common citizenship through cooperation (Reddy, 2001). 
 
Cooperative governance constitutes the basic framework of the devolved system of 
government.  It is based on the premise that the three spheres of government namely 
national, provincial and local, cooperating or acting in harmony with each other, are more 
likely to address challenges than if they were to act separately or in competition (Reddy, 
2001). 
 
Chapter three of the Constitution spells out the parameters for the promotion of 
cooperative governance and emphasises the fact that the three categories of government 
have distinct powers and responsibilities (Levy and Tapscott, 2001; Du Plessis, 2004; 
Reddy, 2001).  It specifies that the three spheres are distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996; Du Plessis, 
2004; Reddy, 2001).  These three key considerations constitute an integral part of the 
decentralised South African state (Reddy, 2001). Levy as quoted in Powell (2001) 
provides working definitions for the aforementioned concepts where “distinctive” 
according to the author implies that one sphere of government can be distinguished from 
the other in terms of legislative and executive competencies.  It is assumed that the 
respective sphere of government can best serve public issues.  The second concept 
“interdependent” refers to the interdependence of one sphere of government on another to 
fulfil its constitutional obligations.  Local and provincial governments depend on national 
and provincial government respectively to undertake their functions.  National and 
provincial government has the responsibility of oversight, empowerment and intervention 
in the dependent sphere (Levy as quoted in Powell, 2001).  The third concept 
“interrelated” refers to the duty of each sphere to cooperate with one another in mutual 
trust and good faith for the greater wellbeing of the entire country.  Here a duty is 
imposed on each sphere to avoid litigation against another sphere (Levy as quoted in 
Powell, 2001; Levy and Tapscott, 2001; Reddy, 2001). 
 
In the above context, Reddy (2001) suggests that it is generally accepted that cooperative 
governance is founded on a devolved system of government and that the three spheres 
and stakeholders working harmoniously together are more likely to address challenges 
than if they were acting on their own or alternatively in competition with one another. 
 
The Constitution prescribes a set of principles for cooperative government and 
intergovernmental relations where all spheres of government and all organs of the state 
within each sphere must: 
- preserve the peace, the national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic;  
- secure the wellbeing of the people of the Republic; 
- provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the 
Republic as a whole; 
- be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic and its people; 
- respect the constitutional status, institutions and powers and functions of 
government in the other spheres; 
- not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of 
the Constitution; 
- exercise their powers and functions in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another 
sphere; 
- cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by: 
• fostering friendly relations; 
• assisting and supporting one another; 
• informing one another of, and consulting with one another on matters 
of common interest; 
• coordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
• adhering to agreed procedures, and 
• avoiding legal proceedings against one another. 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996). 
 
Intergovernmental relations as an evolving system of institutional cooperation extend 
beyond the traditional relations between central, provincial and local government.  It 
should include relations with the private sector, labour, NGOs, political parties, 
parastatals and the impact of internationalisation and globalisation (Reddy, 2001). 
 
The Constitution refers to the establishment of structures and institutions for the 
promotion and facilitation of intergovernmental relations (South Africa, 1996).  In this 
regard the Chief Directorate Co-operative Governance and Provincial Affairs endeavours 
to enhance cooperative governance.  It comprises of three directorates namely: 
- Provincial Government 
- Boundary Disputes, and  
- Intergovernmental Relations 
The work of this division is focused mainly on establishing and upholding systems of 
mutual cooperation among all spheres of government.  This involves supporting 
provincial government in its efforts to achieve effective constitutional governance, and 
promoting the principles and practices of multilateral cooperation, including 
intergovernmental relations and cooperative governance (Chief Directorate:  Co-
operative Governance and Provincial Affairs, 2005). 
 
Cooperative governance is a unique governance model which embodies the best ideals of 
the new democracy (Cloete, Kulati, Moja & Olivier, 2003).  Within South African higher 
education institutions, for example, cooperative governance starts from the premise that 
no single stakeholder can take sole responsibility for determining an institutional 
transformation agenda.  In order for cooperative governance to work, higher education 
institutions must create structures and conditions that will enable the differences between 
stakeholders to be negotiated in participatory and transparent ways (The White Paper on 
higher education transformation, 1997 as quoted in Cloete, et al., 2003). 
 
Whilst cooperative governance is a constitutional imperative it needs to be moved beyond 
principles into reality if South Africa’s urgent development imperatives are to be met 
within a realistic timeframe (MacKay and Ashton as quoted in Du Plessis, 2004). 
 
3.2.3 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance, a term that scarcely existed before the 1990’s, is now universally 
invoked wherever business and finance are discussed.  The term corporate governance 
carry different interpretations and its analysis involves diverse disciplines and approaches 
(Keasey, Thompson & Wright, 2005).  Sir Adrian Cadbury in his analysis of corporate 
governance contends that the concept is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals.  The aim, 
Cadbury contends, is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society (King Report, 2002).  Mervyn King, on the other hand, 
describes corporate governance as simply the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled (King as quoted in Wixley and Everingham, 2005).  Wixley and 
Everingham (2005) expand on this notion and suggest that corporate governance more 
specifically is concerned with the structures and processes associated with management, 
decision-making and control in organisations. 
 
The modern process of corporate governance reforms started in the United Kingdom with 
the establishment of the Cadbury Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance in 1991.  This committee was established in response to three areas of 
concern.  Firstly, anxieties were expressed over the use of “creative accounting” devices 
(Whittington quoted in Keasey, Thompson and Wright, 2005; Wixley and Everingham, 
2005).  Secondly, concerns over a number of corporate failures attributed to concealed 
financial weaknesses by high-profile, domineering CEOs were raised.  The rapid growth 
in executive remuneration which was not linked to the organisation’s performances, was 
highlighted as a third concern (Keasey and Wright as quoted in Keasey et al. 2005; 
Wixley and Everingham, 2005).  It was the Cadbury Report, which appeared in the 
United Kingdom in 1992, that gave rise to improved standards of corporate governance in 
the United Kingdom particularly (Wixley and Everingham, 2005). 
 
South Africa too had a number of corporate failures in the early 1990s.  Corporate 
scandals fuelled by devious and secretive business practices had their roots in the 
apartheid era when the country was ostracised by the international community (Wixley 
and Everingham, 2005; Keasey et.al, 2005).  The King Committee on Corporate 
Governance was formed in 1992 under the auspices of the Institute of Directors to 
consider corporate governance, of increasing importance around the world and in South 
Africa.  This concurred with social and political transformation in the country and its 
readmission into the community of nations and the world economy.  The King 
Committee, in 1994, successfully formalised the need for companies to recognise that 
they no longer act independently from the societies and the environment in which they 
operate (King Report, 2002). 
  
The main components of corporate governance involve direction, executive action, 
supervision, and accountability of the enterprise concerned.  The first recommendation of 
the King Report of 2002 is that the board must give strategic direction to the company 
(Wixley and Everingham, 2005).  In line with the aforementioned notion, Chris van 
Melle Kamp, a partner in the employment agency Spencer Stuart, maintains non-profit 
organisations are taking a much more disciplined approach to how they structure and run 
their boards as the spotlight on corporate governance begins to permeate the non-profit 
sector (Management Today, 2005). 
 
3.2.4 Other facets of governance 
James Wolfensohn in an address to the Board of Governors of the World Bank Group in 
September 1999 maintained that if countries do not have good governance or tackle 
corruption or have an adequate legal system which does not protect human rights, 
property rights and contracts, the development of such countries would be fundamentally 
flawed.  Weak governance is increasingly seen to be at the core of economic 
development challenges where misguided resource allocation, excessive government 
intervention and arbitrariness and corruption have deterred private sector investment and 
slowed growth and poverty-reduction efforts in a number of settings (World Bank, 2000).  
The IMF concurs with the World Bank on the notion of poor governance and contends 
that, where there is poor governance, there are greater incentives and more scope for 
corruption (International Monetary Fund, 2003). 
 
Whilst the foregoing sections explored various definitions of the concept “governance”, 
this section will pay attention to other facets of governance, in particular the concept 
“good governance”. 
 
The terms ‘governance’ and “good governance” are being used with growing regularity 
in development and public management literature.  “Bad” or “poor” governance is 
increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of evil in societies worldwide.  
Increasingly, major donors and international financial institutions are basing their aid and 
loans on the condition that reforms be undertaken to ensure “good governance” (Van der 
Walt, 2004). 
 
Camay and Gordon (2004) prefers to use the terms “sound governance” instead of “poor 
governance” and maintain that “sound governance” is participatory, transparent and 
accountable where the implementation of government policy will succeed if affected 
citizens and CSOs are directly involved in the entire process.  Citizens, CSOs and the for-
profit private sector are stakeholders with government in governance, the authors contend 
(Camay & Gordon, 2004). 
 
Good governance according to Van der Walt (2004) has eight major characteristics, 
namely: 
a) Participation 
Participation by citizens is a key cornerstone of good governance.  Participation could 
either be direct or through legitimate intermediary institutions or representatives.  
Participation needs to be informed and organised which implies freedom of association 
and expression on the one hand and an organised civil society on the other (Van der Walt, 
2004). 
 
b) Rule of law 
Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially.  Impartial 
enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible 
police force (Van der Walt, 2004). 
 
c) Transparency 
Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that 
follows rules and regulations. Information should be freely available and directly 
accessible in a form of media that is easily understandable (Van der Walt, 2004). 
 
d) Responsiveness  
Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders 
within a reasonable timeframe (Van der Walt, 2004). 
 
 
e) Consensus oriented 
There are many actors and several viewpoints in a given society.  Good governance 
requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in 
society on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be 
achieved.  It also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for 
sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development.  
Understanding the historical, cultural and social context of a given society proves 
paramount (Van der Walt, 2004). 
 
f) Equity and inclusiveness 
A society’s well-being depends on ensuring that all its members feel part of the 
mainstream of society.  A key responsibility of government is to ensure that the benefits 
of economic growth are equitably distributed across society.  Taxation and expenditure 
measures are prominent instruments for this purpose (Van der Walt, 2004). 
 
g) Effectiveness and efficiency 
Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the 
needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal.  The concept of 
efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural 
resources and the protection of the environment (Van der Walt, 2004). 
 
h) Accountability 
Accountability is a key requirement of good governance.  Not only governmental 
institutions but also the private sector and civil society organisations must be accountable 
to the public and to their institutional stakeholders.  In general an organisation or an 
institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decision or actions.  
Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law (Van der 
Walt, 2004). 
 
The contribution that the IMF can make to good governance (including the avoidance of 
corrupt practices) through its policy advice and, where relevant, technical assistance, 
manifests itself principally in two spheres: 
- Improvement of the management of public resources through reforms 
covering public sector institutions, for example, the treasury, central bank, 
public enterprises, civil service, and the official statistics function, including 
administrative procedures, for example, expenditure control, budget 
management and revenue collection. 
- Support for the development and maintenance of a transparent and stable 
economic and regulatory environment conducive to efficient private sector 
activities, for example:  price systems, exchange and trade regimes, and 
banking systems and their related regulations. 
(International Monetary Fund, 2003) 
 
The World Bank’s interest in governance stems from its concern about the effectiveness 
of the development efforts it supports.  Its emphasis in recent years has shifted from its 
own interventions to the overall country context, that is, the governance climate within 
which those interventions take place.  It has been guided by the nature of the operations 
and the opportunities for action that these offer.  Key dimensions of governance 
identified by the World Bank are: 
- public sector management; 
- accountability; 
- legal framework for development, and 
- transparency and information. 
(Van der Walt, 2004) 
 
The World Bank prefers to draw a distinction between elements of good governance and 
the specific areas of action, for example:  public sector management in which such 
elements could be promoted or their existence enhanced.  Accordingly, four basic 
elements of good governance were identified namely:  accountability, participation, 
predictability and transparency (Van der Walt, 2004). 
a) Accountability 
Accountability is imperative if public officials are to be made answerable for government 
behaviour and responsive to the entity from which they derive their authority.  
Accountability means establishing criteria to measure the performance of public officials, 
as well as oversight mechanisms to ensure that the standards are met.  Lack of 
accountability tends to reduce the state’s credibility as an economic partner.  Economic 
accountability relates to the effectiveness of policy formulation and implementation, and 
efficiency in resource use.  Financial accountability covers accounting systems for 
expenditure control, and internal and external audits (The World Bank, 2000; Van der 
Walt, 2004; UNDP, 1997).  Accountability on the part of NGOs implies the 
demonstration of the effective and efficient use of resources. An accountable NGO is 
transparent, readily opening its accounts to donors and beneficiaries for scrutiny (Waytt, 
2004).  
 
b) Participation 
People are at the heart of development.  They act through groups or associations such as 
trade unions, chamber of commerce, NGOs, political parties and as individuals through 
writing letters to newspaper editors, voting in an election and so on.  Accordingly they 
must have access to representative democracies, which promote development (The World 
Bank, 2000; Van der Walt, 2004; UNDP, 1997).   
 
c) Predictability 
According to the World Bank, predictability refers to the existence of laws, regulations 
and policies to regulate society and their fair and consistent application.  Without 
predictability, the orderly existence of citizens and institutions would be compromised.  
The rule of law encompasses well-defined rights and duties, as well as mechanisms for 
enforcing these and for the impartial settling of disputes.  It requires the state and its 
subsidiary agencies to be as much bound by and answerable to the legal system as are 
private individuals and enterprises (Van der Walt, 2004). 
 
 
d) Transparency 
Transparency refers to the availability of information to the general public and clarity 
about government rules, regulations and decisions.  It both complements and reinforces 
predictability.  It may be used to strengthen the citizens’ right to information with a 
degree of legal enforceability.   Transparency in government decision-making and public 
policy implementation reduces uncertainty and can help inhibit corruption among public 
officials.  A major development in good governance internationally has been 
governments’ commitment to making public important information about the outcomes 
of policy especially fiscal, economic and business policies (The World Bank, 2000; Van 
der Walt, 2004; UNDP, 1997). 
 
The four elements of governance holds, Van der Walt (2004), tend to be mutually 
supportive and reinforcing.  Accountability, he argues, is often related to participation 
and is also the ultimate safeguard of predictability and transparency. 
 
In the context of the NGO sector, NGOs have the responsibility to think about 
governance practices.  Good governance established at the outset encourages 
organisational stability and balanced decision-making (Wyatt, 2004). 
 
3.3 GOVERNANCE:  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND 
NGOs 
Governance includes the state, but transcends it by taking cognisance of the private sector 
and civil society.  Good governance entails constructive interactions among all three 
sectors (UNDP, 1997). 
 
Civil society organisations may provide checks on government power.  In doing so, they 
may contribute to better governance by enhancing the accountability and transparency of 
the political system.  The CSOs may also contribute to policy formulations, safeguard 
rights, articulate interests, and deliver social services.  Such action may enhance 
efficiency and participation in public affairs and strengthen the rule of law, all tenets of 
good governance (UNDP, 2003).  Conversely, governments can impact NGOs by 
creating an enabling environment in which they can function (Clark, 1993).  Such 
enabling environment, suggests Clark (1993), would include the following best practice 
lessons:  
- Nature and quality of governance (Good governance includes  social policies 
which encourage a healthy civil society and public accountability of state 
institutions); 
- The legal framework (registration, reporting requirements, sound management 
discipline, eliminating restrictive laws and procedures, and so on); 
- Taxation policies; 
- Collaboration with NGOs; 
- Public consultation and information (policy impact of NGOs); 
- Coordination (role of governments in coordinating NGO activities); and 
- Official support (government funding, official contracts). 
All the above areas, Clark (1993) cautions, have the potential for conflict, be it conflict 
between NGOs and the government, or between different NGOs and even within an 
individual NGO. 
 
The influence of NGOs on political, economic or social endeavours in a particular 
country are determined in many instances by the relationship between the NGO sector 
and the state. General trends in the Asia-Pacific region, for example, in terms of 
government views and treatment of the non-profit sector are put forward by the Asia 
Pacific Philanthropy Consortium (2003).  Both positive and negative trends are quoted.  
Among the positive trends are: 
- increased opportunities for NGOs to be represented in the different 
government bodies, impacting on government decision-making processes; 
- collaborative partnerships between government and developmental NGOs; 
- self-regulation among NGOs and preference for less regulation, and  
- collaboration and alliance among NGOs that strengthen its ability to deal with 
government in advocating their causes. 
(Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, 2003). 
 
Some of the negative trends quoted include: 
- increased government control over the NGO sector, attributed to the sector’s 
lack of sufficient accountability and performance management control 
mechanisms and 
- mutual distrust between the NGO sector and governments. 
(Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium, 2003). 
 
In Kenya where the NGO sector has assumed the role of a micro-actor in service 
delivery, friction has been experienced between the NGO sector and the state (Oyugi, 
2004).  Oyugi (2004) observes that: 
- The impact of NGOs has been felt especially in the time of national crisis such 
as famine. 
- The mode of NGO operation has been contentious.  NGOs tend to work 
directly with beneficiaries instead of through state agencies.  Still, the spirit of 
co-existence has emerged between the state and the NGO sector. 
- The relative operational autonomy enjoyed by the NGO sector lies in its 
financial sustainability.  NGOs rely on financial resources from outside the 
country.  This situation has caused tension between the state and the NGO 
sector. 
- NGOs have forced the state to relax its authoritarian character in the conduct 
of public affairs.   
In light of the above, Oyugi (2004) believes that the role of Kenyan NGOs in both 
development and governance is bound to increase with time. 
 
Whilst the civil society sector can be strengthened, in particular its governance 
endeavours, the role of the state in providing certain basic services should not be 
dismantled (Arnove and Christina, 2002). 
 
3.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The King Committee’s second report, as alluded to earlier in the text, made public on 26 
March 2002, is South Africa’s contribution to the drive for better corporate governance.  
The King Report contains a Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct (‘the Code’).  The 
recommendations made are voluntary. The Code places a duty and responsibility on all 
boards and individual directors to ensure that its principles are observed.  Though the 
Code only applies to certain categories of business, companies falling outside the 
categories listed should consider application of the Code so far as applicable (Wixley and 
Everingham, 2005; The King Report, 2002).   
 
The King Report is divided into 6 sections. namely: 
- board of directors; 
- risk management; 
- integrated sustainability reporting; 
- accounting and auditing, and 
- compliance and enforcement. 
(Wixley and Everingham, 2005; The King Report, 2002). 
 
In line with the King Report, the Management Trustees of the Nelson Mandela Children’s 
Fund, for example, ensure that the Fund’s policies continue to meet current requirements, 
and the terms and covenants of the Trust Deed approved by the Master of the Supreme 
Court.  These policies would pertain to duties of the full Board of Trustees, and to the 
delegation of authority to the Management Trustees Committee and to various sub-
committees (Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund, n.d.). 
 
In their report on CSO Governing Boards in South Africa, Camay and Gordon (2002) 
proclaims that it is essential for CSOs to focus on their internal organisational health and 
governance as sound internal governance, according to the authors, is a prerequisite for 
CSOs’ attempts to hold their government accountable in turn. 
 
In line with the above deliberations, the purpose of the next section is to explore 
corporate governance in the context of governance within NGOs; leadership 
accountability; transparency; the relationship between the governing board and the CEO 
and management capacity. 
3.4.1 Governance within NGOs 
In a highly competitive and globalised environment characterised by funding withdrawals 
on the part of donors (Naidoo, 2004) and a range of questions by governments and other 
stakeholder on accountability, transparency, value addition, legitimacy and overall 
credibility of NGOs, good corporate governance has emerged not only as a tool to 
enhance professionalism but, more crucially, to ensure that NGO interventions are 
effective, sustainable, efficient and positively perceived by all stakeholders including 
governments, beneficiaries and donors.  The credibility of an NGO can be improved by 
adherence to the principles and practices of good corporate governance (The National 
Association of Non-governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe, 2005). 
 
An integral part of corporate governance is clarity of role of the boards, the policy-
making governing structure of the entity, and management, the operational arm of the 
organisation.  How these roles are defined and executed determine the power relations, 
balance of authority and the extent to which an organisation will be run smoothly, 
effectively and professionally (Camay and Gordon, 2002; The National Association of 
Non-governmental Organizations in Zimbabwe, 2005). 
 
The corporate governance framework of an NGO should ensure the strategic guidance of 
the NGO, the effective monitoring of the NGO management by the board, and the 
Board’s accountability to its stakeholders, its clients, the government, donors and the 
community (Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2002). 
 
Good governance can be achieved through a variety of structures, hold Wixley and 
Everingham (2005).  The classical one, often referred to as the Anglo Saxon model, 
derives from the UK Companies Act of 1844, which enshrined the concept of the 
company as a legal entity separate from its owners.  In this context, governance is 
achieved by a single board of directors appointed by the members and reporting to them 
on the stewardship of the enterprise.  The members would appoint independent auditors 
to report on the fairness of presentation on the financial statements.  The practice evolved 
of appointing full-time executive directors (typically managing director or chief executive 
officer), as well as having a number of non-executive directors (Wixley and Everingham, 
2005; Keasey et al. 2005). 
 
Germany best illustrates the system of corporate governance in Europe.  Their system 
entails two boards of directors: 
- a supervisory board, with no executive powers, but with the authority to 
appoint, approve or remove a manager of the board (both employees and 
shareholders are represented on the supervisory board); 
- a management board, responsible for the ongoing management of the 
enterprise and with the responsibility of reporting to the supervisory board at 
regular internals. 
(Wixley and Everingham, 2005). 
 
The UK model is the basis of the system of governance, which applies in South Africa.  
The King Report (2002) recommends that the unitary board structure remains appropriate 
for South African companies, given the positive interaction and diversity of views that 
take place between individuals with different skills, experience and background (King 
Report, 2002; Wixley and Everingham, 2005). 
 
Each NGO is unique, and the particular arrangements it puts into place for good 
corporate governance will be influenced by that uniqueness (Government of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region, 2002).  Irrespective of the diverse interests and 
endeavours by NGOs, an NGO’s basic documents such as the act of incorporation, 
statutes, charter and rules of operation can establish a basis for good governance by 
including the following information about the governing body or bodies (in addition to 
any other information required by law): 
- Name of the governing body or bodies; 
- Highest and principal governing bodies, with their relationship to other 
organisational entities; 
- Basic responsibilities and powers; 
- Duties of individual board members, such as loyalty and confidentiality; 
- Minimum number of board members; 
- Membership rules (including eligibility, suspension and expulsion); 
- Terms of office (length of terms, limits on re-election); 
- Minimum number of board meetings per year; 
- Method of convening meetings; 
- Decision-making procedures (number needed for quorum, how to vote and 
recording of decisions), and 
- Conflict of interest provision.  
(Wyatt, 2004). 
 
In the South African context, according to the Department of Social Development:  
Directorate Non-profit Organisations (2001), an NPO governing body: 
- Determines the organisation’s mission and purpose; 
- Selects and appoints the chief executive officer (CEO); 
- Supports the CEO and reviews his or her performance; 
- Ensures effective organisational planning; 
- Ensures the organisation has adequate resources; 
- Manages the organisation’s resources effectively; 
- Determines and monitors the organisation’s programme and services; 
- Enhances the organisation’s public image; 
- Serves as a court of appeal, and 
- Measures its own performance. 
 
Many NGOs are adopting best practice and tackling governance issues.  These NGOs 
carefully peruse their board composition in order to support stronger corporate 
governance.  As transparency and accountability are no longer confined to the corporate 
sector, NGOs need to ensure that their boards have the necessary expertise in auditing, 
budgeting, financial governance and diversity (Management Today, 2005). 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Leadership accountability 
Leadership refers to strategic management that is to be carried out by the members of the 
governing body and the chief executive officer.  Leadership is the process of establishing 
direction and influencing others to follow that direction.  Governing bodies strategise on 
the direction organisations should take, and the overall management and programme 
priorities.  Good leadership seeks to develop a clear vision and mission for an 
organisation, and conducts planning that determines the goals needed to achieve the 
vision and mission.  Often the leadership style adopted, for example, autocratic, 
democratic, participatory or liassez faire depends on the situation that prevails and the 
life cycle of the NGO.  Effective leadership requires vision and commitment, and 
individuals who start NGOs require both.  To ensure institutional sustainability, it is 
imperative that institutional power and leadership is not vested in one individual (Centre 
for African Family Studies, 2001; Odiorne, 1969; Greenberg and Baron, 1997). 
 
Accountability in NGOs is receiving increased attention.  Beneficiaries are becoming 
more informed about what to expect from NGO services and are thus becoming more 
critical.  Funding agencies are also becoming more insistent about accountability.  These 
factors are increasing the pressure on NGOs to have policies, standards and benchmarks 
for services which the beneficiaries can understand so that they can make comparisons 
and judgements (Centre for African Family Studies, 2001). 
 
Accountability refers to the final responsibility for the successes or failures of an 
organisation.  This final accountability rests with the governing body, which delegates 
this function to the chief executive officer (Centre for African Family Studies, 2001).  
Accountability can also be regarded as the relationship which comes into existence when 
a task is delegated by one party to another.  The reporting may be implicit or explicit 
(The World Bank, 2000). For an NGO, being accountable implies being able to 
demonstrate regularly that it uses resources wisely and that it does not take advantage of 
its special privileges to pursue activities contrary to its non-profit status.  An accountable 
NGO is transparent, readily opening its accounts and records to public scrutiny by 
funders, beneficiaries and other stakeholders (Wyatt, 2004).  
Some commentators speak about upward accountability (to funders, donors, governments 
or other external actors, often in the context of accounting for resources or the fulfilment 
of particular service targets) and downward accountability (to constituents such as 
community groups, activists, or other beneficiaries of CSO activities).  Others speak of 
horizontal accountability referring to the relationship that exists between civil society 
actors, who see themselves as part of a public process rather than part of a competitive 
culture (Naidoo, 2003). 
 
According to the King Report (2002), corporate governance is essentially about 
leadership.  In the absence of transparent and accountable leadership, business leaders 
cannot be trusted.  This will lead to the decline of organisations and the ultimate demise 
of the country’s economy.   
 
Management or leadership within an NGO, centred on a particular individual, can be 
problematic.  In this context, the chairperson may also be the founder of the NGO and 
most organisational decisions are taken by him or her.  In the absence of the 
aforementioned chairperson, the activities of the organisation may come to a halt (Centre 
for African Family Studies, 2001). 
 
In order to ensure accountable leadership, the Department of Social Development, 
Director – Non-profit Organisations (2001) proposes that the CEO takes responsibility 
for leading organisational processes and activities and suggests that the staff leadership 
should: 
- Endeavour to understand the organisation inside and out; 
- Provide policy guidance and leadership to the governing body.  Staff policies 
must adhere to the relevant legislation and must protect the rights of 
employers, employees, members and volunteers; 
- Manage, direct and implement all services, fundraising and administration 
operations, programmes and activities of the organisation; 
- Implement the policy decisions and directives of the governing body; 
- Uphold and adhere to the constitution and policies of the organisation; 
- Educate the governing body regarding their unique and also overlapping roles 
and responsibilities with the staff; 
- Report regularly to the governing body and otherwise ensure that the board is 
kept informed of all the organisation’s activities; 
- Advise the governing body in a timely fashion of any developments that may 
affect the organisation’s wellbeing; 
- Establish and maintain effective internal communication systems; 
- Maintain effective financial controls, approve all financial disbursements and 
otherwise monitor all financial and accounting activities of the organisation; 
- Prepare annual budgets with the assistance of the staff, the treasurer (if 
appointed) and finance committee (if appointed); 
- Hire, supervise, evaluate and fire staff.  Develop adequate and acceptable 
systems of assessing skills, experience and qualifications, levels of 
responsibility and performance, and remunerate on this basis.  Have clear and 
transparent procedures for employing new staff and disengaging staff; 
- Encourage and support the involvement of volunteers; 
- Maintain the organisation’s records, files, documents and archives; 
- Enter into contracts with suppliers on behalf of the organisation, with the 
approval of the governing body; 
- Represent the organisation to other organisations, the media and the public at 
large; 
- Prepare meeting agendas, staff notices, reports, daily correspondence and 
other necessary internal and external communications, and 
- Maintain confidentiality of sensitive information. 
(Department of Social Development, 2001). 
 
3.4.3 Transparency 
Transparency is the ease with which an outsider is able to make meaningful analysis of a 
company’s actions, its economic fundamentals and the non-financial aspects pertinent to 
that business.  This is a measure of how good management is at making the necessary 
information available in a candid, accurate and timely manner, not only the audit data but 
also general reports and press releases.  It reflects whether or not investors obtain a true 
picture of what is happening inside the company (The King Report, 2002). 
 
Worldwide, the non-profit sector executes a wide range of humanitarian and other public 
works, which are indispensable in fundamental areas of human life.  Conversely, 
evidence exists that non-profit organisations have been exploited for the financing of 
terrorism, for example, and other kinds of criminal abuse (European Commission, 2005).  
To protect the non-profit sector and to strengthen donor integrity and confidence, higher 
standards of transparency and accountability are called for, in the same way that NGOs 
demand accountability and transparency from governments, businesses, educational 
institutions and other organisations (European Commission, 2005; ePublic Relations, 
2002). 
 
NGOs, unlike elected governments and owned businesses, lack an adequate, clearly 
defined basis on which they can be held to account.  The challenge for NGOs holds 
Michael Edwards, as quoted in Zadek (2003), is to show that they can put into practice 
the accountability principles that they campaign for in others.   Few NGOs are obliged or 
voluntarily choose to publish systematic, externally audited accounts of their 
performance.  Their senior management and board members are seldom challenged by 
supporters and rarely stand for election or other form of external scrutiny except for when 
financial fraud has been uncovered.  Accountability to beneficiaries on the one hand 
tends to be informal and to funders, on the other, too bureaucratic, yet personalised and 
archaic.  Resources to NGOs are awarded, more often than not, on the basis of personal 
relationships rather than on the past and future performance of NGOs (Zadek, 2003). 
 
Transparency and accountability to clients, partners, volunteers and donors in Ukrainian 
CSOs, for example, can be enhanced according to Kuts (2001) by putting in place 
appropriate activities.  Activities could include the development of appropriate 
procedures on internal monitoring, control and reporting in CSOs.  The construction of a 
national legal framework, within which CSOs can function, will also enhance 
transparency.  If these activities are pursued, the internal organisational ethics will be 
strengthened (Kuts, 2001). 
 
The European Commission (2005), in its draft discussion document on recommendations 
to Member States regarding a code of conduct for non-profit organisations to promote 
transparency and accountability best practices, suggests oversight mechanisms in the 
fight against the misuse of NPOs.  The Commission proposes that competent authorities 
be assigned to oversee the non-profit sector in Member States.  The oversight role of the 
competent authority should include, for example: 
- Publicly accessible registration systems for NPOs operating in their territory; 
- The provision of guidance to NPOs on financial transparency, explanations on 
the vulnerability of the sector, risk indicators, and guidance on the 
identification of suspicious activities; 
- The requisition of further information where an NPO may be operating 
unlawfully, and 
- The execution of effective and regular tax audits of non-profit organisations 
receiving special tax treatment by the tax authorities. 
Registration, enhanced transparency and accountability standards, contends the European 
Commission (2005), confirm a visible status for NPOs and will assist in the acquisition 
and maintenance of public trust and the credibility of the work of the NGOs. 
 
In the South African context, the Codes of Good Practice for South African Non-profit 
Organisations suggests that it is in the best interests of the organisation, its governance 
and leadership to enhance standards of accountability and transparency by having: 
- A clear mission to drive the organisation and its programmes; 
- Carefully selected governance, staff leadership and competent staff and 
volunteers in office, people who can be trusted; 
- An effective strategic plan of action, with controls in place to monitor and 
evaluate progress.  Opportunities must be provided for beneficiaries to be 
involved in the planning processes, regular evaluations and updating of 
programmes and projects; 
- Policies and systems in place to ensure that resources are optimally used; 
- Accounting systems and controls in place that ensure the transparent and 
effective handling of money and resources, and 
- An organisation that is willing and open to public enquiry and questioning.  
Transparency is fostered by providing timely, accessible and accurate 
information on the organisation and its activities to donors and others.  Its 
annual general meeting must be held with full, open and accurate disclosure of 
relevant information concerning goals, programmes, finances and governance. 
(Department of Social Development, 2001). 
  
3.4.4 The relationship between the governing board and the CEO  
The separation of governance and management involves a division of both duties and 
personnel.  The usual rule is that management runs the organisation from day-to-day, 
while the board sets policy, oversight, and strategically guides the organisation (Wyatt, 
2004; Centre for African Family Studies, 2001; Block, 2001).  The main areas of board 
responsibility are, for example:   
- safeguarding the vision and the mission, integrity, objectives and policies of 
the organisation;  
- setting of values and standards;  
- Ensuring high standards of planning, operation, administration, evaluation and 
reporting in the organisation; 
- Ensuring that statutory obligations are met; 
- Ensuring that adequate resources are available to the organisation for all 
aspects of its work and administration, and 
- Ensuring that resources provided to the organisation are used for their 
intended purpose and are properly accounted for. 
 (An NGO Training Guide for Peace Corps volunteers, n.d.; Wyatt, 2004; 
Commonwealth Foundation as quoted in Camay and Gordon, 2002; Block, 2001).   
 
 
 
The King Report (2002: 23) suggests that organisations be headed by an effective board 
which can both lead and control the organisation, and goes on to require that: 
 
The board comprise a balance of executive and non-executive 
directors, preferably with a majority of non-executive directors, of 
whom sufficient should be independent of management so that 
shareowner interests (including minority interests) can be protected. 
 
 
There should also be an appropriate balance of power and authority on the board, such 
that no one individual or block of individuals can dominate the boards’ decision-making.  
The board should seek to ensure an adequate mix of skills and experience and diversity 
in demographics to enable them to operate effectively (The King Report, 2002; Wixley 
and Everingham, 2005). 
 
Lately, according to Carver and Carver (2001), there has been increasing interest in the 
composition, conduct and decision-making of nonprofit governing boards.  Board-staff 
relations have been under scrutiny as well as trustee characteristics, the board’s role in 
planning and evaluation, committee involvement, fiduciary responsibilities, legal 
liability, and so on. 
 
In terms of the board composition, The Commonwealth Foundation, as quoted in Camay 
and Gordon (2002), contends that members of the boards of NGOs may be either 
nominated or elected, according to the dictates of the legal entity adopted.  They may 
delegate responsibility to others including the paid staff, but must accept ultimate 
responsibility for governance over all aspects of the NGO.  Preconditions for board 
recruitment include identifying the governance needs of organisations in transition and 
discovering the characteristics and qualities to be found in new board members (Block, 
2001). 
 
It is important to clarify the hierarchical relationship between the board and the CEO. 
The board may spell out its expectations of the CEO by constructing a job description 
which generally includes the following duties: 
- Hiring, firing and supervising the staff; 
- Managing and evaluating programmes and operations; 
- Identifying, acquiring and managing resources; 
- Preparing an annual budget; 
- Proposing policies and strategic initiatives to the board; 
- Communicating with stakeholders; 
- Promoting the organisation in the community, and 
- Supporting the board in its work. 
(Wyatt, 2004; An NGO training guide for peace corps volunteers, sc. The King Report, 
2002). 
 
The executive board is led by a chairperson.  In many organisations the role of the 
chairperson is filled by the CEO.  This duality of positions (the CEO also serving as 
chairperson of the board) places the CEO in the powerful position of managing the 
operations of the organisation and also overseeing the future direction of the 
organisation.  As chairperson, the CEO is responsible for running the board meetings, 
setting agendas and overseeing the processes of hiring, firing and compensating top 
management, including the CEO (Wyatt, 2004; Petra, 2005).  When the CEO also holds 
the dual position of chairperson, a potential conflict of interest arises.  This model of 
corporate governance may not be an appropriate structure for all non-profit organisations 
(Block, 2001).  To avoid these conflicts of interests, some commentators such as Wixley 
and Everingham (2005) have advocated for the separation of the positions of CEO and 
chairperson by having the position of chairperson filled by an outside independent person 
(Petra, 2005). 
 
A separation of the respective roles of the board and the NGO management is important.  
In the planning function, for example, management is responsible for: 
- Directing the process of planning; 
- Providing input to long range goals and strategies; 
- Formulation of annual objectives and plans, and 
- Preparation of performance reports on achievements of goals and strategies. 
Whereas as the board: 
- Approves long-range goals and strategies, and  
- Approves annual objectives and plans. 
Both management and the board monitors the achievement of goals and strategies. 
(Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2002) 
 
In the financial management function on the other hand, the responsibility of 
management is to: 
- Prepare a preliminary budget; 
- Monitor that expenditure is within the budget during a fiscal year; 
- Prepare financial statements, and 
- Draft financial management policies and procedures. 
The board takes responsibility for: 
- Finalising and approving the budget; 
- Approving expenditure outside the authorised budget; 
- Approving financial statements; 
- Approving financial management policies and procedures, and 
- Ensuring annual audit of NGO accounts. 
(Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2002). 
 
A separation of duties should also occur in the areas of operational programming, 
staffing, board management and community relations (Government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, 2002). 
 
The governance of an NGO is a shared responsibility.  It is important to consider the 
board as part of a governance structure that also includes the stakeholders, the CEO and 
even other staff.  As with government’s role in society, the CSO governing board is a 
crucial part of a system of checks and balances in an organisation (Camay and Gordon, 
2002).  It is easier for managers than for boards to exercise real power in non-profit 
organisations.  The two principal conditions for there to be a real partnership in which 
power is shared, are: first, that the board contains competent and experienced members 
and second, that management welcomes and/or expects boards to make an important 
contribution (Cornforth and Edwards, 1998). 
 
3.4.5 Management capacity 
Management is the process of administering and coordinating resources in an effort to 
achieve the goals of the organisation.  Essentially a manager combines human resources, 
material resources and financial resources into a productive system in which 
organisational objectives are attained (Odgers and Keeling, 2000).  
 
In recent years, much attention has been focused on the management capacity of NGOs 
(Mostashari, 2005).  In the NGO context, the term “management” broadly refers to 
activities in three general functions which include: 
- planning:  identifying goals, objectives, methods, resources, responsibilities 
and dates for completion of tasks; 
- organising resources:  to achieve the goals in an optimal manner, and 
- controlling or co-ordinating the organisation’s systems, processes and 
structures to effectively and efficiently achieve the goals and objectives - this 
includes ongoing feedback, monitoring, and adjusting systems and structures 
accordingly. 
(Centre for African Family Studies, 2001). 
 
In order to the achieve the above, NGO managers require an organisational structure, 
policies, systems and qualified and committed staff in conjunction with an institutional 
environment in which staff can function at optimal level (Centre for African Studies, 
2001). 
 
In a study conducted by Terence Jackson (2003), it was found that a variety of hybrid 
management systems operate in Africa.  Some of these systems are successful and highly 
adaptive to the operating environment, whilst others are maladaptive and often lead to 
organisational failure.  The management systems employed are: 
- post-colonial (based on coercive leadership and alienative involvement); 
- post-instrumental (based on remunerative reward and contractual 
involvement); 
- African Renaissance (based on normative leadership and moral involvement); 
- African management systems currently appear to be predominantly results- 
and control-oriented (post-instrumental and post-colonial), with some country 
differences:  DRC is more control-oriented; Mozambique and Rwanda are 
more people-oriented (normative), and 
- There is a general desire among managers to be more people- and results-
oriented (particularly in Burkina Faso and Botswana), while people 
orientation is not reflected in managers’ projections of the future of their 
organisations, a higher emphasis on results is (Jackson, 2003). 
 
In a different study, the Centre for African Family Studies (2001) reports on the 
management capacity of NGOs in the reproductive health sector in East Africa. The 
Centre contends that formal organisational structures based on programmes and functions 
and some form of documented management policies and systems were in place.  These 
systems however do not always translate into effective practices.  Decision-making in 
many organisations, most times, still remained a one-person show and lacked 
transparency and internal democracy.  Many NGOs did not have adequate management 
structures and processes and others commented on management practices that were too 
bureaucratic. In many instances, management was the responsibility of one person, 
usually the founder-member.  In this situation transparency was often lacking.   
 
Eugene Saldanha, quoted in an allAfrica article (2002), contends that the lack of skills, or 
insufficient, management capacity to oversee and ensure the successful implementation 
of NGO projects and the delivery of services was a factor contributing to the problems 
faced by NGOs.  
 
French NGOs realised that in order to ensure its future legitimacy and funding base, it 
became imperative for the sector to enhance management capacity, particularly in the 
areas of monitoring, evaluation and the acquisition of funds (Sorgenfrei, 2004). 
3.5 CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a theoretical overview of governance and 
sustainability arrangements of international organisations and NGOs.  Various views 
around the concept of  “governance” were explored.  
 
The research found that “governance” as a concept has gained popularity at both practical 
and theoretical levels and that different meanings have been accorded the concept by 
different people.  The different interpretations have developed along two streams where 
the first views governance as concerned with the rules of conducting public affairs and 
the second views it as a mechanism which steers or controls public affairs.  Governance 
was further perceived by some commentators as a generic term which could be applied to 
all forms of human organisations be it economic, cultural, religious, military or NGOs. 
 
Cooperative governance as an evolving system of institutional cooperation, the research 
established, extends beyond the traditional relations between central, provincial and local 
government in South Africa.  It includes relations with the private sector, labour, NGOs, 
political parties and parastatals.  The research suggests that cooperative governance 
should be fostered between the state and civil society where civil society organisations, 
for example provide checks on government power.  In doing so, they may contribute to 
better governance by enhancing the accountability and transparency of the political 
system.  NGOs may also contribute to policy formulations, safeguard rights, articulate 
interests and deliver social services. Such actions may enhance efficiency and 
participation in public affairs and strengthen the rule of law, all tenets of good 
governance.  Conversely, governments can impact NGOs by creating an enabling 
environment in which they can function.   
 
In addition to the above roles assumed by NGOs, the researcher proposes a collaborative 
relationship between the state and NGOs where NGOs engage in government-designed 
programmes and act as extensions of government line departments.  Such cooperation 
and collaboration will enhance the future sustainability of an NGO. 
In the context of governance arrangements, the research found that corporate governance, 
of which the main components include direction, executive action, supervision and 
accountability of the organisation, has permeated the non-profit sector where an NGO is 
now required to take a more disciplined approach on how they structure and run their 
organisations.  Further, to protect the non-profit sector and to strengthen donor integrity 
and confidence, higher standards of transparency and accountability are called for, in the 
same way that NGOs demand accountability and transparency from governments, 
businesses, educational institutions and other organisations.  Constructive interaction 
among the state, the private sector and civil society, were identified as one of the 
cornerstones for good governance.  Accordingly, along with a number of commentators, 
the researcher proposes the following principles and guidelines for good NGO 
governance which suggest that:   
- NGOs are accountable to their communities; 
- Good governance is the basic form of accountability;   
- Good governance has a formal governance structure;  
- Good governance involves the separation of governance and management; 
- NGOs are mission-based organisations; 
- NGOs promote the highest professional and ethical standards where the board 
articulates the professional and ethical standards of the organisation;  
- NGOs exercise responsible resource management and mobilisation, and 
- NGOs are responsive to the constituencies which they serve. 
 
The lack of skills and insufficient management capacity to oversee and ensure successful 
implementation of NGO projects and the delivery of services was quoted as contributing 
to the problems faced by NGOs.  To alleviate these problems, NGO managers require an 
organisational structure, policies, systems and qualified and committed staff and an 
external and internal environment in which the NGO can function at optimal level. 
 
The researcher concludes that the four basic elements of good governance, namely 
accountability, participation, predictability and transparency need to be activated and 
promoted within NGOs.  By embracing these four elements, NGOs will not only enhance 
organisational stability, but will ensure their future sustainability.  Accountability in 
particular will ensure the effective and efficient use of NGO resources.  An accountable 
NGO is transparent, readily opening its accounts and details of activities to donors and 
beneficiaries for scrutiny.  Participation as another element will ensure that people remain 
at the heart of development where NGO endeavours are concerned.  Predictability on the 
other hand refers to the existence of laws, regulations and policies which regulate NGOs.  
Transparency as the last element would ensure the availability of information around 
NGO activities.  The researcher concurs with Van der Walt (2004) and emphasises that 
the four elements of good governance are mutually supportive and reinforcing.  
Accountability is related to participation and safeguards predictability and transparency.  
It is the duty of each NGO to think about governance practices.   Good governance 
practices established by an NGO at the outset will encourage NGO sustainability. 
 
Given the overview of the conceptual framework of governance and sustainability 
arrangements in this chapter, the next chapter will investigate specific issues relating to 
financial management of NGOs.   
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THEORETICAL FOCUS ON SUSTAINABILITY AND FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT OF NGOs 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the main factors impacting effective management and sustainability of NGOs is 
the nature of their dependability on donor funding (Layton, 2006: 2).  The concepts 
“financial sustainability” and NGOs usually go hand-and-hand since NGOs’ legal status 
as a  “non-profit” entity locate it at the mercy of donor organisations whose inconsistent 
funding priorities remain the biggest threat to NGOs’ financial and operational future 
(Layton, 2006: 2).  
 
NGOs are required to fundraise and to generate an income to become sustainable.   They 
have commonly depended on funding from donor agencies, multilateral organisations 
such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat, as well 
as regional organisations such as the European Union, the African Union and the South 
African Development Community to name but a few examples, for their own 
administration and for conducting programmes (Lekorwe and Mpabanaga, n.d.; 
Viravaidya, n.d.).  Very few NGOs are able to generate their own funding and others are 
unable to draft programmes independent of donors.   Some CSOs complain that when 
they do receive funding from donors, it usually has strings attached (Kihato and Rapoo, 
1999; Smith and Bornstein, 2001; Overseas Development Institute, 1995).  With donor 
funding becoming more limited, competitive, and erratic, the challenge of financial 
sustainability has become very real for NGOs (Aldaba, 2002; Kihato and Rapoo, 1999).    
 
Donors, according to a number of commentators, are subject to funding constraints of 
their own and are often under obligation to boards, government Ministries, or even 
national legislatures, which can limit their capacity to fund purely based on the quality of 
a project or the good record of a grant recipient (Viravaidya, n.d.; Lekorwe and 
Mpabanaga, n.d.).   
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As NGOs are by nature public interest institutions, they too are required to adhere to 
control measures such as being more transparent and accountable in terms of how they 
manage their finances.  The financial management capabilities of NGOs will ultimately 
influence their sustainability (Aldaba, 2002).  Some CSOs collapse due to internal 
problems such as corruption, lack of financial management and inadequate planning.  As 
a consequence, foreign donors are increasingly looking for factors such as organisational 
capacity, accountability, sustainability and proper accounting procedures in the 
organisations they wish to assist (Kihato and Rapoo, 1999).   
 
Furthermore, many NGOs fail to appreciate the importance of being entrepreneurial in 
the sense of creating profits or surpluses for the organisation.  Conversely, some donors 
do not appreciate the creativity of NGOs in generating savings, as they require NGOs to 
spend the entire programmed budget by the end of a particular fiscal or calendar year 
(Aldaba, 2002).  
 
Meanwhile, NGOs face rising costs for human resources, operational overheads and other 
programme inputs, straining their already limited budgets.  In addition, restrictions 
imposed on many grants and donations, as alluded to earlier, along with the uncertainty 
of these funds over time, make it difficult for NGOs to do long-term planning, improve 
their services or reach their full potential.  NGOs in general, therefore, and in developing 
countries, in particular, question how the sector can sustain and support its activities 
financially (Viravaidya, n.d.). 
 
The primary reasons why NGOs need to find different strategies for long-term survival 
are:  donor resources available to NGOs continue to decrease; donor agencies worldwide 
have shifted and narrowed funding into specific, highly political or publicly popular 
regions of the world, for example, Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan and into specific markets 
that do not traditionally fund traditional NGO development; the growth in terms of 
numbers of NGOs worldwide tightened competition between NGOs for increasingly 
limited funding, and donors worldwide have become less willing to fund traditional 
overhead expenses such as salaries, rent and equipment, forcing NGOs to chase more and 
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more donor funds rather than develop long-term programme strategies that support their 
own mission (Layton, 2006; Alymkulova and Seipulnik, 2005;  Viravaidya and Hayssen, 
2001). 
 
In light of the foregoing, and given the overview of the conceptual framework of 
governance and NGO sustainability in the previous chapter, this chapter will firstly 
explore financial management and financial sustainability practices within NGOs in 
general.  Various concepts of funding arrangements from international donors and 
independent scholars will be addressed.  Academic literature on the principles of 
financial arrangements for NGOs will be assessed and deliberated upon. Thereafter the 
chapter will investigate issues pertaining to income and expenditure of NGOs with the 
view to establishing whether global funding mobilisation practices could be replicated in 
South Africa.  Conclusions will be drawn on the value of these frameworks.   
 
4.2 GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS  
Governance, as explored an earlier chapter, is a widely-used term which ranges in 
definition from electoral arrangements to institutional structures (Narayan, Godden, Reid 
and Ortega, 2000).  Budgeting, accounting, financial reporting and management control, 
on the other hand, are the most essential tools for responsible governance, accountability, 
planning and management in non-profit organisations (Ott, 2001).  Good financial 
practices will: 
- help managers make effective and efficient use of resources to achieve 
objectives and fulfil commitments to stakeholders; 
- help NGOs to be more accountable to donors and other stakeholders; 
- gain the respect and confidence of funding agencies, partners and those 
served; 
- give the NGO the advantage in competition for increasingly scarce resources, 
and  
- help NGOs prepare themselves for long-term financial sustainability 
(Alin et al., 2006). 
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The financial sustainability of an organisation depends to a large extent on its financial 
management practices.  This in particular will involve: 
- Managing scarce resources 
 NGOs operate in a competitive environment where donor funds are 
increasingly scarce.  NGOs must therefore ensure that donated funds are used 
properly, and to the advantage of the organisation’s vision, mission and 
strategic objectives. 
- Managing risk 
NGOs face internal and external risks which can threaten operations and even 
survival (eg. Funds being withdrawn, an office fire or fraud).  Risk must be 
managed in an organised way to limit the damage they can cause.  NGOs 
should establish systems and procedures to bring about financial control. 
- Managing strategically  
Financial management is of strategic importance and must be incorporated 
into all aspects of operational management.  Attention should be paid to 
financing the entire NGO in the medium and long term.  Management’s focus 
should not only be on financing projects and programmes. 
- Managing by objectives 
Financial management involves close attention to project and organisation 
objectives.  The financial management process – “Plan, Do, Review” – takes 
place on  a continuous basis. 
Plan: When an NGO starts up, it sets its objectives and planned 
activities.   The next step is to prepare a financial plan for the costs 
involved in undertaking the activities and where to obtain funds. 
Do: Having obtained the funds, the programme of activities is 
implemented to achieve the goals set out in the planning stage. 
Review: Using financial monitoring reports, the actual situation is 
compared with the original plans.  NGO managers can then decide 
if the organisation is on target to achieve its objectives within an 
agreed times scale and budget.  The learning from the review stage 
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is then taken forward to the next planning phase, and so on (Alin et 
al., 2006). 
 
Finances are thus managed by deploying policies, standards, processes, people, 
technology and information to budget, control, account and report on: 
- revenue; 
- current expenditure; 
- capital expenditure; 
- working capital, including amounts owing and amounts due; 
- cash; 
- inventory and production; 
- fixed assets; 
- investments, and 
- funding 
(Pauw et al., 2002). 
 
4.2.1 Financial accountability 
It is a widely accepted notion that NGOs fulfil a number of functions in areas which tend 
to be neglected by the private and public sectors (Srinivas, n.d.).  Over the last few years, 
NGOs and non-profit or voluntary sectors in different parts of the world have 
experienced a growth in the interest around their legal, fiscal, regulation and self-
regulation status.  Internal NGO challenges grew, in particular around NGO 
professionalism, NGO finances and broader sustainability challenges of the NGO sector 
(Naidoo, 2000).  Cases of NGO misconduct in advocacy, fund use, management and 
governance came to light, questioning the NGO’s legitimacy and congruency with social 
values and expectations.  Some NGOs have also ignored the fact that they have to 
account on their performance to a number of stakeholders (Srinivas, n.d.).  Accordingly, 
it has become imperative for NGOs to develop new accountability mechanisms (Naidoo, 
2004) in order to take responsibility for their organisational structures, operations, 
policies and activities (Naidoo, 2003). 
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Accountability tools can include, for example, standards for disclosure of public 
reporting, which are determined in some countries by national legislation.  Some CSOs 
tend to adopt these principles on a voluntary basis.  The vehicles used for channelling 
information around an NGO’s work, financial status, governance and operational 
structure may take the form of annual reports, organisational or project evaluations, 
strategic plans based on external assessments, and regular communications such as 
newsletters, updates, briefs and so on (Naidoo, 2003).  As NPOs do not own the 
resources it raises, donors, sponsors and the state requires careful and effective 
management of such resources, an NGO needs to develop and maintain an appropriate 
financial management system, irrespective of its simplicity, to ensure appropriate use of 
its resources (Department of Social Development, 2001). 
 
Lewis (2003) suggests that a series of good practice principles be identified by NGOs 
which set a standard for developing proper financial management systems in an NGO.  
The principles can be used as a checklist to help an NGO identify relative strengths and 
weaknesses in its systems.  The principles relate to: 
- Custodianship 
This refers to the stewardship or safekeeping of the NGO’s resources.  An NGO’s 
custodians hold the assets and funds in trust and must make sure that they are used in 
accordance with the constitution and any contractual agreements entered into. 
- Accountability 
Those who have invested not just money but also time, effort and trust in the organisation 
are interested to see that the resources of the NGO are used effectively and for the 
purpose for which they were intended.  Accountability, as alluded to in Chapter 3 of this 
study, is the moral or legal duty placed on an individual, group or organisation, to explain 
how funds, equipment or authority given by a third party has been used. 
- Transparency 
Systems must be established whereby all financial information is recorded accurately and 
presented clearly for easy disclosure to those who have a right to request it.  If this is not 
achieved, it can give the impression that there is something to hide. 
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- Consistency 
The financial systems of an NGO should be consistent over the years so that comparisons 
can be made, trends analysed and transparency facilitated.  This does not mean that the 
systems may not be refined.  However, inconsistent approaches to financial management 
could be viewed as an indication of manipulation on the part of employees. 
- Integrity 
The integrity or honesty and reliability of an organisation, and the individuals within it, 
has to be beyond question for proper financial management.  To achieve this there must 
be no doubts about how funds are being utilised.  The records must be a true reflection of 
reality.  Proper procedures should be set up and followed by all staff. 
- Non-Deficit Financing 
An NGO should not set out to achieve its objectives until it is confident that it will have 
sufficient funding to cover all of its activities.   
- Standard Documentation 
The system of maintaining financial records and documentation should observe 
internationally accepted accounting standards and principles.  An NGO’s system for 
maintaining financial records should be understood by any accountant from anywhere in 
the world (Lewis, 2003).   
 
In the context of financial accountability specifically, a draft Code of Standard of 
Practice for Nigerian NGOs, for example, suggests that: 
- An NGO should operate in accordance with an annual budget that has been 
approved by the board prior to the beginning of each fiscal year; 
- An NGO should create and maintain financial reports on a timely (at least 
quarterly) basis, accurately reflecting the financial activity of the organisation, 
including the comparison of actual to budgeted revenue and expense; 
- Quarterly financial statements should be provided to the board of directors.  
The statements should identify and explain any significant variations between 
actual and budgeted revenues and expenses; 
- An organisation should subject its financial reports to an annual audit by a 
chartered accountant; 
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- An NGO should provide employees and volunteers with a confidential means 
to report suspected financial impropriety or misuse of organisational 
resources; 
- An NGO should have written financial policies governing the following 
matters: (a) appropriate investment of the assets of the organisation; (b)  
appropriate internal control procedures; (c) appropriate purchasing practices; 
(d) appropriate reserve funds; (e) appropriate compensation, including salary 
and benefits; (f) appropriate expense account reporting, and (g), appropriate 
earned income; 
- The organisation should have clear and written policies on loans and staff 
advances, and 
- Wherever possible, the organisation should ensure that its funding base is 
diversified. 
(International Journal for Not-for-Profit Law, 2001). 
 
In a similar vein, the European Commission, in its draft Code of Conduct for non-profit 
organisations (2005), suggests that: 
- NPOs should follow proper bookkeeping procedures and prepare annual 
financial statements of income and expenditure.  An annual report should be 
prepared.  NPOs should report on the progress on general objectives. The 
financial statements and reports should be kept available at the registered 
office for public authorities having oversight responsibility; 
- NPOs should keep full and accurate audit trails of funds transferred outside 
their jurisdiction/country and of funds transferred to any person delivering 
service on behalf of the originator NPO; 
- Annual financial statements, reports, minutes of trustees’ meetings, and 
records on required audit trails should be held for at least 5 years at the 
registered office of the NPO, and 
- NPOs should have registered bank accounts and should know their 
beneficiaries, donors and associate NPOs. 
(European Commission, 2005). 
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Similarly, the Department of Social Development (2001) in South Africa contends that 
appropriate financial management can be achieved by, amongst others: 
- Setting up appropriate financial systems and employing qualified persons, 
either full-time, part-time or on a voluntary basis, to administer and manage 
these systems; 
- Developing financial policies and procedure manuals that might include:  
financial statement presentation; distribution and timing of financial 
statements; system of accounting codes; bank statement reconciliation 
procedures; investment policies; loan procedures to staff; petty cash handling; 
financial auditing; cheque signing procedures; travel expense and per diem 
policies; income collection and recording systems; payroll policy; insurance 
policies; controls over fixed assets; a contracting or tendering system; a 
purchasing system; fundraising procedures; controls over inventories; 
budgeting procedures; tax procedures and conflicts of interest and disciplinary 
procedures for misuse or misappropriation of resources, and 
- Complying with South Africa’s accepted accounting and auditing practices in 
terms of procedures, banking, reporting and record-keeping. 
The Non-Profit Organisations Act specifically calls for adequate standards of NGO 
transparency and accountability (Department of Social Development, 2001).  Pema and 
Lakha (1995) propose a similar checklist to ensure financial accountability as put 
forward by the Nigerian NGO sector, the European Commission and the Department of 
Social Development in South Africa.  
 
NGO governing boards in particular act as a structure for the financial accountability of 
non-profit organisations.  This accountability is rooted in a public reporting tradition 
rather than a managerial accounting one (Conforth and Edwards, 1998). 
 
4.2.2 Financial experience and control 
The concept of financial control is at the heart of financial management (Alin et al., 
2006). Effective financial accounting and managerial control practices are as important to 
non-profit organisations as they are for for-profit organisations (Herzlinger and 
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Nitterhouse, 2001).  Financial control is a state of affairs which ensures that the finances 
of an organisation are handled properly.   Without financial control, assets are put at risk, 
funds may not be spent in accordance with the organisation’s objectives or donors’ 
wishes, and the competence of managers and the integrity of the organisation may be 
called into question (Alin et al., 2006).    
 
In general, financial control is achieved by designing systems and procedures to suit the 
particular needs of an organisation (Alin et al., 2006).   For the purpose of financial 
control and accountability of NGOs, it is imperative that an overall financial policy be 
constructed which should consist of individual policies pertaining to the donors, income, 
budgeting, expenditure, travel, auditing, petty cash, assets, salaries, staff loans and the 
opening and operation of a bank account (Shapiro, n.d.). 
 
One of the major responsibilities of a board of directors is to establish fiscal policies that 
protect the organisation from either intentional or unintentional misuse of funds.  The 
board must decide how money will be handled internally to ensure that it will be safely 
received, recorded, deposited, and expended in a manner that seems appropriate.   For 
example, tasks such as the receipt of cash, the preparation of financial statements and the 
expenditure of funds should be assigned to two staff members to ensure adequate 
financial controls.  Other forms of control relates to rules around monitoring the budget, 
budget amendments, cheque writing, the receipt of monies and insurance around 
financial losses (Wolf, 2001). 
 
For NGOs to survive in a changing and competitive environment, managers need to 
develop the necessary understanding and confidence to make full use of financial 
information.   Whilst there is no model finance system which suits all NGOs, good 
practice in financial management is achieved by designing systems and procedures 
around: 
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- Accounting records: 
 Every organisation must keep an accurate record of all financial transactions that 
take place so that it can show how the funds have been used.  This is referred to 
as the financial accounting function. 
- Financial planning: 
The budget, linked to the organisation’s strategic and operational plans, is the 
cornerstone of any financial management system and plays an integral part in 
monitoring the use of funds. 
- Financial monitoring: 
Management accounts are internal reports produced so that managers can 
compare the organisation’s progress against the budget and then make decisions 
about the future.  Financial statements are produced periodically for outside 
scrutiny to demonstrate how funds have been applied in the past. 
- Internal controls 
Controls, checks and balances, collectively referred to as internal controls, are put 
in place to safeguard an organisation’s assets and manage risk.  Their purpose is 
to deter opportunistic theft or fraud and to detect errors and omissions in the 
accounting records.  An effective internal control system serves to value and 
protect those who are responsible for handling the financial affairs of the 
organisation.  
(Wolf, 2001; Alin et al., 2006) 
 
As the process of managing and controlling an NGO becomes more complex, an NGO 
board will need assistance in performing its duties and discharging its responsibilities.  
An audit committee may be established to give the board additional assistance regarding 
the quality and reliability of financial and other performance information used and issued 
by the board (Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2002). 
 
In Russia, financial control of NGOs has controversially been placed in the hands of 
government where NGOs are now expected to disclose financial assistance from 
international and foreign organisations and foreign persons to a special agency.  Russian 
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NGOs will be obliged to persuade the authorities of the practicality of NGO endeavours 
and the reasonableness of financial costs pertaining to specific projects (Alimov and 
Kudrik, 2006). 
 
4.2.3 Budgeting 
Budgeting is a process which matches resources and needs in an organised and repetitive 
way so those collective choices about what an entity needs to do are properly resourced.  
A budget on the other hand is an itemised estimate of expected income and operational 
expenses over a set period of time (Pauw, Woods, Van der Linde, Fourie and Visser, 
2002; Odgers and Keeling, 2000). 
 
When funders review a budget, they often compare it to the organisation’s statement of 
need and programme description.  From this comparison, they decide if the issue 
addressed and the anticipated programme benefits are worth the money the organisation 
proposes to spend.  Donors look for budgets that are cost-effective (Cook, 2002).  
Information contained in a budget, should be presented in a meaningful way so that 
better decisions can be made on the allocation of scarce resources (McCaffery and Jones, 
2001).  
 
Ott, 2001 contends that after a budget has been adopted by the board of trustees, it 
continues to serve two vitally important purposes: 
- as a governance and accountability tool for the board and the executive 
director, and 
- as a management tool that provides an executive direction and the 
management staff with discretion (the freedom to run the organisation with 
some flexibility) 
In terms of budget monitoring, it is important to establish a reliable procedure.  In this 
regard, the board generally requires that two people should be involved in processing of 
payments.  One person who is familiar with the budget, the organisation’s operation, and 
the appropriateness of specific expenditures should be responsible for approving 
payments.  That person is often the director of the NGO or his or her designate.  Another 
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person should actually write the cheques and monitor the expenditure for the board of 
trustees (Wolf, 2001). 
  
4.2.4 Funding mobilisation 
Non-profit funding sources vary in predictability, controllability, linkage to 
organisational activities, and the range and amount of management effort they require 
(Gronbjerg, 1993). 
 
Fundraising is a marketing or exchange process requiring an understanding of the total 
potential support markets (constituencies) and what turns them on and what turns them 
off (Department of Social Development, 2001). Fundraising is proactive and should be 
conceptualised and designed as a long-range programme.  Fundraising is planned, 
systematic, ongoing and integrated into an organisation’s programmes and administrative 
tasks (Cook, 2002). Generally, according to Kraak (2001), very few non-profit 
organisations have dedicated professional fundraising human resource capacity and a 
coherent fundraising strategy.  Building NGO fundraising capacity requires the 
development of a fundraising policy and regulations, a fundraising committee with clear 
job descriptions and mechanisms monitoring fundraising activities (Alin et al., 2006).   
 
A well-executed fundraising strategy contains elements such as: 
- Diversification 
Diversified fundraising means that an NGO has several sources of funding from 
several different types of fundraising activities. 
- Sustainability 
Sustainability is about developing self-reliance.  The more self-reliant an NGO is, 
the more control it can maintain over its resources, as well as the decisions around 
resource management and use. 
- Creativity 
Being creative means utilising available resources and taking advantage of 
opportunities as they emerge. 
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- Inclusiveness 
Taking an inclusive approach means finding a role for supportive people to play.  
In this way the boundaries of the NGO will be expanded beyond its present scope. 
(Cook, 2002). 
 
All funding agencies have a limit on their resources and have to make decisions around 
what they will support.  Once a decision has been taken to fund a particular organisation 
a relationship begins to develop.  Funding agencies emphasise the fact that this is a two-
way relationship, with both parties aware of the expectations of the other (Ndlovu, 2004). 
 
4.3 NGO FINANCING 
All over the globe, there is an upsurge in the establishment of non-profit or non-
governmental organisations, (Lekorwe and Mpabanaga, 2006; Scott and Hopkins, 1999) 
essentially funded by financial surpluses produced in other sectors of the economy (The 
Funding Dilemma, n.d.).  With this upsurge comes competition for funding, with larger 
NGOs obtaining most of the available official funding.    
 
Globally, the not-for-profit sector is worth approximately 1 trillion US dollars. Most of 
the NGO funding flows from the North to the South. The role of development aid in this 
upsurge has been phenomenal.  The World Bank and a number of multilateral and 
bilateral organisations, for example, are funding numerous NGO programmes (Scott and 
Hopkins, 1999).  
 
In South Africa, specifically, a strong culture of entitlement and a perceptible dependence 
on international donor funding still prevails, years after the country’s transition to 
democracy.   A key challenge facing a number of local NGOs is that much donor funding 
is redirected to the state, making public funds a major source of revenue for the NGO 
sector.  The state is playing a strong regulatory role in relation to the expenditure of direct 
donor funding, forcing distribution into particular streams. Consequently, international 
donors are far more inclined to fund NGOs that support state programmes than those 
involved in alternative endeavours (Farouk, 2002). 
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South Africa, contends Farouk (2002), has a poorly developed voluntary sector and 
corporate social investment, the second highest source of NGO income, which is not 
premised on any real assessment of needs on the ground.  Most local businesses develop 
their social responsibility programmes in line with state priorities.  Local NGOs also rate 
poorly at inventing creative resource solutions for their long-term viability.  Only a third 
of local NGO funding is derived from income-generation strategies according to the 
aforementioned author (Farouk, 2002).   
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that a study should be made of trends, which prevail in 
NGO financing at international level.  Lessons could be learned from such financing 
practices for replication in the South African NGO sector.  Accordingly, the next section 
will provide an overview of NGO financing sources. 
 
4.3.1 General overview of NGO financing sources 
According to Viravaidya and Hayssen (2001), the work of NGOs, for example: 
protecting the environment; helping the sick and needy; preserving arts and culture; 
improving services to the poor and so on is, by nature, “unprofitable.”   Traditionally, 
NGOs relied on the goodwill and generosity of others to cover the costs of their activities 
through grants and donations.  Today, unfortunately, NGOs find that such traditional 
funding sources are often insufficient to meet growing needs and rising costs.   
 
Non-governmental organisations raise billions of dollars each year (Oxford Analytica, 
2005).  Figure 1 depicts an overview of the sources of NGO revenue.  It reflects the 
variety of financing types, including self-financing, as a possible additional source of 
revenue (Davis and Etchart, 1999a as quoted in Glaser, 2004).  In general, support can be 
received through the state, the public and the private sector on an international, national 
or local level.  Within the government, financial aid may be given through international 
foreign sources or bilateral/multilateral grants, as well as through national or local 
governmental grants.  The private sector may provide corporate grants or foundation 
grants.  Furthermore, financial aid from the general public may come through 
international charitable and local individual donations (Glaser, 2004). 
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Figure 4.1:  Sources of NGO Revenue 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Davis and Etchart, 1999 as quoted in Glaser, 2004: 25 
 
 
The following section will briefly explore international aid, state funding and other 
sources of NGO funding. 
 
4.3.1.1 International Aid 
There have been a number of studies on foreign aid during recent years.  This is 
understandable as: 
Since the Second World War, foreign aid has become an institutional part 
of international relations.  Beginning with the Marshall Plan in the late 
forties, aid has become a common foreign policy instrument of donors and 
has accounted for an important source of income for many developing 
countries.  By 1990 foreign aid flows to developing countries accounted 
for $72 billion… [T]hroughout the post-war period foreign aid as a policy 
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tool has evolved in ways it is provided, and the importance of various 
donors and recipients has shifted (Grant and Nijman, 1998: 3). 
 
The end of the Cold War saw new political challenges - civil wars in parts of Africa and 
the former Soviet Union in particular – being put on the global agenda.  According to 
literature, exploitation, poverty, dictatorship and mismanagement over a period of 30 
years created deep social divisions and weak governance, particularly in Africa.  
Humanitarian and development aid were mandated to mitigate these challenges under 
difficult conditions (Uvin, 1999).  The geography of aid is constantly changing.  Still, 
globally, the not-for-profit sector is currently worth over 1 trillion  US Dollars (The 
Funding Dilemma, n.d.).   
 
The following scheme (Table 4.1) as put forward by Hjertholm and White (2000: 81) in 
Kanbur (2003: 25) provides an overview of the main developments in the history of 
foreign aid. 
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Table 4.1:  Overview of main developments in the history of foreign aid. 
 Dominant or rising 
institutions 
Donor ideology Donor focus Types of aid 
1940s Marshall Plan and UN 
system (including 
World Bank. 
Planning. Reconstruction. Marshall Plan was 
large programme aid. 
1950s United States, with  
Soviet Union gaining 
importance from 1956. 
Anti-communist, but 
with role for the state. 
Community 
Development 
Movement. 
Food aid and projects. 
1960s Establishment of 
bilateral programmes. 
As for the 1950s, with 
support for state in 
productive sectors. 
Productive sectors (eg. 
Support to the green 
revolution) and 
infrastructure. 
Bilaterals gave 
technical assistance 
(TA) and budget 
support;  multilaterals 
supported projects. 
1970s Expansion of 
multilaterals especially 
World Bank, IMF and 
Arab-funded 
agencies). 
Continued supported 
for state activities in  
productive activities 
and meeting basic 
needs. 
Poverty, taken as 
agriculture and basic 
needs (social sectors). 
Fall in food aid and 
start of import support. 
1980s Rise of NGOs from 
mid-1980s. 
Market-based 
adjustment (rolling 
back the state). 
Macro-economic 
reform. 
Financial programme 
aid and debt relief. 
1990s Eastern Europe and 
Federated Soviet 
Union became 
recipients rather than 
donors; emergence of 
corresponding 
institutions. 
Move back to the state 
toward end of the 
decade. 
Poverty and then 
governance 
(environment and 
gender passed more 
quickly). 
Move toward sector 
support at end of the 
decade. 
 Source:  Hjertholm and White (2000: 81) as quoted in Kanbur (2003: 25) 
 
International foreign aid comes in many forms.  Examples of such funding sources are: 
- Voluntary funding organisations such as missions, aid agencies, charitable 
organisations and other groups both religious and secular.  Most of them are 
based in the North, Europe, North America and Australia. 
- International Aid organisations include United Nations Agencies such as 
WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, FAO, the European Commission (EC), the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank.  Funds from these sources are likely 
to be available via national umbrella bodies.   
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- Foreign Embassies such as the Dutch Embassies, to name but one country,  
tend to fund small-scale projects. 
(Alin et al., 2006).  
 
Since its founding in 1945, the United Nations has been an avid supporter of NGOs.  In 
2005, 2 613 NGOs were registered with the U.N. Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), while 1 407 NGOs were accredited to the U.N. Secretariats Department of 
Public Information (Oxford Analytica, 2005).   
 
The shift of official aid towards NGOs accelerated in the 1980s (Overseas Development 
Institute, 1995).  In 1983/84, the value of grants by private voluntary agencies to 
developing countries was nearly 2.5 billion US dollars, increasing to nearly 5 billion US 
dollars in 1997.  The official contributions to NGOs from bilateral assistance rose to 1.04 
billion in 1994 according to the OECD (OECD, 1995 as quoted in Scott and Hopkins, 
1999).  These figures do not include the contribution to NGOs from multilateral 
organisations and the direct contribution of bilateral assistance to South-based NGOs. 
 
The Overseas Development Institute reported in 1995 that 5% of official aid was 
channelled to NGOs.  The organisation contends that in the ten years to 1993/94, the 
United Kingdom increased its official funding of NGOs by almost 400% to 68.7 million 
British Pounds.  In the same period, Australia increased its funding of NGOs from 20 
million Australian Dollars to 71 million Australian Dollars.  Similar expansion occurred 
in the case of Finland, Norway and Sweden from the early 1980s to the early 1990s. The 
organisation further reports that the World Bank suggests that, by the mid-1990s, 30% of 
an NGO’s income came from donor sources.   The World Bank does not fund NGOs 
directly; the most common way for an to NGO receive project funds is by working as a 
paid consultant or contractor to the borrower (World Bank, 1996). 
 
Most NGOs in Central Asia, for example, remain heavily dependent on international 
financial assistance.  International aid in this region constitutes the single largest source 
of NGO funding (Alymkulova and Seipulnik, 2005).  In Bangladesh, the share of aid to 
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NGOs as a portion of total aid to the country has risen from 14.4 percent in the first half 
of the 1990s to 24.6 percent since then.  It is estimated that total aid to NGOs rose from 
an average of $233 million (0.7 percent of GDP) in 1990-95 to $343 million (0.7 percent 
of GDP) in 1996-2005 (The World Bank Office Dhaka, 2006). 
  
French NGOs have sought to diversify their access to funding channels.  Historically they 
were able to attract a large part of their funding from multilateral agencies such as the 
European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank.  Complicated, bureaucratic, 
and time-consuming donor procedures and tendering processes, multilateral or bilateral, 
have led to NGOs forming consortiums in the hope of improving the likelihood of 
winnings bids (Sorgenfrei, 2004). 
 
Looking at foreign aid directed at South Africa, Hearn (2000) reports that the USA was 
by far the largest overall foreign donor to the country and, from 1994 to 1999, it provided 
financial assistance to the tune of $530 million.  During the same period, the European 
Union provided an EU Programme for Reconstruction and Development of nearly $420 
million.  Other significant foreign donors to South Africa, according to Hearn (2000) are 
the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Germany, Canada and the United Kingdom. The 
World Bank acts as a knowledge bank providing lessons of international experience 
(Hearn, 2000). 
 
In terms of foreign aid to South Africa from other donors and foundations, the European 
Union launched a programme to be implemented by Interfund to conduct capacity-
building in the CSO sector in order to enhance the capability of organisations to become 
self-reliant.  The Ford Foundation focused on building the infrastructure for a robust civil 
society.  The Mott Foundation grant-making programme sought to strengthen the non-
profit sector by building local resources for the sector.  The W.K. Kellogg Foundation 
grant-making programme promoted partnering with community-based organisations and 
institutions, helping them link government and other service delivery institutions.   The 
Open Society Foundation for South Africa was established in 1993 to promote a variety 
of programmes in the areas of educational, social, legal and health care reform 
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(USAID/South Africa, 2000; Stacey and Aksartva, 2002). Section 4.4.1.5 of this Chapter, 
will elaborate on US foundations supporting Civil Society Organisations in South Africa. 
 
4.3.1.2  State Funding 
According to Gardner and Macanda (2003: 3): 
 
The challenge of fighting and eradicating poverty in South Africa and the 
rest of the continent does not lie solely with governments.  It is also the 
responsibility of the communities, civil society and international agencies.  
Governments need to support civil society and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and be responsive to their needs and civil society 
and NGOs should be accountable to the people they serve.  The 
government has the advantage of having considerable financial muscle, 
especially through public revenue, whereas civil society has the 
advantage of proximity and a better understanding of the needs of the 
people on the ground. 
  
In the above context, the challenge in terms of financial sustainability of NGOs in 
developing countries is to develop domestic sources of funding and/or revenue to replace 
unreliable international donor funding (Stuart, 2002) 
  
The next section provides a brief outline of international examples of state financial 
support to NGOs. 
 
In France in recent years, the French government has recognised that NGOs play an 
important role in French development assistance.  This led to a restructuring of the 
funding system for NGOs, and the establishment of a system with the specific purpose of 
allocating funds for NGO projects: la Mission pour la Cooperation Non-gouvernementale 
(MCNG).  Government funding to NGOs takes place mainly through ‘cofinancements’, 
for example, co-financing of development projects.  In some cases, NGOs obtained block 
funding for their programmes which were not tied to specific projects (Sorgenfrei, 2004). 
 
NGOs based in the United States of America receive 31% of their income from 
government contracts.  However, in 2004, it was reported that 37% of over 5 000 U.S. 
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NGOs  reported a decrease in U.S. government funding from the year 2003 (Layton, 
2006). 
 
In the Czech Republic, NGOs receive approximately 39% of their funding from the 
government, and a quarter of organisations receive over half of their funding from state 
resources.  Part of this funding comes from a unique arrangement that provides Czech 
NGOs with access to a portion of the funds received from state privatisation.  As part of 
this endeavour, 73 Czech foundations received approximately 47.5 million US dollars in 
2002 to build their endowments.  Despite this level of state support, Czech  NGOs are 
concerned about being over-reliant on state support (Stuart, 2002). 
 
In Bosnia, the Council of Ministers dedicated 150 000.00 US dollars from the state 
budget to assist local NGOs for the first time in 2002.  Despite limitations in the plans to 
distribute these funds and the limited amout of money, NGOs viewed the contribution as 
an important sign that the government recognised the significant role of NGOs in the 
country (Stuart, 2002). 
 
For many years, Croatian state financial support to NGOs has been provided through the 
Government Office of Cooperation with NGOs.  For the first time in 2002, funding was 
made available for NGO whose initiatives exceeded a one-year period (Stuart, 2002). 
 
Across Central and Eastern Europe, local-level governments have become a further 
growing source of support to NGOs.  In addition to financial support through grant 
competitions or tenders, many local government entities provide in-kind support to 
NGOs, often in the form of free or reduced-cost office space (Stuart, 2002). 
 
The Indian NGO sector, which boasts over one million NGOs, depends largely on 
multilateral and government funding.  Misra, as quoted in Farouk (2002) contends that 
Indian NGOs lack an awareness of local resource mobilisation. 
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Indonesian NGOs are encouraged to self-finance their activities and end the dependency 
on foreign funding by obtaining funds from local foundations, philanthropic institutions, 
individual sources, their government and private companies (Jakarta Post, 2000). 
 
As NGOs are continuously faced with funding dilemmas, Ashoka, an international non-
profit organisation promotes creative and innovative ways for the NGO sector to become 
self-sustaining (allAfrica, 2002).   
 
4.3.1.3 Other sources of NGO funding 
Finding a comfortable balance between the need for continued foreign or international 
assistance to NGOs and the desire to decrease such dependency by encouraging local 
philanthropic activities remains a significant challenge in developing countries (Atkinson 
and Messing, 2002; Camay and Gordon 2004; Davis and Etchart, 1999; Jakarta Post, 
2000).  NESsT (Nonprofit Enterprise and Self-Sustainability Team), a US registered non-
profit with branches in Santiago, Chile, and Budapest, Hungary, looks at self-financing as 
one alternative to the more traditional fundraising approaches used by non-profit 
organisations (Davis and Etchart, 1999).  Self-financing, according to Atkinson and 
Messing (2002: 16), can be defined as:  
  
 …[t]he procurement of revenue by internal entrepreneurial methods, 
in other words, strategies used by NGOs to generate some of their 
own resources to further their mission. 
 
  
Self-financing methods or strategies include, for example: 
- membership fees; 
- fees for services; 
- product sales; 
- use of hard assets, for example, equipment rental; 
- use of soft assets, for example, patents, copyrights; 
- ancillary business ventures, and 
- investment dividend 
(Atkinson and Messing, 2002; Academy for Educational Development, 2004). 
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According to Atkinson and Messing (2002), venture philanthropy can mean different 
things to different people. NESsT applies a venture philanthropy approach of self-
financing, analogous to that of its venture capital peers in the for-profit sector, to help 
non-profits develop entrepreneurial activities in order to generate sustainable income for 
their non-profit mission (Connecticut College Magazine, 2002; Atkinson and Messing, 
2002).  The support from venture philanthropists includes, for example, assisting NGOs 
to behave like businesses, building organisational capacity and supplying NGO managers 
with advisory services, and offering loans and/or equity equivalents rather than traditional 
donations.  Venture philanthropy insists on setting clear performance goals, with 
expectations of concrete financial and/or social returns on an investment (Atkinson and 
Messing, 2002).  NESsT established the Sustainable NGO Financing Project in 1997 to 
assist NGOs in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia.  The primary goals 
of the project were to develop: 
- the capacity of NGOs to use self-financing strategies effectively and 
responsibly and 
- the financing mechanisms for providing capital to NGO entrepreneurs to start 
up or expand self-financing activities    
(Davis and Etchart, 1999). 
 
NESsT is but one organisation preaching NGO self-financing initiatives.  Others include 
smaller donor agencies such as German Agro Action, Enterprise Works Worldwide, the 
Roberts Enterprise Development Fund, the Aspen Institute and other private foundations. 
They have been active in helping individual NGOs establish businesses, and in trying to 
upgrade the commercial skills of the NGO community as a whole (Viravaidya and 
Hayssen, 2001). 
  
In Bangladesh, NGOs have established commercial enterprises, also known as 
endowment models, using the profit stream to support development endeavours. The 
endowment model is designed to reduce dependence on donors and other sources of 
funding, and proved an innovative solution to financial sustainability (World Bank, 
2006). 
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 NGOs, using self-financing initiatives in the NESsT project mentioned in earlier text, 
raised a number of challenges they have encountered (Glaser, 2004).  One, the identity of 
an NGO might be influenced by internal and external factors.  Some NGO members may 
fear that a profit-making focus may endanger the organisation’s mission, where the NGO 
manager may focus more on what is marketable and economically feasible rather than the 
desirable vis-à-vis the mission (Toepler, 2004; Glaser, 2004; Atkinson and Messing, 
2002).  Secondly, organisational capacity may prove problematic, as self-financing 
approaches demand business-oriented management, planning and accounting skills.  
NGOs may lack these required institutional human resource capacity and knowledge.  
Thirdly, available capital and financing of self-financing initiatives may be lacking, as 
traditional donors generally do not fund self-financing initiatives.  Lastly, instability in 
the external environment such as unclear legal and tax legislation, and unstable 
economies, diverse customer demands and challenging competitors may have negative 
effects on the NGO’s mission-driven business (Glaser, 2004; Atkinson and Messing, 
2004). 
 
Despite the above challenges, more and more NGOs are designing intervention strategies 
that incorporate cost recovery components through “fees-for-services” or various loan 
and credit arrangements (Viravaidya and Hayssen, 2001).  Viravaidya and Hayssen 
(2001: 7) illustrates this point by putting forward the following example: 
 
Les Centres pour le Developpement et la Sante (CDS) in Haiti 
received a grant to install a drinking water system in a slum area of 
the capital Port-au-Prince.  Residents pay a per bucket fee for the 
water, which covers all operating and maintenance costs of the system 
and also generates a surplus that is used to improve solid waste 
collection in the neighborhood. 
 
Whilst the above example is commendable, the authors contend that NGO programmes 
that depend on cost recovery components to sustain themselves may have to exclude 
from participation some of the people that the NGO most wishes to help (Viravaidya and 
Hayssen, 2001).  This assertion supports the challenges and concerns expressed around 
the NGO’s mission by Glaser (2004) and Atkinson and Messing (2004) above.  For 
NGOs, starting a business is only one possible route to achieving greater financial 
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security, which in itself is a long-term goal that cannot be reached overnight (Viravaidya 
and Hayssen, 2001).  
 
Besides self-financing initiatives, non-financial contributions can be raised by NGOs 
from local citizens, businesses, local authorities and so on, in a variety of forms, for 
example: 
- in-kind material donations (for example: office supplies, building material, a 
car, sports and recreational equipment and so on); 
- in-kind intellectual services (for example: legal, accounting, medical, 
psychological and engineering advice or assistance), and 
- volunteer work of local citizens. 
The non-financial contributions the community can donate to NGOs may differ from 
country to country and even between different communities (Academy for Educational 
Development, 2004). 
 
4.3.2 The funding environment for South African NGOs 
Prior to 1994, NGOs had a multitude of funding options as alluded to in an earlier chapter 
(Camay and Gordon, 2004).  The arrival of democracy in South Africa, however, has 
seen the redirecting of funding to a newly legitimate democratic government (Farouk, 
2004).  South African organisations such the National Funding Agency (NDA), the 
National Lottery and the Umsobomvu Fund were created in an attempt by the 
government to fill the funding gap.  Yet NGOs struggled to diversify their funding 
sources to sustain themselves financially (Camay and Gordon, 2004).   
 
The following sections will deal with the trends in financial support for South African 
NGOs from individual contributions, private sector corporate social responsibility 
programmes, government, national funding agencies, foreign donors, foundations and 
community philanthropic organisations. 
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4.3.2.1 Conventional giving/Individual giving 
According to Camay and Gordon (2004), there is a longstanding tradition of individuals 
making contributions, financial and in-kind, to a wide range of NGOs with which they 
have a particular affinity.  The more enabling tax environment described elsewhere, is 
likely to increase individual philanthropy (Camay and Gordon, 2004). 
 
Limited data is available on individual giving.  A CSO survey conducted in 2001 for the 
CIVICUS Civil Society Index Project, as quoted by Camay and Gordon (2004: 59) 
purports that half of the respondent CSOs at the time received no funding from private 
individual donations and bequests.  The survey further contends that 34% of respondents 
received up to 25% of their funding from this source, and a further 8% receive 
approximately 50%.  This supports the notion that there may be a disinterest in individual 
philanthropy in South Africa.    
 
4.3.2.2 Corporate social responsibility 
Many big South African corporations have sizable social responsibility programmes now 
referred to as “corporate social investment” (CSI) (Kuhlase, 2005; Camay and Gordon, 
2004).   Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) emphasises the business response to 
economic, social and environmental considerations (Kuhlase, 2005).  These programmes 
have the capacity to shape the agenda for social development to suit their own objectives.  
In this context, larger and highly visible projects and NGOs are supported by corporate 
donors to elevate their status.  NGOs therefore are required to be business savvy and 
should develop the ability to integrate the corporate donor’s business strategy with those 
social and development needs they wish to see addressed.  For example, an NGO may 
have a very good media department that could render services to the donor at a fee.  
Alternatively, an NGO project could produce goods needed by the business (Erasmus, 
2000). 
 
An annual publication holds, Camay and Gordon (2004), now tries to track the trends and 
levels of corporate programmes.  The CSI Handbook estimates that the total South 
African corporate CSI budget, including multinationals and parastatals as well as other 
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companies operating in the country, was R1.63 billion in 1999, R1.8 billion in 2000, 
R2.04 billion in 2001, and R2.2 billion in 2002 (CSI Handbook 2000; CSI Handbook 
2002 as quoted in Camay and Gordon, 2004: 61). 
 
In addition to individual companies’ CSI programmes, South Africa has seen the erection 
of a number of business initiatives to contribute to the country’s development.   The Joint 
Education Trust (JET) is an example of such an initiative.  It was established in 1992 by 
approximately 20 leading companies called the Private Sector Initiative with a 
commitment of R500 million.  CSOs, trade unions, business associations, political parties 
and education organisations all became part of this endeavour to transform the country’s 
education and training system.  JET supported over 400 NGOs involved in teacher 
development, early childhood development, adult basic education and youth 
development.  At the end of 2000, JET established the JET Education Services and JET 
Education Management to take over and continue with its work (JET Education Services 
– JET History, 2007). 
 
Other examples of business initiatives are:  The National Business Initiative and the 
Business Trust (Camay and Gordon, 2004; Business Trust, 2007). 
 
These limited examples show that large South African businesses have made a significant 
contribution to funding development activity since the beginning of the 1990s.  Camay 
and Gordon (2004: 67) contend that: 
As with other donor funds, corporate funds are not likely to solve CSOs 
problems regarding financial sustainability.  Whilst corporate donors may 
positively influence the manner in which CSOs manage their planning, 
budgets and expenditure, they are unlikely to become long-term supports of 
organisations.  Also, if CSOs restructure themselves too much to operate 
like their business partners, they may well lose touch with their real 
constituency.  The trend towards “marketisation” may draw CSOs away 
from their mission and mode of operation.   
 
4.3.2.3       Government funding of NGOs 
After 1994, the first significant shift in donor policy occurred.  Foreign ministries closed 
their anti-apartheid budgets and brought aid to South Africa through conventional 
 28
frameworks for development aid.  Bilateral aid thus flowed to government departments 
which reduced the proportion of funding available to NGOs (Kraak, 2000; Galvin, 2000).  
In turn, government would shift funding to NGOs to assist with the implementation of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme.  Some NGOs benefited from the RDP 
fund but it soon became apparent that the RDP office was ill-equipped to deal with 
requests from NGOs and that the role of the office would not be to provide funding. The 
main way in which NGOs could access government funding was through the tendering 
process (Galvin, 2000).  In a number of instances, however, NGOs lacked the capacity to 
prepare proposals and business plans, key elements needed to compete for government 
tenders (Camay and Gordon, 2004). 
 
Camay and Gordon (2004) contend that little data had been collected by government to 
indicate how much funding was provided to NGOs.  In order to draw conclusions on the 
nature of government funding to NGOs, they drew on the work of the CIVICUS Civil 
Society Index study, mentioned in earlier text, and found that: 
 
…23% of respondent CSOs receive up to a quarter of their funding from 
fees for service provision to government and a further 11% receive up to 
half their funding from this source.  For 24% of respondents, government 
grants constitute a quarter of their funds and for 10% such grants make up 
half their income.  This would indicate that government funding is 
increasingly important for some CSOs….[h]alf of the respondents received 
no government funding whatsoever; 51% received no fees for services and 
47% received no grants. Thus a large segment of civil society appears to be 
operating entirely without government support. 
 
(CORE/IDASA/SANGOCO, 2001 as quoted in Camay and Gordon, 2004). 
 
 Still, in its attempts to ensure funding for NGOs, the RDP office acted as a catalyst for 
the formation of two development institutions, the National Development Agency and 
the South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) (Galvin, 2004).  Many NGOs 
developed a “new client” relationship with government.  With this new role, NGOs 
became an arm of the state or were co-opted to some degree and this weakened their 
ability to provide critical voices and to serve as government watchdogs (Bratton and 
Landsberg, 1998).    
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 4.3.2.4       Foreign Donors 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to South Africa prior to 1990 was framed within 
the rubric of anti-apartheid endeavours, with donors deliberately choosing to bypass the 
state and its agencies and instead steered funding primarily to anti-apartheid bodies and 
NGOs, inside and outside the country (Development Assistance: an historical 
perspective, 2000; Kraak, 2000; Erasmus, 2000). 
 
After 1994, ODA was shifted from NGOs to the state within the ambit of the 
government’s overarching Reconstruction and Development Programme (Development 
Assistance:  an historical perspective, 2000).   
 
The table below reflects ODA commitments by individual donors in South African Rand 
since 1994. It shows that the five largest donors are the European Union, USAID, the 
European Investment Bank, Sweden and the German Development Cooperation.  
Collectively these five donors accounted for R12 729 million or 73% of the total ODA 
committed to South Africa over a six year period (Development Assistance:  an historical 
perspective, 2000). 
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Table:  4.2 Overseas Development Assistance to South Africa (ZAR 000s) 
DONOR 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 TOTAL 
Australia 5 571 75 832 9 740 67 635 20 324 * 179 102 
Austria 150 7 922 8 107 8 129 * * 24 304 
Belguim 5 078 44 632 3 476 34 646 6 336 2 892 97 060 
China * * * * 137 37 * 137 137 
Denmark 118 054 84 859 167 060 115 608 11 647 110 000 607 228 
DFID 82 524 93 017 113 504 183 715 245 886 ** 718 646 
EIB 209 819 210 872 299 305 1035 380 828 729 649 283 3 233 388 
EU 428 650 577 862 690 599 663 372 791 744 831 160 3 983 387 
Finland * 9 547 62 006 18 274 * * 89 827 
Flanders 390 2 874 2 723 3 218 4 094 2 422 15 721 
France * 245 010 89 573 * * * 334 583 
GTZ*** 22 873 70 518 382 273 29 150 208 463 117 361 830 638 
IDRC 10 037 10 523 6 439 19 655 18 829 11 981 77 464 
ILO 60 * * * 166 440 666 
IRELAND 10 040 6 684 6 306 52 714 5 549 12 824 94 117 
ITALY 6 221 4 940 3 615 85 298 3 227 1 895 105 196 
JAPAN 9 808 16 341 324 236 320 539 68 594 49 725 789 243 
NEW ZEALAND 1 116 * 72 7 307 3 659 3 246 15 400 
NORWAY 139 432 49 659 21 590 88 410 83 760 29 723 412 574 
NETHERLANDS 9 858 94 240 124 691 96 993 132 228 102 202 560 212 
SPAIN * 8 082 1 002 6 709 8 451 12 294 36 538 
SDC 26 925 19 957 74 403 58 008 60 064 20 933 260 290 
SIDA 88 071 259 696 58 533 242 268 181 757 271 938 1 102 263 
UNDP 1 913 63 177 9 054 57 000 28 703 25 144 184 991 
UNESCO * * 728 2 334 * * 3 062 
UNFPA * 3 445 6 870 9 761 667 * 20 753 
UNICEF * * * 22 140 19 029 24 284 65 453 
USAID 1 333920 870 614 566 766 706 168 102 331 * 3 579799 
WB 2 661 * * * 1 975 6 296 10 932 
TOTAL 2 513171 2 830303 3 032671 3 934431 2 973359 2 286043 17569978 
* Data not provided by donor 
** Donor indicated that data was not yet available (closure of financial year) 
*** Strictly speaking, GTZ is not a donor but an implementing agency for the German ODA 
programme. 
Source:  Development Assistance:  an historical perspective (2000: 24) 
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Donors have over time changed their approaches to grant-making on an ongoing basis in 
ways that have been detrimental to NGOs. Donors have rationalised their programmes to 
focus on only a few sectors, regions or localities.   A number of localised NGOs were left 
out of the funding loop.  Some donors have instituted new approaches to funding which 
emphasise competition rather than collaboration amongst NGOs for example: 
competitive, tender-like processes.  Others are looking to leave behind sustainable NGOs 
which they can claim as the result of their funding programmes.  Many donors are 
looking to cut down on their administrative costs and are therefore making fewer, larger 
grants to NGOs.  A prevalent donor policy channelling a large portion of their funds 
through government or the government-created National Development Agency may also 
facilitate government control or co-optation of NGOs through favouritism shown to 
political allies, withdrawal of funds from NGOs which engage in advocacy critical of 
government policy or implementation, and loss of initiative amongst NGOs forced to 
implement only activities consistent with government-designed programmes (Camay and 
Gordon, 2004).   
 
4.3.2.5        Foundations 
Grant-making foundations, local as well as those based in countries such as the United 
States and Germany, have played an important role in supporting South Africa’s NGO 
sector.  Foundations each have their own priorities and criteria for funding.  However, 
due to their own governance structures and considerable flexibility in-country, they have 
been better able to respond to the real needs of civil society (Camay and Gordon, 2004). 
 
Local grant-making foundations, largely created by major corporations such as Anglo-
American, Liberty Life, Standard Bank, and others have supported a range of NGOs over 
the years.  Recently many parastatal organisations have established foundations.  
Prominent amongst these are Eskom, Telkom, Transnet and Rand Water (Camay and 
Gordon, 2004). 
 
As alluded to in Section 4.4.1.1 of this chapter, American foundations such as the Ford 
Foundation, the C.S. Mott Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the W.K.Kellogg 
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Foundation, the Andrew.W. Mellon Foundation and the South African offshoot the Open 
Society Foundation have been especially supportive of the South African NGO sector 
(Stacey and Aksartova, 2002; Camay and Gordon, 2004; USAID/South Africa: 2000).  
Carnegie’s grants to South Africa, for example, encouraged the establishment and growth 
of national, regional and international networks and partnerships of researchers and 
leaders in governmental and non-governmental organisations (Stacey and Aksartova, 
2002).  The Ford Foundation, on the other hand firstly sought to improve the way citizens 
participated.  It secondly focused on the democratic process with the aim to  strengthen 
the non-profit sector thus bolstering democratic institutions whilst broadening the base of 
citizen participation in government (USAID/South Africa, 2000; Camay and Gordon, 
2000; Stacey and Aksartova, 2002).   
 
Table 4.3 below indicates areas of grant-making of six United States Foundations to 
South Africa for the period 1988 to 1996.  
 
Table 4.3:  Areas of grant-making of six U.S. Foundations to South Africa, 1988-
1996. 
 Civil 
Society 
Universities Education Health/Welfare Development Other 
 % % % % % % 
1988 14 42 13 26 2 3 
1989 31 27 20 2 18 2 
1990 14 45 30 7 4 <1 
1991 20 27 31 4 10 8 
1992 29 33 7 20 4 7 
1993 33 18 13 25 6 5 
1994 23 11 22 36 4 4 
1995 19 13 8 33 20 7 
1996 32 23 12 22 6 5 
Source:  Stacey and Aksartova (2002: 385)  
  
Civil society, universities and health/welfare each garnered almost a quarter of 
foundation money between 1988 and 1996, with civil society marginally the best funded.  
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Civil society grant-making constituted a relatively more stable proportion of the dollar 
amount granted to South Africa each year than universities and health/welfare grant-
making.  Civil society always received between 14% and 33% of grants in terms of value 
in South Africa, while the grants to universities and health and welfare followed 
something of a boom-and-bust cycle, fluctuating between 11% and 45%, and 2% and 
36% respectively (Stacey and Aksartova, 2002). 
 
Whilst a variety of official donors began to lose interest in South Africa and its civil 
society after the country’s transition to democracy, the aforementioned foundations 
remained stalwart supporters of the country and its NGOs.  These foundations however 
predominantly fund professionalised, formalised, hierarchically ordered NGOs in the 
fields of advocacy, research, training and government-watching (Stacey and Aksartova, 
2002).  
 
4.3.2.6      National funding agencies 
Since the mid-1980s, several funding agencies have been established at a national level to 
channel funds to civil society for development and poverty alleviation work.  These 
agencies were established either by the government or by donors, or by both (Camay and 
Gordon, 2004).  The next section will explore four of these agencies namely:  the Kagiso 
Trust, the Independent Development Trust, the National Development Agency and the 
National Lotteries. 
 
Kagiso Trust 
The Kagiso Trust was founded as an independent trust in 1986 with funding from the 
European Union.  It was initially established to fund the activities of CSOs involved in 
the struggle against apartheid at a time when donors directed funds away from an 
“illegitimate” South African government.  The EU was Kagiso’s  major donor, followed 
by the governments of Japan, Finland and France, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 
Swedish International Development Agency.  Between 1986 and 1995, the Trust invested 
R750 million in grants in a variety of programmes, providing employment, education, 
housing and social development.  The trust has subsequently established a consultancy 
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wing, Kagiso Trust Consultancy that offers services to other donors, corporate social 
responsibility programmes and government.  Their rationale for managing other donor 
funds to support CSOs is based on the need for an impartial fund manager (Kagiso 
Group, 2007; Camay and Gordon, 2004). 
 
Independent Development Trust 
The Independent Development Trust (IDT) was established in 1990 by the national 
government.  Their original mandate was to disburse a grant of R2 billion in a manner 
that would best serve the development of disadvantaged communities in South Africa.  Its 
programmes of operations included, for example:  capital subsidy schemes, clinic and 
school building, health and welfare projects, water and sanitation projects, in-service 
training, land reform projects and NGO support.  The IDT evolved as a development 
facilitator in addition to the prescribed funding distributor.  It described its own functions 
as ranging from that of “facilitator, broker or intermediary between development 
partners” and establishing networks as well as providing advice and technical support to 
organisations, NGOs and delivering services” (Independent Development Trust:  IDT 
Background, 2007; Gardner and Macanda, 2003).  Because the IDT was established by 
the National Party Government, it did not have much credibility among CSOs involved in 
development.  This necessitated a new funding mechanism for NGOs (Gardner and 
Macanda, 2003). 
 
National Development Agency 
According to Gardner and Macanda (2003), the history of the National Development 
Agency (NDA) may be traced back to the role of NGOs in South African society.  Prior 
to 1994, funding was easily accessible but this situation changed after 1994.  NGOs 
struggled in the new funding environment and a new funding structure was called for.  
The establishment of a National Funding Agency was perceived as a possible solution.   
 
The National Development Agency (NDA) was constituted in accordance with the 
National Development Agency Act (Act 108 of 1998), promulgated in April 2000.  The 
aim of the agency is to promote an appropriate and sustainable partnership between 
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government and civil society organisations to implement the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme.  It is to act as a conduit for funding CSO development work 
and to create a platform for interaction between government and CSOs on development 
policy and practice.  The vision of the agency is to become the country’s key funding 
agency addressing poverty and contributing toward the creation of a healthy, 
economically vibrant and stable civil society (Camay and Gordon, 2004).  Bridget 
Masango, executive director of marketing and communication at the National 
Development Agency in 2002, as quoted in Farouk (2002b), provided a different take on 
the role of the NDA and indicated that the NDA was primarily a development agency and 
secondarily a funding agency with capacity-building as its primary objective (Farouk, 
2002b). 
 
Still, according to Section 3 of the National Development Agency Act, the primary 
objective of the NDA is to contribute to the eradication of poverty and its causes by 
granting funding to CSOs for the purposes of: 
- carrying out projects and programmes aimed at meeting development needs of 
poor communities, and 
- strengthening the institutional capacity of other CSOs involved in direct 
service provision to poor communities. 
The secondary objectives of the NDA are to: 
- promote consultation, dialogue, debate and sharing of development 
experiences between CSOs and relevant organs of state, and 
- undertake research and publication aimed at providing the basis for 
development policy. 
(Gardner and Macanda, 2003). 
 
In the course of its first three years of operation, the NDA learned some hard lessons after 
confronting problems related to management, funding allocation and disbursement, and 
strategy.  In the 2001 financial year, the NDA distributed only 26% of its available funds. 
R48 million donated from the EU, for example, 18 months prior, were not distributed.  
The NDA was accused of being incapable of efficiently attending to the obligations of the 
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NGO sector.  A range of South Africa’s high-priority areas remained underfunded, for 
example:  adult education, early childhood development, HIV/AIDS awareness, domestic 
violence, land reform, human rights education, and rural local development (Camay and 
Gordon, 2004).    
 
Further problems cited were, amongst others, the lack of continuity, institutional 
memory, system-level expertise and shared experience. It was also reported that the 
initial and subsequent allocations, especially from government, were far from sufficient.  
In 1999, R100 million was allocated: R90 million in 2000, R92 million in 2001 and R96 
million for 2002 (Gardner and Macanda, 2003).    Whilst the South African government 
maintains a high level of funding, many NGOs are unable to access it via the National 
Development Agency in the Department of Social Development (allAfrica, 2002).  
Gardner and Macanda (2003) suggest that there is insufficient congruence between the 
funds committed and disbursed by the NDA to provinces and areas where poor people 
live and recommends that funds should be committed in order of need. 
 
National Lottery 
The National Lotteries Board is a statutory body established in terms of the National 
Lotteries Act (Act 57 of 1997).  The board is responsible for the regulation of all lotteries 
conducted in South Africa, including the National Lottery, as well as other private and 
society lotteries.  Although the board reports to Parliament annually, it operates 
independently.  The money raised through the sale of Lotto tickets and scratch cards, 
after value added tax (VAT), is distributed according to the following formula: 
- 50% goes to prizes; 
- 20% goes to the licensee, and  
- 30% goes to good causes (National Lottery Distribution Trust Fund 
[NLDTF]). 
The National Lotteries Act (Act 57 of 1997) prescribes the purposes or which funds 
invested in the NLDTF can be used by distinguishing five categories for which money is 
to be allocated.  The categories are: 
- The Reconstruction and Development Programme; 
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- Charities; 
- Arts, Culture and National Heritage; 
- Sport and Recreation, and  
- Miscellaneous Purposes. 
(Louw, 2002). 
 
From the National Lotteries’ inception, CSOs have been nervous that the billions of rands 
being raised each year will not be used appropriately and that they would lose out.  In 
reaction to the lottery pay-outs in 2001, controversy raged when service delivery charities 
complained about what they perceived to be excessive amounts allocated to organisations 
in the sport and recreation category.  It was felt that this category did not benefit 
previously disadvantaged communities.  Complaints were also lodged about the selection 
of beneficiaries and the initial payments (Camay and Gordon, 2004;  Louw, 2002;  
Development Update, 2001). 
 
Camay and Gordon (2004: 93) contend that: 
 
The evolution of these national funding agencies, and their set-up and 
transformation processes, are indicative of the continuing struggles for 
resources and control over development objectives between civil society 
and government.  They also demonstrate the difficulties faced in terms of 
recasting various institutions – both state and independent – to become 
consistent with the revised agendas and modalities of the new South 
Africa. 
 
4.3.2.7      Community philanthropic organisations  
Community philanthropic organisations such as the Western Cape Community Chest and 
community foundations are based on the belief that there are untapped assets in 
communities throughout the world.  If these assets are gathered, held in public trust, and 
managed effectively, they can be used to support sustainable community development 
and reduce developing countries’ dependence on external sources of funding (Pearson as 
quoted in Camay and Gordon, 2004). 
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Community Chests 
The Community Chests in South Africa are equivalent to the U.S-based United Ways.  
The Western Cape Community Chest, for example, funds 520 different organisations, 
with an emphasis on poverty alleviation, children, mental health, AIDS education and 
prevention, and orphans.  In addition to making grants to non-profits in the Western 
Cape, the Community Chest has advocated for changes in the national tax laws to make it 
more appealing for individuals and corporations to make donations to non-profit 
organisations (Description of NGOs visited as part of NCCED’s Study Tour to South 
Africa, 2007). 
 
Community Foundations   
According to Kuhlase (2005), community foundations have a key role to play in bringing 
together stakeholders such as civil society, the private and public sectors.  A community 
foundation, maintains Legodi (2003: 1), can be defined as: 
 
 …[a] philanthropic and development institution (part of the non-profit, 
non-governmental sector) working in a specified geographical area, 
dedicated to addressing critical needs and improving the quality of life in 
that area.  Its broad purpose is to promote and support local philanthropy 
and community development activities  through constructive grant-
making. 
 
 
An early example in South Africa of a community foundation was a joint initiative by a 
civic organisation, a CSO and a local corporation to establish a community trust (similar 
to a community foundation).  The eMbalenhele Civic Organisation, Planact and Sasol 
developed an agreement which stipulated that the community would give its authority for 
contributions to be made, and that a trust be created and registered in order to control the 
application of funds (Coeser and Walker as quoted in Camay and Gordon, 2004). 
 
Currently six community foundations are supported through the Industrial Development 
Corporation’s (IDC) R50 million Foundation Fund established in 2003.  There are three 
in the Western Cape, one in Mpumalanga , one in Kwa-Zulu Natal and one in the Eastern 
Cape, with equity stakes (shareholding/ownership) ranging from 3% to 49% .  There are 
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long-term social and financial investments, where the dividends will flow directly to the 
community foundation (Kuhlase, 2005). Other community foundation programmes have 
been funded by US Foundations such as Ford, Mott and Kellogg (Legodi, 2003). 
 
Camay and Gordon (2004) caution that not all community organisations may succeed, as 
the initial endowment (the capital sum used to generate annual income for grant-making) 
may be difficult to raise.   
 
4.3.3 Funding sources: Advantages and disadvantages  
When relying on donor funding, NGOs may have to face various negative and positive 
aspects, linked to the sources of funding (Glaser, 2004).  Table 4.4 below, provide an 
exposition of typical funding sources and the advantages and disadvantages attached to 
each. 
Table 4.4:  Funding Sources:  Advantages and Disadvantages. 
FUNDING SOURCE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Individual Largest source of giving; 
 
Ongoing source one can build; 
 
Once a giver, also an advocate; 
 
Volunteers are good source of 
money. 
 
Costly to develop, small return 
per individual unit;  
 
Hard to generate unless broad-
based direct service appeal; 
 
Risky for inexperienced; 
 
Need significant assistance from 
the organisation’s board and 
volunteers. 
 
Large-Family Foundations Source of large sums of money; 
 
Accessible, professional staff; 
 
Clear guidelines, process; 
 
Most likely to research your 
request; 
 
Board of volunteers can help, 
not always key. 
 
Start-up funds only; 
 
Lengthy process; 
 
More difficult to access through 
personal influence;  
 
Proposals may be more lengthy. 
Community Foundations Much like large-family 
foundations;  
 
Staff may be sufficient. 
There is a host of foundations 
within foundations; 
 
Most money is earmarked, 
“special funds”. 
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Small-Family Foundations May fund ongoing operating 
expenses;  
 
Personal influence with board 
members helps;  
 
Guidelines often broad; 
 
Not very fussy about grant 
format. 
Hard to access, no professional 
staff; 
 
Often not large sums of money; 
 
Without personal influence, may 
not be possible. 
Large Corporations/Corporate 
Foundations 
Can be source of large sums of 
money; 
 
Smaller amounts of money may 
be ongoing; 
 
Often have accessible, 
professional staff;  
 
May be tied to volunteer 
involvement; 
 
Business Strategy may be clear; 
 
Source of cause-related 
marketing. 
Large sums of money are not 
ongoing; 
 
Hard to get around staff; 
 
Must be within their guidelines; 
 
Not likely to contribute if not 
headquartered locally or have a 
public consumer base; 
 
Often want board 
representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Small Corporations Very informal approach; 
 
Money may be ongoing; 
 
Personal connections will 
suffice; 
 
Neighbourhood focus will help. 
Small amounts of money; 
 
Narrow range of interest; 
 
Personal contacts are key. 
Federated Funds Steady source of relatively large 
sums of money; 
 
Clear process; 
 
Professional staff, can be 
agency staff driven. 
Generally cannot be start-up 
organisation; 
 
Must be social service and fit 
priority focus; 
 
Very lengthy entry process; 
 
Very time consuming as must 
be part of yearly fund raising 
process, with periodic in-depth 
review. 
Government Large sums of money possible; 
 
Process is set, clear; 
 
Political clout helps; 
 
May be a source of ongoing 
money. 
May only pay by unit of service, 
fluctuates; 
 
Unspent monies may be 
returned; 
 
Difficult record-keeping. 
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Churches and Organisations Often looking for group 
projects. 
In-kind services most likely; 
 
Need to fit their service focus, 
neighbourhood or religious 
outlook. 
Source:  McNamara (1999). 
Also see:  Glaser (2004); Atkinson and Messing (2002). 
 
In concluding this section, Camay and Gordon (2004) contend that a culture of 
dependency and entitlement prevails amongst some NGOs.  The authors report that there 
is a need to build public understanding of philanthropy, social responsibility and 
individual citizen responsibility and voluntarism to contribute to the public good.  NGOs 
are cautioned to work hard at achieving sustainability.  Diversifying funding sources by 
using some of the funding channels alluded to in this chapter may be a way in which 
NGOs can ensure financial sustainability, usually threatened by traditional donor settings 
(Glaser, 2004).  It is better for an NGO to hold a mixed funding portfolio instead of 
depending on a single donor to meet current and future needs (Viravaidya and Hayssen, 
2001; Layton, 2006). 
 
4.4 FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE AS AN INDICATOR OF SUSTAINABILITY 
In spite of vast amounts of money flowing to NGOs, surprisingly little information and 
data is available on NGO expenditure.  In the absence of such historical data, the extent 
of NGO expenditure in general proves hard to trace.  The next section will nonetheless 
give a brief overview of NGO expenses as espoused in the annual reports of a few NGOs 
and general views of NGO expenditure put forward by a few publications and experts.  
The concepts “capital expenditure” and “current expenditure” will also be defined. 
 
4.4.1 Capital expenditure 
Pauw et al (2002: 65)  contend that capital expenditure is: 
…[o]f a non-recurrent nature – it is usually once-off expenditure.  It is for 
durable acquisitions.  This type of expenditure usually indicates economic 
growth of an entity, for example, purchase of land, acquisition and 
erection of buildings, engineering works and the improvement of existing 
works to extend lifetime.  It further includes the purchase of machinery, 
equipment, computers, vehicles, tools, furniture and buildings.  The 
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general definition of capital expenditure includes the acquisition of all 
items with a lifespan exceeding one year. 
 
4.4.2 Current  expenditure 
Current expenditure, according to Pauw et al (2002: 65), is: 
 
…[e]xpenditure of a recurrent nature.  It usually repeats itself year after 
year – for example, salaries and administrative expenditure such as 
travel, professional services and renting equipment such as photocopiers.  
Current expenditure is expenditure not intended for the acquisition of 
assets.  Expenditure on the normal maintenance of capital goods and 
interest payments is also considered to be current expenditure.  
 
 
Many donor grants and donations carry restrictions on the types of expenses that they 
may cover.  The most common restriction is to cover only direct programme costs 
(Viravaidya and Hayssen, 2001).  It would appear that donors are less willing to fund 
traditional overhead expenses such as salaries, rent and equipment or any other cost 
related to support services (Layton, 2006;  Virayvaidya and Hayssen, 2001).  NGOs are 
expected to contribute to these costs on their own, or at least cover an increasing share of 
these costs over time (Virayvaidya and Hayssen, 2001).  Donors couch their reluctance 
for core funding in terms of concerns of not wanting to be the major donor to any NGO 
because of fears of generating an overreliance and dependency (Bornstein, 2001). 
 
In order to get an idea of an NGO’s expenses, the researcher perused the annual reports 
of three NGOs which reflect the following expenses: advertising, auditing, accountancy 
and other services, bad debts, bank charges, car hire, cleaning and office sundries, 
communications, computer software and support, conferences, workshops and seminars, 
consultancy fees, depreciation, donations, electricity and water, entertainment, equipment 
(maintenance and rentals), finance charges and interest, freight, fund-raising expenses, 
hotel accommodation, human resources, insurance and licenses, lease of motor vehicles 
and equipment, legal fees, motor vehicle expenses, office renovations, postage, telex, fax 
and telephone, printing and stationery, projects, rates and taxes, regional services levies, 
relocation expenses, rent, repairs and maintenance, salaries, sale of assets, Skills 
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Development Levy, staff development, staff and board meetings, staff recruitment, 
sundries, subscriptions, periodicals and books, sundry equipment, sundry furniture and 
fittings, travelling expenses, website maintenance and administrative fees reimbursed 
from projects  (IDASA Annual Report 2001, Community Law Centre Annual Report 
2003, Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust Annual Report 2005) 
 
The above reflects that whilst the mission, philosophies, client bases, skills and 
experiences may differ across various NGO sectors, individual NGOs have designed their 
programmes in such a way to recover the costs of operational and capital expenses, which 
donors are reluctant to fund.  It is imperative that the costs of an NGO’s core activities, 
not exceed the inflow of grants and donations (Viravaidya and Hayssen, 2001).   Good 
cash flow management is also important and requires that information on: 
- cash available;  
- expected revenue inflows; 
- expected capital and operating outflows, and 
- financing flows 
be readily available (Pauw et al., 2002).  Cash flow budgets are also essential to the 
management of cash and requires planned inflow and outflow of cash through the 
organisation.  This provides the base plan against which the management of working 
capital takes place (Pauw et al., 2002).  
 
Alex Burger, (2007) an MBA graduate, employed by the World Bank and working in 
Chad, contends that a sustainable balance between capital expenditure and current 
expenditure occurs when:  
 
No more than 15% of an NGO’s budget is spent on overall 
administrative expenses.  That means anything that cannot be 
charged or allocated directly to a programme for example fund-
raising, overall administrative costs and so on.  As for capital 
expenses there is no rule that exists.  Often NGOs do separate 
capital expense campaigns because this is a big ticket item, and falls 
outside of a regular budget.  So for example a building would fall 
under this category.  Other capital expenses such as computers and 
so on should be “folded” into programmatic budgets. 
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When Tracey Bailey (2007), National Coordinator of an NGO, was asked to respond to 
the question around how a sustainable balance between capital expenditure and current 
expenditure of an NGO could be attained, she responded by saying: 
 
I have absolutely NO idea!  
 
 
A former stakeholder of a different NGO, who wishes to remain anonymous indicated, 
that whilst being involved in NGO endeavours for a number of years, he too did not 
know what a sustainable financial ratio between capital and recurrent expenditure, would 
be.  When feedback was solicited from two administrators, the first  located in the School 
of Public Health at the University of the Western Cape and the second at PLAAS also 
located at the aforementioned university, around an appropriate apportionment of 
funding between the operational and capital cost of an NGO they  were “silent” on the 
matter.  This indicated that they may not have an answer to this very important question. 
 
4.5 SUSTAINABILITY OF NGOs (DONOR FOCUS) 
Foreign donors are changing their approach to grant-making to South African NGOs in 
several ways (Camay and Gordon, 2000; Baden, Hassim and Meintjies, 1999).  Many 
donors have rationalised their programmes to focus on only a few sectors or regions or 
localities of interest (Camay and Gordon, 2000).   
 
4.5.1 Donors funding specific economic sectors 
Before the year 2005, USAID, for example, planned to spend 400 million US dollars in 
six sectors in South Africa, namely democracy and governance, education, health, 
economic policy, micro-enterprises and housing (Camay and Gordon, 2000).  Some 
agencies such as SIDA, UNDP, UNICEF and Norad promote gender-sensitive 
approaches in all programmes which they fund.  Funds are also provided for gender-
specific activities.  Other organisations such as the World Bank and GTZ do not provide 
for gender-specific programmes.  Thus far, donor support has concentrated on: 
- policy and institutional development:  support for the national gender machinery; 
- political empowerment:  training for women in Parliament and local government; 
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- legal rights and violence against women:  support for research, training and 
services, and 
- social sector support:  gender equity in education, health care, welfare, housing 
and water. 
(Baden, Hassim and Meintjies:  1999). 
 
4.5.2 Variations across countries in donor-NGO funding arrangements 
Generally, in terms of donor-NGO funding arrangements, there are variations across 
countries.  In Australia, there are 32 different funding mechanisms through which NGOs 
can obtain funds from the government.    The dominant type of NGO activity funded by 
donors today remains projects and programmes put forward for funding by the NGOs 
themselves, and utilised for projects and programmes in particular developing countries.  
In the United Kingdom, this is facilitated through the Overseas Development 
Administration’s Joint Funding Scheme; in Sweden through the NGO Programme and in 
Finland, through the NGO Support Programme.  Additionally, a small proportion of 
donor funds are channelled through a range of international NGOs, whilst most bilateral 
donors have also provided funds to NGOs specialising in sending volunteers abroad, and 
to NGOs working on education and information initiatives within donor countries 
(Overseas Development Institute, 1995). 
 
4.5.3 Conditions attached to funding 
Different donors have also applied varying degrees of conditionality to the non-project 
funds they provide for NGO work.  In contrast to the United Kingdom, which has 
stringent conditions attached to official funds used for development education and 
information work, other donors, such as the Scandinavians, have a more permissive 
approach and even provide funds for activities and campaigns critical of official aid 
policy (Overseas Development Institute, 1995). 
 
4.5.4 Funding attached to NGO leadership 
In the context of funding attached to NGO leadership, Okiama (2004) reports that in 
Kenya, a charismatic leader is regarded as an asset to an NGO.  Foreign funding is 
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attracted by NGO leaders who display eloquence, energy, purpose and courage, a 
proficiency in the English language and excellent public relations skills.  However, once 
a leader obtains national or foreign support, the aims and objectives of the NGO are soon 
forgotten.  And, as the realities of global politics and donor preferences shift, so does the 
original vision of the NGO.  The Kenyan government has been called upon to put 
forward laws providing for the monitoring of operations and accounts of NGOs in the 
interest of consistency, transparency and accountability (Okiama, 2004). 
 
Niloy Banerjee (n.d.). drawing on general experiences of working with NGOs on a 
DFID- funded project of the Charities Aid Foundation India, contends that, in India, an 
NGO leader needs to have a reasonable level of contact with donors and key staff in a 
donor agency.  This, the author maintains, ensures a level of comfort on both sides and it 
is not infrequent to find donors line up behind a leader because he or she meets certain 
requirements of comfort even if the person is a known autocratic.   
 
During the 1980s, leadership of the South African Council of Churches and the United 
Democratic Fund for example, despite the apartheid government’s endeavours to control 
NGOs in general and foreign funding in particular, was able to attract considerable 
foreign support (Gerhart, 2000; Camay and Gordon, 2000). 
 
In concluding this section, the researcher contends that donor funding is attached to NGO 
leadership.   
 
The next section will conclude this chapter. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore financial management and financial 
sustainability practices within NGOs in general.  Concepts pertaining to funding 
arrangements from international donors, and independent scholars were explored.  
Academic literature in the principles of financial management for NGOs, was assessed.  
The chapter also investigated issues pertaining to income and expenditure of NGOs with 
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the view to drawing lessons of experiences on global funding mobilisation practices for 
replication in South Africa.   The following conclusions are drawn. 
 
In terms of financial management, the chapter established that budgeting, accounting, 
financial reporting and management control were the most essential tools for governance, 
accountability, planning and management in non-profit organisations and, accordingly, 
NGOs are now required to develop an appropriate financial management system.  In this 
context the NDA has put forward a document entitled:  Basic Financial Management for 
community-based organisations which aims to teach South African NGOs basic financial 
record-keeping skills (NDA, n.d.).    
 
Good practice in NGO financial management furthermore includes:  keeping an accurate 
record of all financial transactions (accounting records); linking the budget to the 
organisation’s strategic and operational plans (financial planning); producing 
management accounts so that managers can compare the organisation’s progress against 
the budget and then make decisions about the future (financial monitoring); producing 
financial statements for outside scrutiny to demonstrate how funds have been applied in 
the past (financial monitoring); having internal controls or checks and balances in place 
to safeguard the organisation’s assets and to manage risk (internal controls) and having 
an audit committee or auditor to assist in the quality and reliability of financial and other 
performance information used. 
 
Financial control endeavours should include proper planning, programming and reporting 
mechanisms.  In the absence of clear financial management policies and practices, the 
NGO will meet an early demise. 
 
 In terms of funding mobilisation, the research revealed that non-profit funding sources 
vary in predictability, controllability, linkage to organisational activities, and the range 
and amount of management effort they require.  To source adequate funding, the NGO 
sector is required to construct a well-executed fundraising strategy which contains 
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elements such as diversification, sustainability, creativity and inclusiveness.  In this 
context, the NDA can assist.   
 
The role of the NDA as conduit for state funding in the South African context, was also 
explored.  Research revealed that it has become increasingly difficult for South African 
NGOs to secure funds as it would appear that donors choose to spend money in areas 
different from those in which most NGOs function.  In conjunction with assisting NGOs 
around basic financial management practices, the NDA can play a facilitative role in the 
NGO proposal construction process particularly when it pertains to fundraising.  
 
The research also revealed that more literature is available on NGO income than NGO 
expenditures.  The latter is an area, which requires more extensive research and 
exploration. 
 
The chapter found that, irrespective of the business of the NGO, managers of NGOs have 
to pay as much attention (if not more) to finding funds as they do to using those funds.  
As global needs continue to change, NGOs increasingly find that available funding is 
inadequate to meet current programme needs.  International, national and local donor 
funding will not be sufficient sources of sustainable NGO income.  International donors 
have various conditions attached to their income, and funding from government impacts 
on the autonomy of NGOs.  Donations from local corporations and government 
development agencies are closely linked to national development imperatives.  Individual 
giving,  too, appears underdeveloped. 
    
One of the challenges South African NGOs faces is to devise a sustainable framework of 
local resource mobilisation.  A possible solution is to garner financial and in-kind support 
form local allies, such as the media, private business, private individuals and the public in 
general.  This could steer NGOs away from a detrimental dependence on international 
donors. 
NESsT’s (Nonprofit Enterprise and Self-sustainability Team) - an international, non-
profit company committed to strengthening the financial sustainability of CSOs that work 
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for social change in Central Europe and Latin America - proposition of self-financing as 
an alternative to the more traditional fundraising approaches (explored throughout the 
chapter) appears an attractive alternative funding framework too.   
 
The researcher proposes that the aforementioned funding approach, in conjunction with 
the mobilisation of local revenue sources, be considered as a funding framework by the 
South African NGO sector.  While some NGOs have adopted the one approach over the 
other, a combination of the aforementioned approaches may prove rewarding.  When 
financial sources are diversified, the chances of an NGO sustaining itself is enhanced.   
 
Whilst NGOs in developing nations will rely on financial resources from developed 
countries for some time to come, it is imperative that they be proactive and devise 
strategies to determine their destiny. 
  
It is agreed. NGOs need a variety of financing tools and sources in order to reduce risk 
and to sustain their work. 
      
The next chapter will provide an assessment of selected NGO case studies in South 
Africa. 
 
 50
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CASE STUDIES:  AN ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED NGO CASE STUDIES IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1. BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comparative case assessment of selected 
NGOs in South Africa.  To facilitate this process, important historical and contemporary 
theoretical expositions of NGO experiences, as lessons for governance and funding 
arrangements for current South African NGOs, have been gleaned from Chapter Two of 
this dissertation.  These theories and paradigms will form the basis of analysis in this  
chapter.  Specific attention was paid to NGOs operating in South Africa’s new political 
economy where the demise of apartheid brought about fundamental changes in the form 
and function of the state, which included the restructuring of cooperative governance 
within the different spheres of government and civil society.  Survival strategies 
employed by NGOs beyond 1990 suggest that NGOs had to redefine their roles in 
relation to service delivery and to the state.  In turn, the South African government 
realised that the NGO sector can be a developmental partner to the state assuming various 
roles.   
 
Research findings suggest that a large number of CSOs which emerged between 1990 
and 1997 enjoyed the status of Section 21 companies or trusts, and secured funds from 
foreign and domestic sources in particular consultation fees, services charges, tenders for 
contracts and private donations.  The longer-term sustainability of these CSOs appeared 
linked to the improved institutional environment in which they functioned.  With regard 
to financial management practices, beyond 1994, donors took a stringent stance towards 
financial accounting and programme reporting requirements.  In terms of governance, 
internal governance structures of NGOs emerged to take the form of governing boards.  
In this context, governance, emphasised organisational procedures and the process of 
governing. 
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Key issues identified around governance propose that the four basic elements of good 
governance namely accountability, participation, predictability and transparency are 
imperative within NGOs.  By embracing these four elements, NGOs will not only 
enhance organisational stability, but will also ensure their future sustainability. 
 
With regard to financial sustainability of NGOs, research shows that irrespective of the 
business of the NGO, managers of NGOs have to pay much attention to accessing funds.  
A possible solution to ensure an NGO’s financial security is to mobilise financial and in-
kind support from local allies such as the media, private business, private individuals and 
the public in general.  Self-financing from own income as an alternative to the more 
traditional fundraising approaches appears an attractive funding option to increase 
sustainability.  The researcher contends that a combination of the aforementioned 
approaches would prove a much more sustainable funding prospect.  When financial 
sources are diversified, the chances of an NGO sustaining itself financially is 
substantially enhanced.  NGOs thus need a variety of financing tools and sources in order 
to reduce risk and to sustain their work. 
 
Developmental non-governmental organisations are mostly a funded sector, depending on 
funds from the community, businesses, government or from foreign governments, 
foundations and businesses as alluded to earlier (Mazibuko, 2000; Kihato, 2001; Fehnel, 
1997).  Despite its dependence on donations, NGOs are known to have a reputation for 
offering specific advantages over more bureaucratic government structures in the delivery 
of a range of social, economic, technical and political objectives.  Research suggests that 
NGOs are better able to reach the poor, that they are flexible and responsive and that they 
can offer tailored and innovative service delivery interventions  (Martin, n.d.; Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996; Bourne & Seager, 2000).   
 
To test the above assertions, and the theoretical propositions around governance and 
financial sustainability of NGOs in South Africa and NGOs in general, three specific 
cases were decided upon.  Section 5.2.4 of this chapter will elaborate on the selected 
cases. 
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The next section will reflect on the research methodology this study employed. 
 
5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
According to Hutchinson as quoted in Brynard and Hanekom (2006: 3) “research is a 
scientific investigation and study undertaken to establish facts and thereby reach new 
conclusions.  It can be distinguished from other human activities by its systematic 
nature”.  “Research methodology” contend Welman, Kruger and Mitchell (2005:  2) 
“considers the logic behind research methods and techniques.”   
 
A distinction between the terms “methodology” and “methods” needs to be made.  Bailey 
as quoted in Rashe (2006: 5) suggests that “methodology refers to the philosophy of the 
research process.”  It aims to investigate the motivation of the research and helps the 
reader to understand in the broadest possible terms not only the products of scientific 
inquiry but the process itself.   Methods, on the other hand, refer to the range of 
approaches used in research to gather data which are used as a basis for inference and 
interpretation, for explanation and prediction (Cohen and Manion, 1980: 26).  
 
In the human sciences, two basis research methodologies can be distinguished namely 
qualitative methodology and quantitative methodology (Brynard and Hanekom, 2006:  
36). 
 
For the purpose of this study, a qualitative research methodology was applied.  
Qualitative methodology refers to “research that produces descriptive data – generally the 
participant’s own written or spoken words pertaining to their experience or perception.  
Usually no numbers or counts are assigned to these observations” (Brynard and 
Hanekom, 2006: 37).  In qualitative research methods such as case studies, in-depth 
interviewing of key informants, participant observation, questionnaires and perusal of 
personal documents such as life histories, diaries and autobiographies are used (Brynard 
and Hanekom, 2006: 37).   
 
The most frequently used techniques of data collection within qualitative research are: 
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- A literature review; 
- Questionnaires; 
- Interviews, and 
- Observation. 
The use of three of the above techniques within this study is discussed in the sections 
below. 
 
5.2.1 Literature review 
According to Babbie and Mouton (2001: 565) “every research report should be placed in 
the context of the general body of scientific knowledge….(t)he reader should be brought 
up to date with previous research in the area, pointing to general agreements and 
disagreements among the previous researchers”.   According to  Mouly (1970: 126) “the 
review of the literature is an exacting task, calling for a deep insight and clear perspective 
of the overall field.  It is a crucial step which invariably minimises the risk of dead-end 
rejected topics, rejected studies, wasted effort, trial-and-error activities oriented towards 
approaches already discarded by previous investigators and – even more importantly, 
erroneous findings based on faulty research designs.  It promotes a greater understanding 
of the problem and its crucial aspects and ensures the avoidance of unnecessary 
duplication.  It provides comparative data on the basis of which to evaluate and interpret 
the significance of one’s findings and, in addition, contributes to the scholarship of the 
investigator.” 
 
An in-depth literature review was conducted which explored existing theories and 
paradigms on governance and sustainability arrangements of NGOs in general and South 
African NGOs in particular.  The literature consulted allowed the researcher to formulate 
an adequate conceptual framework. A solid base was constructed on which to base the 
research and analysis of this study. 
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5.2.2 Questionnaire 
This study made use of a structured questionnaire.  Selected candidates who participated 
in the completion of the questionnaire included: an NGO director, financial specialists 
within the NGOs and individual staff members.  The advantage of a questionnaire is that 
“respondents have time to think about the answer to questions in the questionnaire.   A 
disadvantage of a questionnaire is that the researcher is not at hand to explain 
uncertainties, which may result in biased or distorted answers by the participant”  
(Brynard and Hanekom, 2006: 46).   
 
A pilot study was conducted with the Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust.  The national 
coordinator volunteered to complete the questionnaire.  This process allowed the 
researcher to improve sections of the questionnaire. 
 
5.2.3 Interviews 
“Interviewing, as a method of collecting data, allows the researcher to explain his or her 
questions if the respondent (interviewee) is not clear on what is being asked. It allows the 
researcher to probe more deeply following the answer of a respondent” (De Wet as 
quoted in Brynard and Hanekom, 2006: 40). 
 
Unstructured interviews were conducted to glean information which the questionnaire 
and literature study did not reveal.  Interviewees included the deputy director of one of 
the NGOs and staff members, who volunteered their participation and who wished to 
remain anonymous.  A University of the Western Cape financial specialist was another 
interviewee. 
 
5.2.4 Case study 
This study is situated within the framework of a case study.   The term “case study” 
according to Brynard and Hanekom (2006: 193 - 194), “pertains to the fact that a limited 
number of units of analysis are studied intensely.  The units of analysis include 
individuals, groups and institutions”.  When we investigate a group or institution, we 
often make use of fieldwork, conducting the investigation on the spot under the natural 
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circumstances of the specific case.  As far as the research procedure is concerned, 
participant observation and unstructured interviews are usually used to study the chosen 
case but, in some instances, even descriptive statistics may be appropriate.  The aspects 
deserve special mention as far as case studies are concerned.  Firstly, the case should be 
defined or demarcated.  Secondly, whichever technique is used to collect data, the 
concern is not merely to describe what is being observed, but to search in an inductive 
fashion for recurring patterns and consistent regularities.  Thirdly, triangulation is 
frequently used to discern patterns.  Because the number of cases is limited, the very 
purpose of the case studies is to intensively examine those cases that are indeed available.  
In view of the consideration that the researcher himself or herself is the research 
instrument, an attempt is usually made to corroborate findings according to at least three 
different approaches. 
 
The cases selected for this study include the Centre for the Study of Higher Education 
(University of the Western Cape, South Africa), Oxfam International Great Britain as an 
example of an international NGO and the Sustainability Institute on the outskirts of  
Stellenbosch, South Africa,  from which lessons regarding governance and financial 
sustainability could be drawn. One of the cases, Oxfam International, represents the large 
international NGO sector; a second, Centre for the Study of Higher Education, focuses on 
higher education policy as an organization that is based at a university, and the third, the 
Sustainability Institute, has a developmental orientation with access to a variety of 
funding sources. As these NGOs receive funding from international, national and private 
sources, a comparative analysis will be allowed, which will facilitate an understanding of 
the nature of sustainable financial arrangements.   Each NGO has a unique governance 
structure, which will allow for an analysis highlighting possible similarities or 
differences.   
 
The following section will provide a brief overview of the type of operations of the 
selected cases, their contextual perspective, the nature of their activities, the governance 
arrangements and their fundraising and financial management practices. 
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5.3. OXFAM INTERNATIONAL 
5.3.1 Brief historical overview 
The nature and purpose of Oxfam as an NGO can perhaps best be summarised by citing 
the Oxfam 2007 report which contends that: 
The name Oxfam means different things to different people.  To some it is 
the relief agency that provides shelter and clean water when a disaster hits 
a community.  To many people in Britain, it represents their local charity 
shop.  To others, Oxfam is the powerful voice that speaks out nationally and 
globally on behalf of poor people, tackling major issues such as debt, trade 
and the right to education.  Its aim is simple:  to work with others to 
overcome poverty and suffering. 
 
Oxfam International is a confederation of 13 organisations working together with over 
3000 independent non-governmental organisations in more than 100 countries to find 
lasting solutions to poverty, suffering and injustice, as alluded to earlier.  The 
organisation seeks increased worldwide public understanding that economic and social 
justice are crucial to sustainable development.  It strives to be a global campaigning force 
continuously promoting equity (Oxfam International, 2005). 
 
The endeavours of Oxfam International began in 1942 when it set up the Oxford 
Committee for Famine Relief, highlighting the problems created by the Nazi occupation 
of Greece at the time, requesting that relief be sent to those in most urgent need.  From 
1948 awards grants were made to projects in Europe and elsewhere and in 1949 the 
Committee’s objectives were again broadened to ‘the relief of suffering arising as a result 
of wars or  other causes in any part of the world.’  The committee gradually became 
known by its abbreviated telegraph address, Oxfam.  This name was formally adopted in 
1965 (Oxfam GB, 2007). 
 
Oxfam’s work in South Africa extends as far back as 1965 when a grant was allocated to 
feed poor children in the country.  These feeding programmes continued throughout the 
1960s when over £90 000 was allocated to a number of agencies involved in various 
feeding schemes.  The South African programme gradually expanded as a network of 
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contacts was built, mainly with church representatives, involving a range of development 
activities in townships and rural areas (Oxfam GB, 2007). 
 
By 1985 Oxfam had taken on more human rights-related endeavours in South Africa and 
was supporting 27 advice offices as well as having made a substantial grant towards the 
establishment of the Legal Resource Centre in Port Elizabeth.  Advice offices were 
staffed by paralegals who played a crucial role in assisting victims of the worst abuses of 
the apartheid era.  The Legal Resource Centre became the largest non-governmental legal 
service provider in South Africa (Oxfam GB, 2007). 
 
In 1993, the country office in Johannesburg, South Africa, was opened.  Over the years, 
Oxfam has supported a wide range of local organisations and communities mainly in 
rural areas of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Free State provinces (Oxfam GB, 
2007). 
  
5.3.2 Contextual perspective (South Africa)  
The current programme Oxfam is implementing in South Africa is an advocacy and 
campaigning programme.  It recognises that inequality is a fundamental driver of poverty 
in South Africa and is worsened and perpetuated by HIV and AIDS and gender 
inequality.  The programme focuses on women and children affected by HIV and AIDS, 
and women suffering from domestic violence.  The geographical focus of Oxfam’s work 
is in Welkom and Qwa Qwa in the Free State province.  At a national level, Oxfam 
supports South African organisations that campaign for improved health services, better 
responses to the HIV and AIDS crisis, and those calling for an end to gender-based 
violence.   The organisation encourages collaboration amongst civil society organisations 
in the aforementioned areas, and also collaboration between government and NGOs 
(Oxfam GB, 2007). 
 
5.3.3 The Nature of the NGO’s Activities  
Oxfam International’s programmes in general address the structural causes of poverty 
and related injustice.  It works primarily through local accountable organisations seeking 
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to strengthen their empowerment. It helps people directly where local capacity is 
insufficient or inappropriate for Oxfam’s purposes, and it assists the development of 
structures which directly benefit people facing the realities of poverty and injustice and 
which are accountable to them (Oxfam International, 2002). 
 
The programme of Oxfam in South Africa specifically focuses on the following four 
areas. The first area is the creation of effective and accountable systems of social 
delivery.  The focus is on health services that are effective in dealing with the HIV and 
AIDS pandemic, and which are responsive to the specific needs of women and the 
obstacles that they may face in accessing services.  The second area focuses on ending 
gender inequality and gender-based violence.  This involves work at the local level 
supporting survivors of gender-based violence, challenging ideas and beliefs that lead to 
gender-based violence, and at the national level, changing policies and programmes that 
impact on the prevalence of and response to gender-based violence.  The third area of 
focus is on developing new approaches to investment and the distribution of the benefits 
of growth to ensure that South Africa’s approach to economic development contributes to 
overcoming poverty and inequality.   A collection of research projects informs this 
particular focus area.  The last focus area is that of encouraging and supporting South 
Africa to utilise its full potential as a regional and global leader in overcoming poverty, 
inequality and conflict (Oxfam GB, 2005). 
  
Oxfam’s work extends over large social sectors.  As an international NGO, it effectively 
delivers it programmes as it has very specific areas of focus.   
 
The next section of this study explores the governance structures employed by Oxfam. 
  
5.3.4 Governance 
5.3.4.1  Introductory Biographical information 
Oxfam Great Britain, established in 1942 as alluded to in earlier text, is an independent 
organisation registered as a charity, affiliated to Oxfam International, with partners, 
volunteers, supporters and staff of many nationalities.  By October 2006, its headquarters 
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employed 692 people in various areas of expertise which include, for example, 
fundraising, policy, trading (shops), campaigns, media, core humanitarian, UK 
programme management and Middle East and Eastern Europe programme management 
as well as support functions (IT, HR, directorate, finance and audit).  Its average field 
staff head count by November 2006 averaged 4716 personnel.  Four hundred volunteers 
are employed at its headquarters. Approximately 12 000 people are employed in the 
Oxfam shops (Stringer, 2007;  Oxfam Accountability Report 06/07). 
 
5.3.4.2  Executive management structure 
Oxfam’s supervisory board is appointed by through election of members.  Oxfam GB’s 
Trustees form a council, which is the governing body of Oxfam GB, and meets 
approximately five times a year. Trustees, who are all unpaid volunteers, are responsible 
in law for everything Oxfam GB does.  Oxfam's council has overall responsibility for 
Oxfam but delegates the management of Oxfam to the senior executive staff i.e. the 
Director and the Corporate Management Team (Oxfam Annual Report and Accounts 
2000/02). 
 
5.3.4.3  Board members 
There are between 10 and 12 members of Council. Trustees serve on Council for three 
years with the possibility of a second consecutive three-year term of office, extendable up 
to nine years in the case of Honorary Officers.  There is also Oxfam’s Association, which 
can have up to 32 members. It is made up of all the current Trustees, plus around 20 other 
members. The Association has powers to remove and replace Trustees in the event of a 
major failure or default on the part of Council.  The overall length of service of all board 
members is over 11 years.  The knowledge and skills available within the board relevant 
to the work of the organisation ranges from legal, technical, community, management, 
accounting to fundraising (Oxfam Annual Report and Accounts 2005/06;  Oxfam 
Accountability Report 2006/07). 
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5.3.4.4  Accountability and the board 
This section explores mechanisms employed by Oxfam to support accountability. 
Oxfam's system of governance was revised following a strategic review, completed in 
June 1998. Part of the changes included the move to a smaller governing body of 10 to 12 
Trustees as described above. The strategic review concluded that a smaller council should 
be enabled to listen to and be influenced by the views of its stakeholders. Two regular 
mechanisms which support this form of accountability are the Assembly and a  
Stakeholder Survey (Stringer, 2007).  
 
The aim of the Assembly is to strengthen Oxfam's accountability by facilitating informed 
debate and an exchange of views on issues of strategic or corporate importance between 
different stakeholders. At the event itself, around 180 participants drawn from different 
stakeholder groups (e.g. overseas/GB partner organisations, volunteers, staff, 
campaigners and all of Oxfam's Council, Association and Corporate Management Team) 
meet to debate and discuss key issues. The Assembly has no decision-making powers, but 
enables decision-makers to hear a wider range of views on policy issues (Stringer, 2007).   
 
The Oxfam Stakeholder Survey gathers views from different groups of stakeholders 
(internationally and within GB) on Oxfam's performance - both what the organisation 
does and the way that it works. Like the Assembly it is a key mechanism which supports 
Oxfam's accountability. The findings of the survey are reported to the Oxfam Assembly 
and are made available publicly through the Oxfam website (Oxfam Stakeholder Survey, 
2000; Stringer, 2007). 
 
The board members have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities, which 
is informed by clear organisational policies (Stringer, 2007). 
 
5.3.4.5  Organisational policies 
The Council’s primary role is to ensure that the money it holds in trust is applied 
effectively for the purposes of and furtherance of that trust which is the relief of poverty, 
distress and suffering. In order to carry out this key role, council has to ensure that Oxfam 
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abides by its ethos, values, stated charitable objectives and constitution and operates 
within the constraints of the law. In so doing, it is responsible for preserving Oxfam’s 
good name and reputation.  The council determines Oxfam’s policies, objectives and 
budgets.  It satisfies itself that an appropriate strategic management process is 
implemented by providing an independent challenge on key assumptions and assessing 
whether the strategy is reasonable in relation to the risks involved, the resources required 
and the benefits to be achieved. The council approves the strategy, but does not itself 
create the strategic plan.  The council further ensures that effective processes exist to 
identify, minimise where possible, monitor and manage the potential risks that Oxfam 
faces.  Another function of the council is to ensure that the right management team is in 
place and is operating effectively and efficiently. The council’s role is to question, 
scrutinise and actively monitor management for which purpose the council should have 
the opportunity to constructively question, test and challenge management views and 
proposals.  In relation to internal control and management information systems, the 
council ensures that effective internal control systems exist to protect the organisation, 
and that the necessary management information systems exist to assess Oxfam’s 
performance and progress in meeting its objectives. These would include the evaluation 
of operational effectiveness and efficiency and impact, compliance with laws and 
regulations, and the reliability of management and financial information.  Lastly, the 
council gives account of its actions in appropriate ways to donors, regulatory bodies, 
beneficiaries, partners and staff and volunteers, other stakeholders and the public, as 
required by law and good practice, and to act in accordance with the Nolan Committee’s 
Seven Principles of Public Life, namely selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, 
openness, honesty and leadership (Stringer, 2007).   
 
In discharging the responsibilities listed above, the role of Trustees is to ensure that 
Oxfam is well managed, rather than to manage it themselves. Day-to-day implementation 
of policy will be delegated to the Director of Oxfam, and through the Director to the rest 
of the Corporate Management Team (CMT). The council’s responsibilities are to ensure 
that proper procedures and checking mechanisms are in place so that it can be certain that 
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management is doing its job in a cost-efficient and effective way, and that staff with the 
calibre needed to discharge their responsibilities are in situ (Stringer, 2007). 
 
This in turn requires that the Director of Oxfam should be accountable to the Trustees for 
the effective management of Oxfam, for implementing policies and achieving the 
objectives laid down by the Trustees, and for appointing suitable staff (Stringer, 2007). 
 
In addition to serving Oxfam as Trustees, most Trustees will also contribute to Oxfam by 
making available their specialist skills and experience. It is most important that they 
make a clear distinction between when they are serving Oxfam as a Trustee and when 
they are serving Oxfam in any other voluntary capacity, for example as an adviser 
(Stringer, 2007).  
 
5.3.4.6  Board’s participation in the formulation and adaptation of a formal, 
documented and measurable long-range or strategic plan 
Trustees, advised by the Director and CMT, are responsible for setting the objectives and 
policies of the organisation. The Director and CMT will then develop more detailed 
strategies, policies, objectives and goals of Oxfam, both annual and longer term, and 
report on their achievement. The Trustees must consider, appraise, question and, where 
appropriate, challenge and improve these strategies, policies objectives and goals. They 
must review the performance of the Director and take appropriate action when they are 
not satisfied with it. The review of the Director’s performance would normally be 
undertaken by the Chair on behalf of the Trustees after appropriate consultation with 
Trustees. Part of their role is to support, encourage, challenge, stimulate, help and where 
justified, criticise the performance of the Director and his senior colleagues (Stringer, 
2007). 
 
5.3.4.7  Self-assessment of the organisation against measurable specified 
criteria 
At present Oxfam does not undertake evaluations in a systematic way.  The Deputy 
International Director leads on the coordination, communication and promotion of a 
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range of quality initiatives driven by different units of the organisation. Following a 
recent review, a team within the Humanitarian Department is dealing with a specific 
remit of advising and supporting humanitarian programme quality and learning. Key 
strategic areas will include improving our work in accountability to beneficiaries; 
prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse; gender equity and reducing gender-based 
violence; and programme monitoring/evaluation & learning.  This team will work with 
colleagues in the Programme Learning and Accountability team who provide 
organisational leadership and develop the monitoring, evaluation and learning process 
(Stringer, 2007). 
 
5.3.4.8  Distinction between the role of the organisation’s CEO and the 
chairperson of the governing board 
There is a clear distinction between the role and the responsibilities of the CEO and the 
governing body.  Oxfam's Trustees form a council, which is the governing body of 
Oxfam, and meets approximately five times a year. Trustees, who are all unpaid 
volunteers, are responsible in law for everything Oxfam does. These responsibilities are 
to ensure that Oxfam abides by its charitable aims and constitution, and operates within 
the law.  The Trustees are ultimately accountable for the overall management of Oxfam.  
They ensure that income and assets are used to help Oxfam's beneficiaries, and that its 
finances are properly and effectively managed and monitored.  The Trustees set policy 
and objectives, and monitor the implementation and evaluation of its results.   The 
Trustees have to preserve Oxfam's good name and reputation (Stringer, 2007).  
 
The Director of Oxfam is the chief executive of the charity and is responsible to Trustees 
for the management of Oxfam. Reporting to him/her are the five Deputy Directors and 
the Directors of Fundraising and Corporate Marketing, who are responsible for the six 
Divisions (Stringer, 2007).  
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5.3.5 Financial sustainaibility 
5.3.5.1  Sources of funding 
Oxfam GB’s sources of funding range from individual giving, corporate social 
investment, government funding, foreign donors, grant-making foundations to national 
funding agencies.   
 
Table 5.1:  Revenue and Recurring Costs 
1.1. Total income Input number: £310 million 
1.2. Revenue (institutional donors) Input number: £94 million 
1.3. Revenue (non-institutional donors) Input number: £216 million 
1.4. Revenue from the EU (included in above) Input number: £15.9million 
1.5. Recurring/ fixed HQ costs A split between fixed and variable headquarter costs 
is not available. Governance costs (as defined by UK 
SORP) amount to £1m. 
(See http://www.oxfam.org.uk/about-us/accounts/index.htm) 
 
Table 5.2: Sources of income 
 
Sources of income % received in year ending April 2001 
Donations 34% 
Grants from UK Govt, EU, UN 16% 
Other Oxfams and NGOs 6% 
Food aid 10% 
Shops and Trading 33% 
Interest and other 1% 
(See This is Oxfam, n.d.) 
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Figure 5.1:  Sources of income 
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5.3.5.2  Self-financing 
Trading is responsible for making as much money as possible to overcome poverty and 
suffering by maximising the value of the gifts of time, product and money that are given 
to Oxfam by its volunteers, donors and customers (Oxfam Annual Report and Accounts 
2005/06).  
 
In 2005/2006, Oxfam shops contributed £25.2 million to overcome poverty and suffering. 
Oxfam Shops also made significant contributions to Oxfam and Disaster Emergency 
Committee (DEC) appeals (Oxfam Annual Report and Accounts 2005/06). 
 
5.3.5.3  Self-financing strategies 
Oxfam has been making money from the gift of time (the time spent by volunteers) and 
the gift of product (the donations given by the public) for over 50 years, with the first 
shop opening in 1947 in Broad Street, Oxford. Since then, Oxfam's Trading Division has 
grown to be the largest charity network in the country, with around 750 shops (Oxfam: 
About our shops, 2007). 
 
Every Oxfam shop is unique, some shops sell a wide range of products while others focus 
almost exclusively on one product; such as music, furniture, clothing, or books (Oxfam 
shops are the largest second hand book retailers in Europe, selling 1million books a 
month). 
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What every Oxfam shop does have in common is the aim to make as much money as 
possible to overcome poverty and suffering.  Every Oxfam shop aims to be at the heart of 
its community, with each shop team deciding what their shop will offer, what prices to 
charge, what promotions to do, and what products to sell.  Oxfam shops receive almost 
all of their stock from customers over the counter. Some shops augment this with stock 
from textile and book banks, and other initiatives (Oxfam: About our shops, 2007). 
 
Started in 1975, Wastesaver has developed into one of the largest recycling centres in 
Europe, processing a massive 10,000 tonnes of clothes, textiles and shoes every year. 
Wastesaver contributed almost £700,000 to the cause in 2002/03 (Oxfam: About our 
shops, 2007). 
 
Many Oxfam shops sell new products, such as Fair Trade food and drinks. There is also a 
wide range of gifts and Christmas cards. Oxfam shops sell more Christmas cards than any 
other charity retailer  (Oxfam: About our shops, 2007). 
 
All this is supported by the largest number of charity shop volunteers in the country. 21 
000 volunteers of all ages and from all walks of life come to Oxfam for friendship, 
training, work experience and the chance to help Oxfam make a difference in the lives of 
poor people all over the world. These volunteers provide the equivalent of over 4,000 full 
time staff, working nearly 7,7 million hours per year.  Without their gift of time, the 
Trading Division would be not be able to make its contribution to overcome poverty and 
suffering (Oxfam: About our shops, 2007). 
 
Oxfam GB has good prospects for long-term sustainability. 
 
5.3.5.4  Categories of Expenditure 
Expenditure and income is charged to an account code.  These define the category of 
expenditure (eg, salaries, equipment, travel).  The account codes are mandatory and 
controlled by UK Finance in Oxford.  In addition, each project and code is identified by a 
unique project code within the PeopleSoft System. This code is the same in both the 
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PeopleSoft Project Management Module (OPAL) and the general ledger.  Expenditure is 
also tracked against a contract code generated by the PeopleSoft contract module 
(Crimson). All items of expenditure relating to a project are booked to the project code. 
Within each project, further elements of the coding system are used to identify partner 
and cost classification (Stringer, 2007). 
 
The organisation’s capital expenditure and financial investment amounts to 
approximately ₤ 2.5 million (Stringer, 2007).  
 
5.3.6 Financial management  
In terms of good financial management practices, Oxfam keeps an accurate record of all 
financial transactions.  It links the budget to the organisation’s strategic and operational 
plans.  The organisation produces management accounts so that managers can compare 
the organisation’s progress against the budget and then make decisions about the future.  
It produces financial statements for outside scrutiny to demonstrate how funds have been 
applied in the past and it has internal controls (checks and balances) in place to safeguard 
the organisation’s  assets and to manage risk.  Oxfam has an audit committee/auditor 
to assist with the quality and reliability of financial and other performance information 
issued. 
 
The organisation has, amongst others, the following financial policies, rules and 
procedures in place.  An Expenditure Authorisation Policy, an Expenses Policy, an 
Investment Policy, a Reserves Policy 2006, Restricted Income Policies, Restricted 
Income Procedures, International Division Guide to Mandatory Procedures, International 
Division Finance Procedures and the United Kingdom Accounting Finance Procedures 
(Oxfam Annual Report and Account 2005/06). 
 
5.3.7 Financial control endeavours 
Each year the annual corporate objectives are derived following the production of the 
three-year strategic plan.  The achievement/ measurement of progress on these annual 
objectives is recorded through a written quarterly reporting process.  These annual 
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corporate objectives for the following year are set out in the annual report and accounts 
and the progress achievement against the previous year’s objectives are also reported 
upon in the annual report and accounts.  Budgetary control exists at HQ and all local 
offices. Accountancy software exists at HQ and all local offices.  Oxfam uses PeopleSoft 
Financials as its accounting software. Access to the system is controlled by logon options 
and passwords. Users' individual access rights are determined by 'roles' within the system 
(eg, only certain staff can post journals). Once items have been posted to the ledger, they 
cannot be removed - they only can be 'journalled' by staff with appropriate authority.  The 
accounting software is web-based and accessible by HQ in Oxford, regional centres and 
country offices.  It is accessible in some local sub offices. It is delivered via the Internet 
and accessibility is determined by the local Internet connections (Stringer, 2007). 
 
An organisational risk register is developed and approved by Trustees. A progress report 
against actions defined to mitigate risks is reviewed every 6 months.  The internal audit 
team carries out a risk evaluation process with local managers as an integral part of the 
audit approach (Stringer, 2007). 
 
In concluding the discussion on Oxfam, it is imperative to recapture the discussion on 
governance and financial management.  As alluded to earlier, Oxfam’s supervisory board 
is appointed by the election of members.  Oxfam GB’s Trustees form a council, which is 
the governing body of Oxfam GB, and meets approximately five times a year.   There are 
between ten and twelve members of council.  Their term of office ranges from three to 
nine years.  Trustees are all unpaid volunteers. They are responsible in law for everything 
Oxfam GB does.  Oxfam’s council has overall responsibility for Oxfam but delegates the 
management of Oxfam to senior executive staff. 
 
In relation to finances, Oxfam GB’s sources of funding ranges from individual giving, 
corporate social investment, government funding, foreign donors, grant-making 
foundations and national funding agencies.  Oxfam’s self-financing strategies take the 
form of a large number of shops, and it has been making money through the assistance of 
volunteers and the donations given by the public.  In terms of good financial management 
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practices, the organisation employs a number of financial policies, rules and procedures 
which take the form of, for example, an expenditure authorisation policy, an expenses 
policy and so on. 
 
The next section will deal with the Centre for the Study of Higher Education, formerly 
known as the Education Policy Unit. 
 
5.4 CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF HIGHER EDUCATION (UNIVERSITY 
OF THE WESTERN CAPE) 
5.4.1 Brief historical overview 
The Centre for the Study of Higher Education, formerly the Education Policy Unit 
(EPU), is a specialist centre of research, analysis and teaching in the field of higher 
education policy.  It is located in the Faculty of Education at the University of the 
Western Cape (UWC) (Centre for the Study of Higher Education, n.d.). 
 
The EPU was originally established in 1992 by Professor Harold Wolpe, a leading 
intellectual figure in the anti-apartheid struggle.  Working in exile in the United Kingdom 
until then, he founded a unit called Research in Education in South Africa (RESA).  
Close ties were developed with a similar unit at UWC, the Research and Training Project 
on Education in South Africa (RETPESA), led by Dr Saleem Badat, who later became 
the second director of the EPU.  After the 1990 unbanning of the liberation movements 
and the subsequent transition towards democracy, it was decided to relocate RESA to 
South Africa and to merge with RETPESA to form the EPU as a joint project of UWC 
and the National Education Co-ordinating Committee (Centre for the Study of Higher 
Education, n.d.). 
 
At its inception, its immediate function was to provide support to the mass democratic 
movement and to the African National Congress government-in waiting on the process of 
formulating a post-secondary education policy framework for the new South Africa.  The 
EPU has since focused exclusively on the field of higher education studies.  During 2001, 
it was decided to change the name of the Unit to the Centre for the Study of Higher 
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Education (CSHE) in order to reflect its focus on higher education, and its functions as a 
centre of critical scholarly research, analysis and teaching in this field (Centre for the 
Study of Higher Education, n.d.). 
 
5.4.2 Contextual perspective 
The mission of the centre is to conduct high quality, relevant research and analysis in the 
field of higher education policy studies, and to contribute to building capacity among 
researchers, policy-makers, planners and institutional personnel in this field.  In 
undertaking this, the CSHE seeks to contribute to political, economic, intellectual and 
cultural development and to the transformation of education and training in South Africa 
(Centre for the Study of Higher Education, n.d.). 
 
5.4.3 Nature of activities 
The CSHE’s programme focused initially on background research in support of 
formulating the national policy framework for the transformation of higher education in 
South Africa.  As part of this, CSHE staff participated in a number of key policy 
processes including the National Education Policy Investigation (NEPI), the African 
National Congress’s policy framework for HE and its implementation plan, the National 
Commission on Higher Education (NCHE), the National Committee on Further 
Education (NCFE) and the Gender Equity Task Team of the Department of Education. 
(Centre for the Study of Higher Education, n.d.). 
 
The CSHE’s research programme has been periodically revised in response to changes in 
the policy terrain and the field of HE studies.  With the finalisation of the higher 
education macro-policy framework around 1997, the focus of CSHE work has shifted 
towards policy implementation and change management, and monitoring and evaluation.  
As part of this evolving programme, CSHE researchers are involved in conducting self-
initiated and commissioned research projects for government, donor and other agencies, 
institutions and other role-players.   The organisation contributes towards scholarly and 
popular publications and presentations at local and international conferences, seminars 
and workshops.  It provides higher education materials and data to government, political 
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and popular organisations, institutions and the media.  The research staff contributes 
towards teaching at the University of the Western Cape and other institutions.  One of its 
programmes is geared towards capacity-building of particularly black and women policy 
researchers.  The organisation has hosted local, national and international conferences, 
seminars and workshops.   A range of national and international visitors and students 
have been attached to the Centre.  The CSHE works closely with a wide network of local 
and international associates and agencies (Centre for the Study of Higher Education, 
n.d.). 
 
 5.4.4 Governance 
5.4.4.1  Introductory Biographical Information 
The Education Policy Unit (EPU) originally established in 1992 by Professor Harold 
Wolpe as a joint creation of the University of the Western Cape (UWC) and the National 
Education Coordinating Committee, arising out of an agreement that “an appropriate 
education policy is crucial to the creation of a viable, non-racist, unitary and democratic 
South Africa” (Education Policy Unit, 1999; Centre for the Study of Higher Education, 
n.d.), as discussed in earlier text, began its work with a research staff of three.  During 
1996-97, the EPU operated with a full-time staff complement of 15 persons – a director 
as Chief Executive Officer with the responsibility to lead, direct and coordinate work of 
the UWC EPU, six senior researchers, three researchers, a librarian and four information 
technology and administrative support staff.  As the need arose, senior researchers, 
researchers, and research assistants were drawn into the work of the EPU.  All staff, 
excluding the director, were supported through donor funds and funds secured from 
commissioned and contract research (Centre for the Study of Higher Education, n.d.).  In 
1999, the EPU proposed to operate with a full-time staff complement of eleven consisting 
of a director, two senior researchers, two researchers, two trainee researchers, two 
administrators, one data processor/analyst and a librarian.  However, in 2001, the staff 
complement expanded to a director, a deputy director, three senior researchers, three 
researchers, one doctoral fellow, one research intern, one research librarian, one library 
assistant, one operations and project manager, one administrator and one data and IT 
manager (Education Policy Unit, 1999; Centre for the Study of Higher Education, n.d.). 
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 In 2005, the CSHE was reconfigured into a virtual centre and refocused its work in line 
with three main strategic functions which included, firstly, postgraduate work in Higher 
Education Studies.  A second focus is on research in the area of Higher Education and 
related fields that will lead to accredited academic publications.  The last area of focus 
would be selected and relevant applied research and professional development projects, 
subject to the availability of funding (The future of the CSHE, n.d.).   
  
The downsizing of the CSHE in 2005 resulted in twelve staff members being laid off.  
Future work contracts awarded to individuals within the “new virtual” centre were to 
differ in nature (full-time or part-time) and duration, depending on the needs of the CSHE 
in relation to commissioned project requirements (The future of the CSHE, n.d.). 
    
The Education Policy Unit operated like an NGO, in particular around its funding base, 
according to one of its strategic workshops in 2003.  Its assistance in the formulation of 
higher education policy for the African National Congress (ANC) government-in-waiting 
prior to 1994 locates it within Smith’s (2001b) definition of an NGO which contends that 
“in the South African context, the focus is on what prior to 1994 might have been called 
‘anti-apartheid’ or ‘anti-governmental’ organisations, which provided research, policy, 
advocacy and various developmental or welfare services intended to support the struggle 
against apartheid and assist the victims thereof”.  No records could be located of the EPU 
formally registering as a Section 21 organisation under the Companies Act (Act 61 of 
1973).  Dr Bev Thaver in an interview in April 2007 contends that the EPU, prior to 
1994, could be regarded as a CSO. 
  
5.4.4.2  Executive management structure 
The Constitution of the NECC/UWC Education Policy Unit, signed by the Rector of the 
University of the Western Cape on 19 March 1991, stipulated that the UWC EPU shall 
have a management committee, answerable to the NECC and to the Senate of the 
University of the Western Cape jointly and severally, comprising the following people: 
the Rector of UWC or such alternate person as the Rector of UWC shall nominate for the 
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purpose:  five persons elected triennially by the Senate of the University of the Western 
Cape, of whom at least two shall be members of the Faculty of Education of UWC, and 
provided that any person may be elected to repeat term of office; a person nominated by 
the National Executive Committee of the NECC to represent the NECC at the national 
level; five other persons nominated triennially by NECC, provided that any person may 
be so nominated to repeat a term of office; the Director of the UWC EPU; two students 
registered for degree or diploma programmes at UWC to be nominated annually by the 
Student Representative Council of UWC, provided that any student may be nominated to 
repeat a term of office;  two members elected annually by the staff of the UWC EPU 
(excluding the director) from within its own ranks, provided that any person may be 
elected to repeat a term of office (The Constitution of the NECC/UWC Education Policy 
Unit, 1991). 
 
With the disbanding of the NECC, the EPU was governed effectively by a Management 
Committee comprising of UWC senior managers and academics and a University of Cape 
Town Professor of Education.  The 1996 Senate Academic Planning Working Group 
recommended that the EPU become a Unit within the Faculty of Education and that 
reports to the Faculty Board be channelled through a reconstituted Board of Management 
responsible for approving the research and financial management of the EPU (Education 
Policy Unit, 1999). 
 
A new governance structure was proposed in 1999.  Emphasis was placed on the key 
elements such as accountability where it was proposed that the EPU be accountable to the 
Executive Committee and Faculty Board of the Education Faculty and that the Unit 
render an annual report to the Executive Committee and Faculty Board of the Education 
Faculty.  Interim reports are to be submitted to the Executive Committee and Faculty 
Board of the Education Faculty as those bodies may require from time to time stipulate 
(Education Policy Unit, 1999). 
 
Coming to the Management Committee, it was proposed that the supervision of the EPU 
be delegated to a Management Committee, answerable to the Executive Committee and 
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Faculty Board of the Education Faculty, comprising of the  Dean of the Education 
Faculty, the Dean of Research, the Deputy-Dean of the Education Faculty, the Vice-
Rector (Academic), the Academic Planning Officer, the EPU Director, an  EPU member 
elected annually by the staff of the EPU, and two to three persons with specialist 
knowledge of the field of higher education (Education Policy Unit, 1999). 
 
The overall governance structure, which persisted after the EPU became the CSHE 
continued in its complexity.  The CHSE Constitution dictates that the Management 
Committee, as alluded to earlier, of which the Dean of the Education Faculty is the chair, 
is the first level of accountability.  This body takes strategic decisions and provides 
advice.  The Centre provides financial statements to the aforementioned committee.  
However, the director of the Centre reports to the Faculty of Education’s Executive 
Committee.  In turn, the Dean reports to the Faculty Board on the activities of the Centre.  
The Management Committee provides the Faculty Board with the CSHE’s annual report.   
In turn, the Faculty Board reports to the University Senate (Limani Consulting CC, 
2003). 
 
5.4.4.3  Internal management systems, structures and procedures 
A 2003 report on a CSHE’s strategic planning workshop revealed very complex overall 
decision-making structures and processes.  In particular, no clarity existed at the time 
around the roles of the Director and Deputy Director and on the relationship between 
these two roles.  Decision-making in the organisation was centralised in the office of the 
Director for example.  This impacted negatively on the implementation of plans and 
decisions.  The financial manager at the time was uncertain about how her position fitted 
into the overall management structure of the CSHE (Limani Consulting CC, 2003). 
 
5.4.4.4  Organisational policies 
The Constitution of the NECC/EPU Education Policy Unit (1991), of which a review was 
considered in 2003, bestowed upon the Management Committee the following decision-
makings powers:    Firstly, to  own or control movable and immovable property in the 
name of the UWC EPU, or in the name of UWC, or in the name of the NECC.   Secondly 
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it can hire and fire staff, including the Director of the UWC EPU, for which purpose the 
Management Committee shall have the power to appoint and receive advice from such 
selection committees as may from time to time, be necessary, saving that the 
Management Committee may choose to disregard the advice of the selection committee.  
Lastly, the Management Committee has the power to own copyright in the research 
publications of the UWC EPU.  The aforementioned Constitution was up for review in 
2003 as its content became outdated.  No new Constitution currently exists. 
 
5.4.4.5  Board’s participation in the formulation and adaptation of a formal, 
documented and measurable long-range or strategic plan 
Both the Management Committee and the Executive Board reviewed and commented on 
the organisation’s programmes, operations and financial reports.  The board also assisted 
in the formulation of a human resource strategy (Limani Consulting CC, 2003). 
 
5.4.4.6  Procedures for evaluating projects and activities 
Both donors and the Centre determined the procedures for evaluating projects and 
activities.  The Centre had internal procedures for evaluating and monitoring particular 
projects. Each researcher, for example, (Thaver, 2007) was required to monitor progress 
and projects and to meet donor reporting deadlines.   External procedures were set by 
funders in terms of what projects and categories were to be funded and when reporting 
needed to take place.  Funding was attached to individual research (Thaver, 2007). 
 
5.4.4.7  Self-assessment of the organisation, against measurable specified 
criteria 
The Centre undertook regular, yearly strategic planning workshops. Here issues such as 
the strategic direction, management systems, structures and procedures, internal 
relationships, outputs, administration and support, information services, the stakeholders, 
partners, clients, competitors, and donor organisations were deliberated upon (Limani 
Consulting CC, 2003). 
5.4.4.8  Distinction between the role of the organisation’s CEO  and the 
chairperson of the Board of Trustees 
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There was a clear distinction between the roles and responsibilities of the Director, 
Management Committee and Executive Committee.  The Director was responsible for 
framing strategy, programmes and operations.  The role of the Deputy Director appeared 
obscure.  The Management Committee chair was responsible for governance, in 
particular, financial oversight, guidance and support of the director (Limani Consulting 
CC, 2003). 
 
5.4.5  Financial Sustainability 
5.4.5.1  Sources of funding 
The Centre derived its funds from five different sources: 
 
Core funds have been provided by the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA).  The SIDA core funds proved vital in supporting a core research and 
administrative team, the research needs of civil society organisations without the funds to 
commission research, research training, publishing, networking and infrastructure 
(Education Policy Unit, 1999). 
 
Project funds have been derived from numerous international and local agencies on the 
basis of applications for the funding of specific research projects (Education Policy Unit, 
1999). 
 
Commissioned/consultancy research funds have been derived from research, by the 
Centre or individual staff members, commissioned by various bodies and consultancy 
work (Education Policy Unit, 1999). 
 
Miscellaneous funds have been provided by various agencies such as the British Council 
for specific purposes such as supporting staff development, overseas networking visits, 
conference attendance and so forth (Education Policy Unit, 1999). 
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University of the Western Cape funds funded the salary of the Director.  The contribution 
of the university also included free accommodation, free basic utilities and various 
services of an administrative nature (Education Policy Unit, 1999). 
According to an CSHE staff member, 80% of the funding was secured from international 
donors and 20% of funding was secured from project funds and commissioned research 
(CSHE, 2008). 
 
Table 5.3:  Sources of income 
 
Sources of income Approximate % received per annum 
International donors 80% 
Commissioned projects/research 20% 
(Source:  CSHE staff member, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 5.2:  Sources of income 
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5.4.5.2  Self-financing 
The Unit/Centre generated its own income by producing work for clients such as:  
government, NGOs, SAUVCA, JET, CHE, CHET, UWC, DANIDA, Ford Foundation, 
students organisations, academics and students and the private sector (Limani Consulting 
CC, 2003). 
 
It was committed to pursuing alternatives to core funding and, in this regard, considered 
lobbing the corporate business sector for annual grants to sustain core activities and to 
obtain occasional contributions for specific activities (Limani Consulting CC, 2003)..   
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5.4.5.3  Financial sustainability 
The UWC CSHE Workshop Report dated April 2003 noted that the organisational culture 
of the Centre was determined by money and time.   The workshop questioned whether the 
sustainability of the organisation should be the concern of the Director alone.  
Sustainability should be linked to accountability, and not only issues of finance, the 
strategic session contended. 
 
The following propositions were made with regard to developing an appropriate and 
effective funding and financial management strategy which in turn would impact on 
financial sustainability.  The organisation intended to ensure the ongoing flow of longer-
term and larger-scale project funding through ongoing strategic reflection on priorities, 
networking and procurement of project work.  It wanted to make certain that project 
budgets increasingly covered overall costs by developing a comprehensive budget 
template, including billable days and rates, and by incorporating realistic rates into 
budgets, working from the template, accommodating all non-project costs.  As not all 
operating and support costs can be borne by project funding, it was proposed to secure 
alternative forms of core funding by creating a list of possible funders, including private 
donors, by creating publicity material and contacting funders.  The organisation further 
proposed the development of appropriate time-management tools.  It considered cutting 
operating costs.    The last proposition included the investigation of income-generating 
activities such as “costing out” the Resource Centre and information services (Limani 
Consulting CC, 2003).  
 
The Education Policy Unit, in a document entitled: “Funding Request:  The Research and 
Training Programme of the Education Policy Unit, University of the Western Cape, June 
1999, asserts that: 
 
Increasingly, traditional and major core funders of units like the Education 
Policy Unit are moving towards structuring direct bilateral funding 
agreements with government departments or shifting their funding 
programmes to other areas of education and/or other social sectors.  While 
the EPU has been fairly successful in securing funds from commissioned 
and contract research projects and consultancies, the volume of such 
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funding remains inadequate in meeting all the resource requirements of the 
EPU.  The EPU is committed, over the next three years, to diversifying its 
core funding sources in order to maintain its operations through 
approaching various donor agencies as well as the local corporate business 
sector.  In the meantime, and during the next three years however, the EPU 
will have to continue to look to SIDA for core funding support. 
 
Despite the commitments expressed above, in 2005, the EPU/CSHE experienced severe 
managerial and financial difficulties.  Managerial difficulties started with the untimely 
death of Prof Harold Wolpe in 1996.  Two acting-directors were appointed.  Thereafter 
Professor Badat assumed the directorship.   In 1999, he was replaced by Associate 
Professor Subotzky.  Dr Bev Thaver, deputy director of the CSHE in an interview (April 
2007) contended that: 
 
Post Harold’s death the EPU experienced a period of instability and 
struggled to realign itself.  Saleem took over in 1999.  The year 2000 to 
2004 saw a period of “consolidation”. No funding was available however 
due to changes in the higher education sector.  The lack of funding saw 12 
researchers retrenched between 2004 and 2005. 
 
Table 5.2:  Categories of expenditure 
 
ITEM 
 
PERCENTAGE OF OVERALL 
BUDGET 
Personnel 56% 
Research 16% 
Training 13% 
Equipment 2% 
Conferences/Seminars 4% 
Library/Resource Centre 2% 
Publications 1% 
Administration 6% 
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Figure 5.3: Categories of expenditure 
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The above table and graph indicates that the largest portion of the organisation’s funds 
was spent on personnel.  This situation was not cost-effective.  The financial 
sustainability of the organisation was compromised.  When the Centre experienced 
financial difficulties according to Thaver (2007), as alluded to earlier, staff retrenchments 
took place. 
 
5.4.5.4  Financial management  
The University of the Western Cape developed a Financial Procedure Manual to achieve 
effective and efficient management of “Restricted Funds1”.  It provides specific step-by-
step procedures to be performed in achieving the aforementioned objectives.  It was 
proposed that the manual be used in conjunction with the Draft Policy on Restricted 
Funds and the Draft User Guide on Restricted Funds. 
 
In terms of good financial management practices, CSHE keeps an accurate record of all 
financial transactions.  It links the budget to the organisation’s strategic and operational 
plans.  The organisation produces management accounts so that managers can compare 
the organisation’s progress against the budget and then make decisions about the future.  
It produces financial statements for outside scrutiny to demonstrate how funds have been 
applied in the past and it has internal controls (checks and balances) in place to safeguard 
the organisation’s  assets and to manage risk.  The university has an auditor to assist 
in the quality and reliability of financial and other performance information issued. 
 
                                                 
1 Restricted Funds in this context refers to funding received from external donors. 
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To further enhance an effective cost-centred financial system, the following propositions 
were made at the UWC CSHE Workshop in 2003 to periodically review the financial 
reporting system.  The workshop suggested that financial, administrative and research 
reports such as finance reports, leave reports, telephone usage reports, timesheets and 
inventory lists be presented to management on a monthly basis. The working relationship 
with the university’s finance department required enhancement. 
 
Despite the above policies and procedures, it was confidentially revealed by a staff 
member of the university’s finance department that the Centre still exhibited 
inappropriate use, and failure to report donor funding (Anon, 2007). 
 
5.4.5.5  Financial control 
The financial accountability of the EPU/CSHE was to various donors as well as to the 
University of the Western Cape.  Unstructured interviews with individuals associated 
with the Centre revealed that inappropriate shifting of funds between the different 
programme funds occurred.  Funds were also not spent in accordance with the assigned 
budgetary line items.  Proper financial control was thus not exerted (Anon, 2007). 
 
5.4.6 General orientation 
The following table indicates who is actively involved in the planning, designing, 
implementation and evaluation of the organisation’s programmes and projects. 
 
 Planning Designing Implementing Evaluating 
Management 
Committee/Executive 
Committee 
X X   
Executive leadership X X X X 
Senior Staff X X X X 
Junior Staff X X X X 
Beneficiaries/target groups X X X X 
Other NGOs/CSOs/CBOs X X X  
 
 
The management committee of the Centre was involved in the planning and design of the 
institution’s programmes.  The Centre’s  executive leadership, together with the senior 
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and junior staff and target groups on the other hand, participated in the planning, 
designing, implementation and evaluation of the organisation’s programmes.  Other 
NGOs/CSOs/CBOs were involved in the planning, designing and implementation of the 
Centre’s programmes (Anon, 2007). 
 
Unstructured interviews and a strategic workshop report revealed that the Centre did not 
adequately deal with organisational governance.  The Centre was inadequately managed 
and the day-to-day running of the organisation proved problematic.  Financial expenses 
were not properly monitored and controlled.  In this regard, the Centre did not adhere to 
basic ethical principals of good governance. 
 
In concluding the discussion on the Centre, it is important to emphasise that the EPU was 
governed by a Management Committee comprising UWC senior managers and 
academics and a University of Cape Town Professor of Education.  The overall 
governance structure persisted after the EPU became the CSHE.  With regard to internal 
management structures, no clarity existed around the roles of the director and deputy 
director.  Decision-making, for example, was centralised in the office of the director. 
 
The Centre derived its funds from different sources such as core funds from the Swedish 
International Development Agency, project funds, consultancy research, miscellaneous 
funds from, for example, the British Council and funds for the director’s position from 
the University of the Western Cape.  The Centre generated its own income by producing 
work for various clients.  Whilst clear financial management procedures existed, 
unstructured interviews revealed that, at times, funds were not spent according to 
budgetary line items.    
 
The next section will deal with the Sustainability Institute. 
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5.5 SUSTAINABILITY INSTITUTE 
5.5.1 Brief historical overview 
The Sustainability Institute, a non-profit trust, is an international living and learning 
centre located on the outskirts of Stellenbosch.  It forms part of the wider Lynedoch 
EcoVillage which is the first ecologically designed socially mixed community in South 
Africa, (Facts about the Lynedoch EcoVillage, 2003) built around a learning estate, at the 
centre of which is located a primary school accommodating 400 children descendant 
from families of farm workers (Sustainability Institute Brochure, n.d.). 
 
Founded in 1999 by Eve Annecke2 and Mark Swilling3, the Sustainability Institute 
provides residential accommodation for visiting writers, artists, development workers, 
and a learning space for participants in the organisation’s various education programmes.   
The Institute works in partnership with the School of Public Management and Planning 
University of Stellenbosch, with reference to Masters and PhD degrees in Sustainable 
Development Planning and Sustainable Agriculture; Early Childhood Development 
(ETDP SETA accredited service provider for training for women from poor and violent 
areas incorporating early learning, healing and sustainability); Community Development 
Practice and Management (building capacity in the NGO sector through focusing on 
competent and capable development practitioners through assessed and certified training 
by means of a network of service providers facilitated in a hub around specific and 
agreed standards); Project facilitation to establish Sustainable Neighbourhood 
                                                 
2 Eve Annecke is the director of the Sustainability Institute. She is co-founder of the Institute and of 
Lynedoch Development. She has worked for many years in organisational learning, with a special focus on 
process facilitation, dialogue and leadership. She has been an early childhood development worker and is a 
trained Montessori pre- and primary educationist. Her Masters in Management Learning through Lancaster 
University, UK, focused on the relationship between sustainability and the practice of leadership (See 
http://www.sutainabilityinstitute.net)  
3 Professor Mark Swilling is Division Head – Sustainable Development in the School of Public 
Management and Planning at the University of  Stellenbosch, Academic Director of the Sustainability 
Institute and a Senior Research Fellow at the Warwick Institute of Governance and Public Management, 
Warwick University (UK).  He was co-founder, former Director and Professor of the Graduate School of 
Public and Development Management, University of Witwatersrand, 1993 – 1997.  Prior to joining the 
Graduate School of Public and Development Management, Professor Swilling worked for PLANACT, an 
urban development NGO which he helped establish in 1985.    He assisted in the initiation of various NGOs 
in various parts of South Africa (See http://www.sopmp.sun.ac.za/contact/main/staffdetail.asp?staff_id=5) 
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Developments in various localities, and  policy research in the sustainable development 
sector (Overview:  Sustainability Institute, n.d.4). 
 
In 2002, the institute started to operate independently from Spier, after receiving some 
grant funding from its owners.  During the same year, Eve Annecke became the fulltime 
director or the institute whilst Mark Swilling was appointed as a Professor at the 
University of Stellenbosch (Overview:  Sustainability Institute, n.d.). 
 
5.5.2 Contextual perspective 
The focus of the Sustainability Institute has been combining practice with theory in a way 
that integrates ecology and equity in support of a sustainable South Africa, with special 
reference to ways of reducing and eradicating poverty (Overview:  Sustainability 
Institute, n.d.). 
 
5.5.3 Nature of the NGO’s activities 
At the end of 2006, the institute was involved in a home-base at the Lynedoch EcoVillage 
Development, which demonstrates child-centred sustainable living in practice.  Another 
one of the organisation’s initiatives was an M.Phil in Sustainaible Development Planning 
and Management (130 participants in 2006).  It is involved in a PhD programme and 
Early Childhood Development (50 participants in 2006).  The organisation created jobs 
for youth through Sustainable Construction Training (40 participants).  Another initiative 
focuses on Community Development Management and Practice with specific reference to 
capacity-building and career pathing in the HIV/Aids sector.  This endeavour, in the end, 
impacts on civil society as a whole.  Further initiatives take the form of projects (applied 
research) on strategic design of sustainable neighbourhoods at Phillipi Agri-Business 
Place, Oude Molen and other locations. Ongoing research such as Government’s 
Economic Policy, Sustainable Cities, the Non-Profit Sector, complexity theory, 
leadership development form the organisation’s portfolio (Overview:  Sustainability 
Institute, n.d.). 
                                                 
4 Also see http://www.sustainabilityinstitute.net
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From 1999 to 2002, the Sustainability Institute, strategically participated at executive 
management level in the Spier Estate which culminated in the awarding to Spier of the 
Fair Trade in Tourism in South Africa Awards in 2003.  It actively participated in 
creating a sustainable context for the Spier developments, demonstrating in practice a 
working example of an integrated private/public/community partnership, which would 
provide the space for the future learning programmes.  A partnership emerged between 
the Sustainability Institute Trust, Lynedoch Development (Section 21 not-for-profit 
company), Spier Holdings and the Stellenbosch Municipality (Overview:  Sustainability 
Institute, n.d.).  Between 2000 and 2005, the Sustainability Institute acted as the founding 
members of Lynedoch EcoVillage Development (Overview:  Sustainability Institute, 
n.d.). 
 
5.5.4 Governance 
5.5.4.1  Introductory Biographical Information 
The Sustainability Institute, established in 1999 as alluded to in earlier text, is an 
independent organisation, registered as a Trust (PBO with Section 18A status) under the 
Trust Property Control Act of 1988.  It employs ten full-time and eight part-time people. 
Areas of expertise within the institute include, for example, programmes and project 
management; coordination and administration; expertise in public management, and 
planning and development planning options. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 173
5.5.4.2  Executive management structure 
 
Director 
Reports to Board of Trustees 
Reports to a management team on operational issues 
Reports to small highly autonomous teams on programmes and projects.   
 
The above organogram suggests the Institute’s director heads the organisation and reports 
to a Board of Trustees.  On operational issues the director reports to a management team, 
and on programmes and projects, the individual reports to small highly autonomous 
teams.  
 
5.5.4.3  Board members 
The organisation is governed by a board of trustees.  There are 7 board members.  The 
overall length of service of all board members is between 4 and 7 years.  The types of 
knowledge and skills on the board, relevant to the work of the organisation, ranges from 
technical skills, community engagement, management skills to fundraising skills 
(Anneke, 2007). 
 
The board of trustees does not undertake a process of self-evaluation.  They do however 
have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.  Written organisational 
policies governing the roles and responsibilities of the trustees take the form of a Trust 
Deed and a Constitution which outlines the responsibilities of board members (Anneke, 
2007). 
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The board annually reviews, comments and signs off the organisation’s programmes and 
operations.  It also assists in the formulation of a human resource strategy.  
 
5.5.4.4  Distinction between the role of the organisation’s CEO and the 
chairperson of the Board of Trustees 
There is a clear distinction between the role and responsibilities of the director and the 
board of trustees.  The director is responsible for framing strategy, programmes and 
operations.  The board chair is responsible for governance issues i.e. convening meetings, 
financial oversight, guidance and support of the director, and the holding of the vision 
and values within the trustee decision-making processes (Anneke, 2007). 
 
5.5.5 Financial Sustainability 
5.5.5.1  Sources of funding 
The Sustainability Institute’s sources of funding take the following form: 
 
Table 5.5:  Sources of funding 
 
Sources of Income 
 approximate % of 
funding received 
per annum from 
each source 
Individual giving 10% 
Corporate social investment 70% 
Government funding  
Foreign donors (International Development 
Assistance) 
5% 
Grant-making foundations 5% 
National Funding Agencies  
Community philanthropic organizations  
Fees (membership/service provision) 5% 
Small business development, running guest house 
 
5% 
 
The largest portion of the organisation’s funding is secured from corporate social 
investment.  Equal portions of funding are received from foreign donors, grant-making 
foundations, fees and the running of a small business (Anneke, 2007). 
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To date, the Sustainability Institute and the Lynedoch EcoVillage Development have 
received grant funding from the Spier Estate, USAID, DANIDA, Investec, IFC, Ford 
Foundation, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Nedbank, University of Stellenbosch, Mott 
Foundation, BOE Bank and the Development Bank of South Africa (Sustainability 
Institute, n.d.). 
 
5.5.5.2  Self-financing 
Self-financing is a funding approach that the Institute pursues.  The institute has been 
making money from small business development, charging fees for courses and the 
running of a guesthouse.  It believes that self-financing strategies will enhance 
entrepreneurship and will contribute to its independence (Anneke, 2007).  
 
5.5.5.3  Financial sustainability 
The organisation has good prospects of long-term sustainability with a good balance of 
fees for services and a diversified donor base.  The organisation contends that a diverse 
funding base has a longer chance of lasting, creates less dependency on one source of 
income and allows more freedom in ways of responding rapidly to a changing 
environment (Anneke, 2007). 
 
5.5.5.4  Categories of expenditure 
Approximately 10% (including land and buildings) of the organisation’s overall budget is 
spent on capital expenditure.  Ninety percent of the organisation’s budget is spent on 
recurrent (operating) expenditure (Anneke, 2007).   
 
5.5.5.5  Financial management  
In terms of good financial management practices, the Sustainability Institute keeps an 
accurate record of all financial transactions.  It links the budget to the organisation’s 
strategic and operational plans.  The organisation produces management accounts so that 
managers can compare the organisation’s progress against the budget and then make 
decisions about the future.  It produces financial statements for outside scrutiny to 
demonstrate how funds have been applied in the past and it has internal controls (checks 
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and balances) in place to safeguard the organisation’s assets and to manage risk.  The 
university has an auditor to assist with the quality and reliability of financial and other 
performance information issued. 
 
The organisation has, amongst others, the following financial policies, rules and 
procedures in place: Each programme manager takes responsibility for all expenses 
incurred against his/her programme.  The director must approve all expenses. All 
payments made must be co-signed by two signatories. All financial transactions are 
processed on a daily basis and the financial records are updated monthly, with 
management reports given to the director as well as to the programme managers. 
 
5.5.6  Financial control 
Financial control endeavours take the following forms:  The financial planning is done 
between the management team and the financial manager.  Financial programming, for 
example, setting up the budget, is done between the director, programme co-ordinator 
and financial manager.  Financial reporting, on the other hand, is done monthly between 
the financial manager and programme co-ordinator, financial manager and director. The 
board of trustees signs off the overall budget annually. A financial audit is also performed 
annually (Anneke, 2007). 
 
5.5.7 General orientation 
The following table indicates who is actively involved in planning the organisation’s 
programmes and projects. 
 
 Planning Designing Implementing Evaluating 
Donors/Funders     
Board of directors/trustees     
Executive leadership X X X X 
Senior Staff X X X X 
Junior Staff X X X X 
Beneficiaries/target groups X X X X 
Other NGOs/CSOs/CBOs  X X  
Membership  X  X 
Ordinary Citizens     
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The table reflects that donors, the board of trustees and ordinary citizens play no role in 
the planning, designing, implementation and evaluation of the organisation’s programmes 
and projects. 
 
The director contends that the organisation “on the whole” is dealing with organisational 
governance, management of the organisation, administrative matters, controlling and 
monitoring of expenses and adherence to ethical principals very well.  She admits that 
daily challenges may arise in each of these aforementioned areas (Anneke, 2007). 
 
The organisation suggests that an NGO can be a developmental partner to the state, and 
the roles that they can assume could provide strategic direction, design, implementation 
and technical support for poor communities in ways that are owned and dictated by these 
poor communities, within the policy framework created by the state. 
 
In concluding the discussion on the Sustainability Institute it is important to review the 
organisation’s governance structure.  The institute’s director heads the organisation and 
reports to a board of trustees.  There are seven board members and their overall length of 
services ranges from between four to seven years.  Various types of skills such as 
management skills, fundraising skills and so on, are found within the board relevant to 
the work of the organisation.    A trust deed and a constitution governs the roles and 
responsibilities of the board members.    
 
In relations to funding, the largest portion of the organisation’s funds is secured from 
corporate social investment.  Equal portions of funding are received from foreign donors, 
grant-making foundations, fees and the running of a small business.  The organisation has 
good prospects of long-term sustainability due its diverse funding base.  The organisation 
also has sound financial management practices.  Each programme manager, for example, 
takes responsibility for all expenses incurred against his/her programme.  The director, 
however, approves all expenses.   Proper budgeting and financial auditing practices are in 
place.   
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter contextualised the case studies by emphasising the key empirical assertions, 
and the theoretical propositions around governance and financial sustainability of NGOs 
in South Africa and NGOs in general.  A set of specific financial and governance issues 
were identified that were investigated in the case of each NGO.  Three cases were 
explored.  These included the Centre for the Study of Higher Education (University of the 
Western Cape, South Africa), Oxfam International as an example of an international 
NGO, and the Sustainability Institute in  Stellenbosch, South Africa.   
 
Each organisation operates within a specific economic sector and has different areas of 
business.  Their governance structures differed too.  Oxfam as an international NGO has 
very clear governance structures. The roles of individuals within these structures are 
clearly defined.  In the case of the CSHE, located within a university setting, governance 
structures are more complex.  Numerous hierarchical levels blur reporting lines.  Clear 
roles and responsibilities were not assigned to individuals within this organisation.  The 
Sustainability Institute, on the other hand, has a very simplistic governance structure.  
Clear roles and responsibilities are assigned to individuals and to board members. 
 
In relation to funding options, Oxfam appears most established.  It has a hybrid funding 
source which is sustainable.  Its self-financing strategies, specifically its shops, is a 
financially beneficial endeavour.  Whilst prior to 1994 the CSHE had a range of funding 
options, this situation changed after 1994, and the organisation struggled to redefine itself 
in the new political economy.  Even though it attempted new funding strategies, the 
organisation met an early demise and is now operating in a virtual capacity.  The 
Sustainability Institute, on the other hand, places more emphasis on generating its own 
income.  It does not rely entirely on one source of funding.  This organisation believes 
that a diverse funding base is more sustainable.  The organisation is also cushioned by the 
fact that it is located within a well-established internationally renowned university. 
 
With regard to financial management practices, both Oxfam and the Sustainability 
Institute have clear financial management policies.  Whilst the CSHE had to adhere to 
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university financial policies, at times internal organisational decision-making practices 
hampered effective and efficient financial reporting activities.    
 
The next chapter will assess the research findings.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
RESEARCH RESULTS AND FINDINGS:  AN APPLICATION OF THE 
PREFERRED FRAMEWORK 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results and findings of the qualitative research undertaken in 
order to meet the research objectives as set out in Section 1.4 of Chapter one.  It provides 
an application of the preferred framework in terms of governance and financial 
sustainability. 
 
The historical and contemporary trends and tendencies of governance and financial 
arrangements in South African NGOs revealed that the new dispensation brought about 
fundamental changes.  NGOs had to redefine their roles in relation to the delivery of 
services.  The sector’s funding strategies had to be revised and commercialised activities 
took the form of, for example, consultations, contracts, the selling of services and 
products.  As donors took a tighter stance towards internal governance, NGOs had to 
improve their accounting and programme management practices.  The non-profit sector 
was forced to adopt concepts such as efficiency, strategic planning, cost-effectiveness 
and results-based management. Changes occurred within the legal framework in which 
NGOs operated.  The roles of NGO governing bodies in conjunction with NGO 
management became more and more important.  In addition, non-profit organisations are 
now required to do regular self-assessment, led by the governing board, against 
measurable and specified criteria to ensure sound governance.   
 
Corporate governance, the main components of which include direction, executive action, 
supervision and accountability of the organisation, have permeated the non-profit sector 
where non-profit organisations are required to take a more disciplined approach in terms 
of how they structure and run their organisations.  Higher standards of transparency and 
accountability, are called for.   
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Principles and guidelines for good governance suggest the following: NGO’s are 
accountable to their communities; Good governance is the basic form of accountability; 
Good governance has formal governance structures; Good governance involves the 
separation of governance and management; NGOs are mission-based organisations; 
NGOs promote the highest professional and ethical standards where boards articulate the 
professional and ethical standards of the organisation; NGOs exercise responsible 
resource management and mobilisation. They are also responsive to the constituencies 
they serve. 
 
With regard to financial management, budgeting, accounting, financial reporting and 
management control are the most essential tools for governance, accountability, planning 
and management in a non-profit organisation.  Accordingly, NGOs are compelled to 
develop an appropriate financial management system. 
 
NGO financial management should include:  keeping an accurate record of all financial 
transactions; linking the budget to the organisation’s strategic and operational plans; 
producing management accounts so that managers can compare the organisation’s 
progress against the budget and then make decisions about the future; producing financial 
statements for outside scrutiny to demonstrate how funds have been applied in the past; 
having internal controls or checks and balances in place to safeguard the organisation’s 
assets, and to manage risk and having an audit committee or auditor to assist in the 
quality and reliability of financial and other performance information used. 
 
Funding mobilisation strategies reveal that the non-profit funding sources vary in 
predictability, controllability, linkage to organisational activities, and the range and 
amount of management they require.  To ensure sufficient funding, the NGO sector is 
required to construct a well-executed fundraising strategy, which contains elements such 
as diversification, sustainability, creativity and inclusiveness.  NGO self-financing 
strategies appear a very attractive funding option in comparison to the more traditional 
fundraising approaches.  NGOs need a variety of financing tools and sources to reduce 
risk and to sustain their work. 
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The following section will provide an analysis of governance and financial sustainability 
of NGOs by positing theoretical knowledge gathered in Chapter two, three and four of 
this study, and statements posited above, against empirical evidence as forwarded in 
Chapter five. 
 
6.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The researcher will report on the research findings pertaining to NGO governance and 
NGO financial sustainability.  The latter will be explored in a later section whilst the next 
section will pay particular attention to an NGO’s legal status, its leadership, the executive 
management structure, the composition of the board, the role of the CEO vis-a-vis the 
chairperson of the board, organisational policies, procedures employed by NGOs to 
evaluate its projects and activities, and cooperative governance between the state and an 
NGO. 
 
6.2.1 Governance 
Section 3.2.1 of this study suggests that many different meanings have been accorded to 
the concept “governance”.  The term generally refers to the way in which power is 
assumed, conveyed and exercised within a society or an organisation.  This section will 
report on the lessons of experience learnt from governance arrangements within Oxfam, 
the Centre for the Study of Higher Education and the Sustainability Institute. 
 
6.2.1.1 Legal status 
The long-term sustainability of the non-profit sector is linked to the legislative framework 
of a country in which the NGO operates.  In South Africa, the Non-Profit Organisations 
Act (Act 71 of 1997), lays out in great detail a framework for the creation and operation 
of civil society organisations. 
 
Oxfam GB is an independent organisation, registered as a charity, affiliated to Oxfam 
International, with partners, volunteers, supporters and staff of many nationalities.  The 
Sustainability Institute operates as a Trust and is registered under the Trust Property 
Control Act of 1988.  The Centre for the Study of Higher Education, as a university-
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based organisation, on the other hand, reflects no record of formal registration as a non-
profit organisation, Trust or Section 21 not-for-gain organisation.  This may have 
impeded its sustainability, as literature reveals that local and international funding 
agencies increasingly demand that funding recipients be registered as non-profit 
organisations as evidence of compliance with basic criteria of authenticity as a bona fide 
organisation.  The fact that Oxfam GB and the Sustainability Institute are formally 
registered organisations enhances their long-term sustainability prospects. 
 
6.2.1.2 NGO leadership 
Corporate governance is essentially about leadership.  In the absence of transparent and 
accountable leadership, the organisation will decline.  To ensure accountable leadership 
the chief executive officer should take responsibility for organisational processes and 
activities.  A charismatic leader is regarded as an asset to an NGO.  In the context of the 
Sustainability Institute, both Professor Mark Swilling and Ms Eve Anneke, as founder 
members of the organisation, can be regarded as charismatic leaders.  Professor Harold 
Wolpe, the founder of the Education Policy Unit/Centre for the Study of Higher 
Education,  could be regarded as a charismatic leader too.  However, with the untimely 
death of Professor Wolpe, the organisation struggled to secure sustained leadership.  In 
the same vein, the organisation was unable to attract funding in the same way as 
Professor Wolpe did.  Leadership centred on a particular individual proves problematic.  
Potential leadership capacity within the organisation should be identified and groomed.  
In the case of Oxfam GB, its Council holds overall leadership responsibility and delegate 
the management of the organisation to the senior executive staff such as the Director and 
Corporate Management Team.  The latter are not the founder members of the 
organisation.   
 
6.2.1.3 Executive management structure 
An executive management team, the operational arm of the organisation, who clearly 
understands its roles and functions should manage an organisation.  Oxfam’s executive 
management structure has clear responsibilities as evident in Chapter five Section 5.3.4.2.  
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The same can be concluded for the Sustainability Institute where the director reports to 
the board of trustees, a management team and small highly autonomous teams on 
programmes and projects.  The EPU/CSHE management structure proved complex and 
peculiar.  Various disconnected reporting lines existed (See Chapter five Section 5.4.4.2).  
Where an non-cohesive management structure exists the administration and coordination 
of resources will not be utilised in an effective and efficient manner towards the 
attainment of the organisation’s vision, mission and strategic objectives.  Staff within the 
organisation will lose their commitment and will not function at optimum level.  This is 
evident in the displeasure expressed by the EPU/CSHE at a strategic session around the 
management of the organisation. 
 
Formal, effective organisational structures based on programmes and functions in 
documented management policies and systems should be in place.  The policies and 
systems should be translated into effective management practices.  Management practices 
should also not be too bureaucratic where the organisation’s activities are hampered. 
 
6.2.1.4 Composition of the Board 
Organisations should be governed by an effective board, which can both lead and control 
the organisation.  There should be an appropriate balance of power and authority on the 
board, such that no one entity or block of persons can dominate the board’s decision-
making.  The board should seek to ensure an adequate mix of skills and experience and 
diversity in demographics to enable them to operate effectively.  Particular knowledge 
and skills amongst board members is essential to ensure efficient governance. 
 
The case studies explored in this study show that the governing boards consisted of 
between 7 to 16 members.  The types of knowledge and skills within the board as 
reported by the Sustainability Institute and Oxfam GB, relevant to the work of the two 
organisations, ranged from technical skills, community engagement skills, and 
management skills to fundraising skills.  The composition of the board of the EPU/CSHE 
represented diversity in relation to the education sectors the individual board members 
represented.  The construction of the board in this instance was not centred on the skills 
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and knowledge individual board members bring to the organisation.  Boards should play 
a key role in fundraising, for example and it is imperative for this particular skill to be 
present.  Such expertise will enhance the organisation’s financial sustainability. 
 
It is imperative that the construction of the board be considered carefully.  Board 
members should possess knowledge and skills relevant to the work of the organisation.  
Legal expertise as a requisite skill for one or more board members should be considered 
to ensure that the organisation remain compliant within the legal framework of the 
country and sector in which it finds itself. 
 
6.2.1.5 Distinction between the role of the CEO and Chairperson of the Governing 
Board 
In many organisations, the CEO fills the role of the chairperson of the board.  This 
duality of positions places the CEO in a powerful position to manage the operations of 
the organisation and also to oversee the future direction of the organisation.  This 
situation is problematic and a conflict of interest may arise.  It is suggested that the 
position of CEO be separated from that of the chairperson of the board.  The hierarchical 
relationship between the board and the CEO should also be clearly defined.  The board 
may spell out its expectations of the CEO by devising a job description with very specific 
duties (see Section 3.4.1 of Chapter three).   
 
The three cases studied (see Chapter five of this study) support the notion of the 
separation of power between the CEO of the organisation and the chairperson of the 
board where each entity has clearly assigned roles and responsibilities. 
 
6.2.1.6 Organisational policies  
To uphold the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct as forwarded in the King Report, 
it is imperative for organisations to have specific policies elucidating the duties of the 
governing board and the management committee of the organisation.  Such policies will 
contribute to sound internal governance.  
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The cases investigated in this study support the above notion and have policies reflecting, 
for example, the ethos and values of the organisation.  Other policies, to name but a few, 
focus for example on strategic management, risk identification management, internal 
control and management information systems, a trust deed and a constitution.  A range of 
policies existing within these organisations govern the role and responsibilities of both 
management and the board.  
 
Whilst CSHE had various policies in place, both at organisational and university level, 
tensions existed between the roles of the financial manager, the deputy-director and the 
director of the organisation. In this situation, unhealthy internal management practices, 
and tensions between individuals soured working relations, and impacted negatively on 
the implementation of the organisation’s policies.  At times, even the best-formulated 
organisational policies cannot remedy internal strife.   
 
Policy documents may dictate governance structures.  Internal environmental factors may 
impact negatively on the efficient and effective execution of these policies and should be 
taken into account in the policy formulation process. 
 
6.2.1.7 Procedures for evaluating projects and activities 
In order for an NGO to remain relevant in relation to its role and purpose in today’s 
global context, it should regularly evaluate its projects and activities, which in turn will 
impact on good corporate governance. 
 
The Sustainability Institute reports that both funders and the organisation initiate 
evaluating strategies.  Evaluation is done on an ongoing basis, against the objectives of 
specific programmes. 
 
Oxfam, on the other hand, reports that its evaluation mechanisms are currently under 
review.  At present the organisation does not undertake evaluation in a systematic way.  
This is extremely surprising given the nature and business of the organisation and the 
number of years it has been in existence.  
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At the CSHE, each researcher working on a research project, was required to monitor 
progress on projects to meet donor reporting deadlines.  External procedures were set up 
by funders in terms of what projects and categories were to be funded and when reporting 
needed to take place.  Both internal and external evaluation mechanisms thus existed.  
This information is contentious as an anonymous source revealed how funding was 
shifted between various projects without proper authorisation. 
 
The researcher contends that it is imperative for organisations, at set intervals, to assess 
its relevance in the sector in which it operates.  Not only should the vision, mission and 
strategic objectives of the organisation be in line with the services that are required in the 
environmental context, the business of the organisation must also reflect activities which 
attracts sufficient funding.  Against the vision, mission and strategic objectives of the 
organisation, clear control and evaluating mechanisms should be instituted.  In this way 
the organisation remains relevant and sound governance is insured. 
 
6.2.1.8 Cooperative governance between NGOs and the state 
A state, antagonistic towards its NGO sector, will not provide an enabling environment in 
which the sector can operate.  NGOs can play a number of important roles in various 
areas.  It can assume a social watchdog role and it can hold government to account.  
Government in turn can hold NGOs to account on their activities, through legislative 
frameworks.   
 
The EPU/CSHE, prior to 1994, assisted the ANC government-in-waiting in formulating 
higher education policy.  After 1994, the organisation’s focus shifted toward higher 
education academic research specifically.  At various intervals, the centre was 
commissioned by the South African state to pursue specific research endeavours. 
 
The Sustainability Institute contends that this organisation can be a developmental 
partner to the state where it provides a assistance in strategy formulation, design, 
implementation, technical support with poor communities in ways that are owned and 
dictated by these poor communities, within the policy framework created by the state. 
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Oxfam believes that to overcome poverty and suffering involves changing unjust policies 
and practices, nationally and internationally, as well as working closely with 
governments and people in poverty. 
  
Cooperative governance thus extends beyond the government and includes NGOs.  
Working with the state to achieve development endeavours will impact favourably on an 
NGO’s long-term sustainability.   
 
In concluding the discussion on governance, the researcher contends that, in order to 
sustain an NGO, the following tenets as captured above, are very important in its 
governance:  The organisation has to reflect its legal status, a charismatic leader is 
imperative and the executive management structure should be clear.  The composition of 
the governing board is important and the roles between the CEO and chairperson of the 
board should be clearly defined.  Organisational policies should be spelled out clearly and 
it is crucial for activities and projects to be evaluated at regular interval. Lastly, 
cooperative governance between the state and the NGO can only enhance the 
organisation’s long-term prospects. 
  
6.2.2 FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Chapter four subsection 4.1 of this thesis contends that one of the main factors impacting 
effective management and sustainability of NGOs is the nature of their dependability on 
donor funding.  In many instances, donor organizations have inconsistent funding 
priorities, further threatening financial sustainability of dependent organisations. Foreign 
donors are also increasingly looking for factors such as organisational capacity, 
accountability, sustainability and proper account procedures in organisations they wish to 
assist.  NGOs are further compelled to develop proper financial management systems.    
In light of the foregoing, this section will report on the lessons of experience learnt from 
financial sustainability practices within Oxfam, the Centre for the Study of Higher 
Education and the Sustainability Institute. 
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6.2.2.1 Sources of NGO Funding 
NGOs are required to fundraise and to generate an income to become sustainable.  In 
general, NGOs have commonly been able to raise revenue through the state, the public 
and the private sector on an international, national, or local level.  Within the 
government, financial aid may be given through international foreign sources or 
bilateral/multilateral grants, as well as through national or local governmental grants.  
The private sector may provide corporate grants or foundation grants.  Financial aid from 
the general public may come through international charitable and local individual 
donations (See Figure 4.1 of this thesis).  The aforementioned sources of revenue vary in 
predictability, controllability, linkage to organisational activities and the range and 
amount of management effort they require.  Some NGOs complain that, in some 
instances, when they do receive funding from donors, it usually has strings attached. 
 
The Centre for the Study of Higher Education derived its funds from five different 
sources.  Core funds were received from the Swedish International Development Agency.  
Project funds were sourced from numerous international and local agencies.  
Commissioned or consultancy research funds were derived from various bodies and 
consultancies.  Miscellaneous funds were provided by various donor agencies such as the 
British Council.  The University of the Western Cape funded the salary of the Director.  
Research revealed that 80% of the organisation’s overall funding was derived from 
international sources. 
 
Oxfam GB’s sources of funding ranges from individual giving, corporate social 
investment, government funding, foreign donor funding, funding from grant-making 
foundations to national funding agencies.   Percentage wise, 34% of funding is derived 
from donations, 16% from grants from the United Kingdom government, European 
Union and the United Nations, 6% from other Oxfams and NGOs, and 10% from food 
aid.  Another 33% of funding is derived from shops and trading and 1% of funding is 
derived from interest accrued.   
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The Sustainability Institute’s sources of funding takes the following form:  10% of 
funding is derived from individual giving, 70% from corporate social investment, 5% 
from foreign donors, 5% from grant-making foundations, 5% from fees charged for 
service provision and 5% of its income is derived from running a guest house and small 
business development.  
 
Whilst the three organisations derived their funding from a diverse range of funders, the 
CSHE derived 80% of its overall funding, in particular its core funding, from 
international sources.  This proved problematic.  Firstly, the South African government 
formed bilateral agreements with international funding agencies after 1994, channelling 
funds away from this organisation.  Also, donors world-wide have become less willing to 
fund traditional overhead expenses such as salaries, rent and equipment.  As a 
consequence, the organisation chased more and more donor funds rather than developing 
long-term programme strategies in support of their own vision, mission and objectives.  
Its inability to attract further funding contributed to its demise.  The Sustainability 
Institute has been able to successfully garner local corporate social investment which 
forms the biggest portion of its income.    Oxfam GB, on the other hand, sources 
approximately equal percentages of funding from donations and its shops and trading 
respectively.  The latter clearly enhances the organisation’s financial sustainability. 
 
The researcher contends that it is more conducive for an NGO to hold a mixed funding 
portfolio than to depend on a single donor to meet current and future needs. 
 
6.2.2.2 Self-financing strategies 
Self-financing, an internal entrepreneurial method to generate an income, as an 
alternative to the more traditional fundraising approaches used by non-profit 
organisations, will contribute to financial sustainability if applied correctly.  Traditional 
donors, however, do not fund self-financing initiatives.  Self-financing strategies may 
include for example:  membership fees, fees for services, product sales, equipment 
rentals, use of patents or copyrights, ancillary business ventures and investment 
dividends.   
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 Self-financing is a funding approach that the Sustainability Institute pursues.  The 
organisation has been making money from small business development, charging fees for 
courses and the running of a guesthouse.   The institute believes that self-financing 
strategies will not only enhance entrepreneurship, but will also contribute to its 
independence. 
 
The Centre for the Study of Higher Education generated its own income by producing 
work for clients such as the South African government, other NGOs, the Ford 
Foundation, student organisations, academics, students and the private sector. 
 
In relation to Oxfam, trading is responsible for making as much money as possible by 
maximising the value of the gifts of time (the time spent by volunteers) and the gift of 
product (the donations given by the public).  Oxfam’s Trading Division is the largest 
charity network in Great Britain with around 750 shops.  Every Oxfam shop is unique.  
Some shops sell a wide range of products while others focus almost exclusively on one 
product such as music, furniture, clothing or books.  Wastesaver, another one of Oxfam’s 
money-generating endeavours, developed into one of the largest recycling centres in 
Europe processing tonnes of clothes, textiles and shoes on an annual basis.  Because of 
these initiatives, Oxfam has very good prospects for long-term sustainability.  
 
The researcher concludes that self-financing strategies do contribute to an organisation’s 
long-term financial sustainability.   
 
6.2.2.3 Expenditure 
Many donor grants and donations carry restrictions on the types of expenses that they will 
cover.  The most common restriction is to cover only direct programme costs.  Donors 
are less willing to fund traditional overhead expenses such as salaries, rent and equipment 
or any other costs related to support services.  NGOs, in general, devise their programmes 
in such a way so as to recover the costs of operational and capital expenses.  An NGO’s 
core activities should not exceed the inflow of grants and donations. 
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 In 2004/05 and 2005/06, Oxfam’s support costs, governance costs and other resources 
expended amounted to 13% and 11% respectively of the organisation’s overall budget.  
This is in line with general trends where experts suggest that no more than 15% of an 
NGO’s budget should be spent on administrative costs. 
 
The Sustainability Institute spends approximately 10% of the organisation’s annual 
budget on capital expenditures and 90% of the budget is spend on operating expenses. 
 
The EPU/CSHE, on the other hand, reported that it spends approximately 56% of its 
budget on staffing costs.  When the Unit experienced financial difficulties as reported in 
an earlier chapter, staff retrenchments occurred.  In essence the Unit reduced its biggest 
expense. 
 
A sustainable balance between capital expenditure and current expenditure should be 
achieved.  Separate fundraising campaigns should be launched for huge capital expenses. 
A lesson learnt from the above expositions is that each organisation, in line with its 
vision, mission and strategic objectives, will devise its programmes in such a way so as to 
recover the costs of operational and capital expenses. 
 
6.2.2.4 Good practice in financial management 
Good financial management practices will help NGO managers to make effective and 
efficient use of resources to achieve organisational objectives and to fulfil commitments 
to stakeholders.   It will help NGOs to be more accountable to donors and other 
stakeholders and gain the respect and confidence of funding agencies and partners.  
Another advantage derived from good financial management practices is that an NGO 
will have a competitive advantage over other organisations in securing scarces resources 
and, in this context, the NGO will further prepare itself for long-term financial 
sustainability. 
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Whilst there is no “one-size fits-all” financial management model for NGOs, good 
practice in financial management is achieved by designing systems and procedures 
around accounting records, financial planning, financial monitoring and internal controls 
 
In terms of good financial management practices, Oxfam, the Sustainability Institute and 
the Centre for the Study of Higher Education keep an accurate record of all financial 
transactions.  Each organisation links the financial budget to the organisation’s strategic 
and operational plans.  Each organisation produces management accounts so that 
managers can compare the organisation’s progress against the budget and then make 
decisions about the future.  Financial statements are produced for outside scrutiny to 
demonstrate how funds have been applied in the past and internal controls (checks and 
balances) are in place to safeguard each organisation’s assets and to manage risk.  
Auditors assist in the quality and reliability of financial and other performance 
information issued. 
 
Oxfam has amongst others, the following financial policies, rules and procedures in plan.  
An Expenditure Authorisation Policy, an Expenses Policy, an Investment Policy, a 
Reserves Policy 2006, Restricted Income Policies, Restricted Income Procedures,  
International Division Guide to Mandatory Procedures, International Division Finance 
Procedures and the United Kingdom  Accounting Finance Procedures. 
 
At the Sustainability Institute, each programme manager takes responsibility for all 
expenses incurred against his/her programme. The director must approve all expenses. 
All payments made must be co-signed by two signatories. All financial transactions are 
processed on a daily basis and the financial records are updated monthly with 
management reports given to the director as well as to the programme managers. 
 
A staff member of the Finance Department at UWC reported that, despite the institutional 
procedures and practices around financial management control mechanisms, the CSHE 
still displayed inappropriate use and reporting of donor funding.   
 
 194
Inadequate and inappropriate financial management practices will lead to the early 
demise of any organisation.  It is imperative that clear and suitable financial management 
policies and procedures be devised for an organisation and that everyone in the 
organisation is familiar with its content and how it should be applied. 
 
6.2.2.5 Financial control 
The concept “financial control” forms the core of financial management.  Financial 
control is a state of affairs that ensures that the finances of an organisation are handled 
properly.  Without financial control, assets are put in jeopardy, funds may not be spent in 
accordance with the organisation’s objectives or donor’s desires, and the competence of 
managers and the integrity of the organisation may be called into question.  Financial 
control is achieved by designing systems and procedures to suit the particular needs of an 
organisation. 
 
Oxfam has a very intricate financial control system in place.  They combine the 
organisation’s corporate strategic objectives with an appropriate budget.  Various forms 
of information technology are used to facilitate this process.  The Trustees and staff 
members play an integral role in the entire process.  Section 5.3.7 Chapter five sets out a 
detailed discussion. 
 
Whilst rules and procedures exist at UWC to exert financial control over entities like 
CSHE, the Centre persisted in applying its own rendition of financial control where funds 
were applied and shifted outside assigned budgetary line items. Chapter five puts forward 
a discussion on this aspect. 
 
Financial control endeavours at the Sustainability Institute take the following forms.  The 
organisation’s financial planning is done between the management team and the financial 
manager.  Financial programming, for example, setting up the budget, is done between 
the director, programme co-ordinator and financial manager.  Financial reporting, on the 
other hand, is done monthly between the financial manager and programme co-ordinator, 
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financial manager and director. The board of trustees signs off the overall budget 
annually. A financial audit is also performed annually. 
 
It is clear from the above deliberations that if you do not exert effective financial control, 
your organisation will not sustain itself financially. 
 
6.2.2.6  Fundraising strategies.   
Some of the main reasons why NGOs need to find different fundraising strategies for 
long-term survival are that donor resources available to NGOs continue to decrease and 
donor agencies worldwide have shifted and narrowed funding into specific, highly 
political or publicly popular regions of the world.  Funding has been shifted into specific 
markets and the “mushrooming” of NGOs worldwide has tightened competition between 
NGOs for increasingly limited funding. 
 
Fundraising is a marketing or exchange process.  It is a proactive endeavour and should 
be conceptualised and designed as a long-term programme.  Fundraising strategies are 
thus planned, systematic, ongoing and integrated into an organisation’s programmes and 
administrative tasks.    Research revealed that, generally, very few non-profit 
organisations have dedicated professional fundraising human resource capacity and a 
coherent fundraising strategy.  Fundraising capacity within organisations requires the 
development of a fundraising policy and regulations, for example, and a fundraising 
committee with clear job descriptions and mechanisms for monitoring fundraising 
activities. 
 
A well-executed fundraising strategy contains elements such as diversification, 
sustainability, creativity and inclusiveness. 
 
Not one of the organisations surveyed indicated that they have a dedicated team of 
fundraisers.  It would appear as if fundraising formed part of the job description of every 
staff member employed at the EPU/CSHE.  The director of the centre was tasked to 
sourcing core funding.  Funds for particular projects were sourced by individual 
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researchers.  The same applied for the Sustainability Institute.  The Institute has highly 
charismatic leadership, and is able to attract funding for endeavours they perceive as 
crucial.  Oxfam, as an established organisation, has very specific income-generating 
endeavours in place, as alluded to in earlier discussions.  Their current fundraising 
strategies, as mentioned in Section 6.2.2.1 of this Chapter, have contributed to the 
organisation’s financial sustainability.     
 
The researcher contends that clear fundraising strategies should be devised over a long-
term period, linked to the organisation’s vision, mission and strategic objectives.  A 
fundraising team should exist within the organisation, or individual fundraisers should be 
appointed.   
 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the results of the research findings of the qualitative research 
undertaken in order to meet the research objectives set out in Chapter one of this study.  It 
provided an analysis of governance and financial sustainability of NGOs by positing 
theoretical knowledge against empirical evidence attained. 
 
The researcher concludes the following:  In relation to governance, and in particular the 
legal status of organisations, local and international organisations increasingly demand 
that funding recipients be registered as non-profit organisations.  A charismatic leader the 
research concludes, impacts positively on any organisation, be it in the capacity of leader 
or fundraiser.    
 
The executive management structure of an NGO should be clearly defined where roles, 
functions and responsibilities are understood by everyone in the organisation.    
 
The composition of the NGO board should be centred on the skills and capacity board 
members bring to the organisation.  Board members should add value to an NGO.   There 
should be a clear distinction between the role of the CEO and the chairperson of the 
governing board. 
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 Organisational policies should be properly constructed and prove adequate in governing 
an NGO.  When it comes to NGO projects and programmes, these should be evaluated 
against clearly defined objectives at regularly determined intervals.   
 
NGOs, in relation to the state, can play a number of very important roles.  It is imperative 
for the state to provide a conducive, legislative environment in which NGOs can function 
at optimum level.   The state can also act as a conduit for NGO funding.  
 
With regard to financial sustainability, the researcher concludes that NGOs should have a 
diverse funding base built on a properly constructed fundraising strategy.  NGOs should 
have a fundraising committee or an assigned fundraiser.  Self-financing strategies proved 
a viable funding solution for NGOs.   
 
In relation to NGOs’ income and expenditure endeavours, a sustainable balance should 
be sourced between the two.  Good financial management practices will help NGO’s 
manage to make effective and efficient use of resources to achieve the organisation’s 
objectives.  Proper financial controls will assist in this regard.   
 
The next chapter will develop an appraisal framework for the sustainability of NGOs. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
AN APPRAISAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF NGOs
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study traces the governance and financial sustainability of NGOs/CBOs/CSOs in 
general and South African non-governmental organisations in particular, with the 
intention of developing improved options for the future regarding the sustainability of 
the NGO sector in South Africa, especially as regards financial management and 
governance.  Accordingly, this chapter aims to develop an appraisal framework for 
the sustainability of NGOs.  
 
A theoretical analysis of existing literature pertaining to governance and financial 
sustainability of NGOs revealed that a generally agreed upon appraisal framework 
assessing the long-term sustainability of NGOs did not exist, but was indeed required 
by a number of NGO stakeholders.  Research revealed that in terms of sustainability, 
it is particularly necessary to assess an NGO’s legal status, its leadership capacity, the 
roles and responsibilities of the executive management, the role of the NGO board in 
its governance processes, and the extent to which principles of good governance are 
practiced within the organisation.  These key criteria proved the most important in the 
governance endeavours of NGOs.   
 
Furthermore, research revealed that sources of NGO funding should be assessed.  
Self-financing strategies and practices should be appraised.  It was evident that 
fundraising strategies, good practices in financial management and financial control 
mechanisms should be assessed, as these key aspects were proven to impact on the 
organisation’s financial sustainability.    
 
In context of the above, an appraisal instrument has been developed in this study as a 
result of the theoretical assessment as well as case experiences.  This appraisal 
instrument, formulated for the South African NGO sector specifically, has been 
applied to the case studies as presented in Chapter One, Section 1.6.  The results of 
this pilot study are presented in Section 7.4 (Also refer to Annexure B).  The purpose 
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for initiating this pilot study was to highlight the strengths, weaknesses and areas for 
future improvement. 
 
The next section presents the aforementioned appraisal framework.  Groups identified 
as potential users (See Section 7.2) will be advised on how it may be utilised. 
 
7.2 THE APPRAISAL FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of this appraisal instrument is to provide a framework for assessing the 
governance and financial sustainability of NGOs.  During this research investigation, 
many NGO stakeholders noted that a standardised appraisal system  would be useful 
in particular for the NGO/CBO/CSO sectors, statutory bodies that exist to regulate 
NGOs, network organisations,  organisations providing funding and NGO managers.  
This instrument does not negate the importance of the output or the impact of an NGO 
on its constituents.  Whilst the latter is imperative to the survival of an NGO, the 
focus of this research in particular is on an NGO’s compliance with good governance 
and financial management practices. 
 
The governance and financial sustainability appraisal framework for NGOs consists 
of systematically developed appraisal criteria based on theoretical assumptions and 
empirical evidence  explored by this research.  Its purpose is to assess and to make 
explicit recommendations with a definite intention  of influencing how NGOs are 
governed and financially sustained.   
 
The appraisal framework is intended to be used by the following groups: 
a) By policy makers in South Africa with specific reference to: 
• The South African  Revenue Service (SARS); 
• The Master of the High Court; 
• The Minister for Social Development;  
• The Director-General: Social Development, and  
• The Registrar of Companies  regarding Section 21 companies, 
to help them decide which guidelines could be recommended for NGOs in 
relation to its governance and financial sustainability.   In this instance, the 
instrument should be part of a formal assessment process.  This instrument 
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should not be used to the detriment of civil society organisations lobbying 
government to change/reformulate certain public policies nor should 
NGOs calling for new legislation on certain issues be penalised; 
b) By NGOs/CBOs/CSOs as a self-assessment tool to ensure that their governance 
and financial sustainability practices are sound; 
c) By government, donors, private sector social responsibility funders, the National 
Development Agency (NDA) and development banks that wish to undertake 
their own assessment of an NGO/CBO/CSO before committing any resources, 
and 
d) By NGO/CBO/CSO staff to help identify critical skills required by the 
organisation. 
 
An appraisal form has been constructed consisting of a governance section and a 
financial sustainability section.  Each section consists of assessment criteria against 
which scores are assigned.  A practical cumulative scoring system has been devised 
that should be facilitated by an assessor who has extensive experience in the area of 
NGOs.  
 
The theoretical assumptions forwarded by the study form the basis of the assessment 
criteria utilised in the appraisal framework.  In particular, evidence from Chapter Two 
(Historical perspectives of NGO governance and funding in South Africa), Chapter 
Three (Theoretical overview of governance and sustainability of NGOs) and Chapter 
Four (Theoretical focus on sustainability and financial management) suggest that an 
NGO’s legal status proves imperative to its legitimacy and its receipt of funding.  
NGO managers, in turn, influence the organisation’s longevity particularly where 
subordinates are groomed to take up leadership.  The form of leadership practised by 
the organisation, whether autocratic or participatory, is an essential component of 
NGO governance.  An NGO’s executive management should understand its roles and 
responsibilities.  Furthermore, diversity in terms of composition and the skills of the 
NGO’s board, theorists suggest, is of utmost importance to the NGOs sustained 
existence. Lastly, the extent to which principles of good governance is applied will 
influence the organisation’s sustainability.   
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All the aforementioned chapters suggest that the financial sustainability of an 
organisation is dependent on, inter alia, the sources of NGO funding, the management 
of a funding strategy and sound financial management and control.  Self-financing 
strategies employed by an NGO are proposed as key contributors to an NGO’s long-
term prospects.   The research suggests that it is imperative for NGOs to apply good 
financial management practices and financial control.  Most NGOs do not have 
clearly defined fundraising strategies or personnel responsible for fundraising.  In 
many instances this has led to the organisation’s early demise.  Williams1 (2008: 2) 
contends that: 
Donors have the upper hand in terms of determining what 
aspects of an NGO they would fund.  Generally they want to 
focus on programme delivery and often sets limits to the 
overhead/organisational/administrative costs of the 
organisation, including governance costs.  In this context it 
would be unlikely that donors would provide resources for a 
fundraising capacity.  In addition if an NGO appoints an 
external fundraiser the donor may argue that if they do not have 
the capacity to develop funding proposals and liase with donors 
what internal capacity exists to manage their funds and the 
programme?  Furthermore, most external fundraisers require a 
percentage payment out of the funds they raised.  Most donors 
would not agree to pay such a commission and this puts the NGO 
in a difficult position if it receives funds through the efforts of an 
external fundraiser.  Do they misappropriate funds from the 
donor to cover the costs of the fundraiser or do they take on 
contract work to cover this cost.  In so doing their focus is shifted 
away from the programme that the funder originally intended for 
them to work on.   
 
The above suggests that it is important that each criterion developed and forwarded in 
this assessment instrument be considered carefully, before any score is assigned.  The 
user will be taken through various steps to follow to ensure that this framework is 
utilised properly.  
 
                                                 
1  Christopher John Williams (Director – TRAC) joined TRAC-MP in 2000 after working at the 
DLA Provincial Office. Chris holds a BA, Honours and MSC in Development Planning and 
provides overall management, leadership and strategic support to TRAC-MP's programme 
activities. 
Also see http://www.trac.org.za/context/About-US.asp
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In concluding the appraisal process, score categories have been developed which will 
indicate whether the NGO is sustainable, or whether particular areas require 
improvement.  The total score attained by an NGO should be measured against one of 
the following score categories. 
 
DIAGRAM 7.1:  SUSTAINABILITY INDICATOR 
 
 
SCORE CATEGORY 
 
 
FINAL SCORE 
 
 
SUSTAINABILITY 
INDICATOR 
 
 
GREEN CATEGORY 
 
 
60% + 
 
Sustainable 
 
ORANGE CATEGORY 
 
41% - 59% 
Strengthen governance 
and financial 
management practices 
 
RED CATEGORY 
 
0% - 40% 
Drastic action required 
with regard to 
governance and financial 
management practices 
 
 
The following appraisal framework has been developed based on the theoretical and 
empirical research of this study, and the key categories2 consists of NGO legal status, 
NGO standards of accountability and transparency, NGO leadership, roles and 
responsibilities of the executive management, the NGO board, the extent to which 
principles of good governance are practiced, sources of NGO funding, self-financing 
strategies, good practices in financial management, financial control measures and 
fundraising strategies.  These areas will be discussed in detail in the sections that 
follow.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Sections 2.6; 2.6.2 of Chapter Two 
See Sections 3.1; 3.2.4; 3.3; 3.4; 3.4.1; 3.4.2; 3.4.3; 3.5 of Chapter Three 
See Sections 4.1; 4.2; 4.2.1; 4.2.2; 4.2.3; 4.5.4; 4.6 of Chapter Four 
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APPRAISAL FORM 1: APPRAISAL INSTRUMENT FOR THE 
SUSTAINABILITY OF NGOs 
 
 
APPRAISAL CRITERIA 
 
MAXIMUM 
SCORE 
 
SCORE 
ATTAINED
 
NGO legal status 
 
10 
  
 
 
NGO leadership (Chief Executive 
Officer/Director/Manager)  
 
 
10 
 
 
 
Roles and responsibilities of the executive 
management  
 
10 
 
 
 
NGO Board 
 
10 
 
 
The extent to which principles of good 
governance are practiced 
 
10 
 
 
G
O
V
ER
N
A
C
E 
 
Score:  Sub-Total 
 
50 
 
 
 
Sources of NGO funding 
 
10 
 
 
 
Self-financing strategies 
 
10 
 
 
 
Good practices in financial management 
 
10 
 
 
 
Financial control measures 
 
10 
 
 
 
Fundraising strategies 
 
10 
 
 
 
FI
N
A
N
C
IA
L 
SU
ST
A
IN
A
BI
LI
TY
 
 
Score:  Sub-Total 
 
50 
 
 
 
TOTAL SCORE: 
 
100 
 
 
 
PERCENTAGE SCORE: 
                               
                                  %  
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The user should note that the criteria and weighting of scores are relative.  Weighting 
(how many points are allocated to each criterion) can be adjusted depending on the 
value placed on particular criteria, within acceptable parameters and particularly by 
facilitating agreement between stakeholders of a particular NGO being appraised.  An 
acceptable parameter in this context will be an adjustment of not more or less than 
two points in the possible score column pertaining to a particular criterion which may 
require an adjustment. 
 
The next section will explain the theoretical relevance of the assessment criteria, and 
perspectives will be provided on the reasoning for the assessment scores pertaining to 
each criterion.   
 
7.2.1 NGO legal status 
In the South African context, the Nonprofit Organisations Act (1997) has been 
enacted to provide an environment in which non-profit organisations can flourish, and 
to establish an administrative and regulatory framework within which non-profit 
organisations can conduct their affairs.  
 
The NPO Act encourages and supports non-profit organisations in their contribution 
to meeting the diverse needs of the South African population.  Non-profit 
organisations are particularly encouraged to maintain and improve adequate standards 
of governance, transparency and accountability.  The Act provides that the Minister 
responsible for non-profit organisations prescribes benefits and allowances to 
registered non-profit organisations after consultation with the committees of the two 
Houses of Parliament responsible for welfare and with the concurrence of every 
Minister whose department is affected by a particular benefit or allowance (Nonprofit 
Organisation Act, 1997). 
  
Whilst the South African government encourages the registration of non-profit 
organisations, research has shown that local and international donors are also 
increasingly demanding that their grantees be registered as non-profit organisations, 
as evidence of compliance with basic criteria of authenticity as a bona fide 
organisation. 
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As the legal status of NGOs has proven to be an important aspect of good governance, 
the criteria of: the existence of a legal entity; an NGO registered as a non-profit 
organisation under the NPO Act 1997; an NGO registered as a PBO; a non-profit trust 
registered under the Trust Property Control Act 1998; an NGO registered as a Section 
21 not-for-profit gain organisation under the Companies Act 1973, and an NGO 
registered for value added tax (VAT) are suggested for determining the status of an 
NGO in this respect (See Appraisal Diagram 1.1).    Also refer to Sections 4.1 and 
2.6.2 of this study for the theoretical discussion. 
 
APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.1 
 
 
GOVERNANCE APPRAISAL 
 
NGO LEGAL STATUS 
Assessment Criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
Assigned
 
 
Existence of a legal entity 
 
/5 
 
 
Registered as one of the following: 
 
• NGO registered as a non-profit organisation under the 
NPO Act of 1997  
• Registered as PBO 
• Non-profit trust registered under the Trust Property 
Control Act 1998 
• Section 21 not-for-profit gain organisation as per the 
Companies Act of 1973 
 
 
/4 
 
 
 
 
Registered for value added tax (VAT) 
 
 
/1 
 
 
 
 
Sub-Total 
 
/10 
 
 
 
 
How to assign scores: 
- Insert a score in each column.  Where the organisation does not meet the 
specified criteria, assign a zero (0).  Where the organisation has partially met the 
assessment criteria, where appropriate and at the discretion of the assessor, 
assign a score of between five (5) and zero point five (0.5). 
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- Transfer sub-total of score attained under Appraisal diagram 1.1  to the 
appropriate block in Appraisal Form 1. 
 
7.2.2 NGO leadership 
Leadership is the process of establishing direction and influencing others to follow 
that direction.   Often the leadership style adopted, for example, autocratic, people-
orientated, participatory, and democratic or liassez faire, depends on the 
circumstances that prevail and the life cycle of the NGO (Centre for African Family 
Studies, 2001; Odiorne, 1969; Greenberg and Baron, 1997). 
 
As corporate governance is essentially about leadership, it is imperative for this 
concept to be assessed within an NGO.  One of the key problems in many NGOs, 
contends Williams3 (2008), “…is the confusion between governance and 
management.  By grouping all in terms of leadership, this confusion is exacerbated.”   
It is thus important to clarify the hierarchical relationship between the governing 
board and the CEO.  To eliminate such confusion, NGO leadership in the context of 
this appraisal instrument refers to an NGO’s chief executive officer/director/manager 
or management, the operational arm of the organisation. 
 
Charisma as an attribute is evoked by some commentators whenever NGO leadership 
is discussed.  In the NGO context a charismatic leader is able to attract funding 
according to Indian, Kenyan and South African commentators,4 which in turn impacts 
on the organisation’s financial sustainability.  A charismatic leader exhibits 
confidence, dominance, a sense of purpose and the ability to articulate goals.  A 
charismatic leader is considered an exceptional person and, with his or her sheer 
presence and personality, is able to shape and influence the future of an organisation 
(Bass, 1990; Raelon, 2003).   
 
In the above context, the following assessment criteria under the heading “NGO 
leadership” have been devised.   Scores can be assigned as indicated in Appraisal 
diagram 1.2. 
                                                 
3 Williams, as noted earlier, has extensive experience in NGO governance.  The National 
Director of the Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust supports this notion. 
 
4 Also see Section 2.2 of Chapter Two and Section 4.5.4 of Chapter Four 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.2 
 
 
GOVERNANCE APPRAISAL 
NGO LEADERSHIP 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
assigned 
The NGO displays ALL of the following leadership criteria 
 
/3 
 
 
NGO manager/director displays transparent and accountable 
leadership in line with the organisation’s constitution 
 
/1 
 
 
NGO leadership (manager/director) is not centred on a particular 
individual where the manager is also the chairperson of the 
governing board.  Clear separation of powers exists between the 
two entities 
 
/1 
 
NGO has a charismatic leader (director/manager) /1  
NGO manager/director delegates the management of the 
organisation to senior executive staff (where subordinates exist) 
 
/1  
NGO manager/director served for 3 years or more as managing 
director or director 
/1  
NGO manager/director effectively manages the operational arm 
of the organisation, and the chairperson of the governing board 
and/or governing board does not intervene in administrative 
issues of the organisation except in the formulation of 
operational policies 
/1  
 
 
 
There is regular supervision of the 
director/manager/management by the chairperson of the 
governing board 
/1  
 
Sub-total 
 
 
/10 
 
 
 
How to assign scores: 
 
- Insert a score in each column.  Where the organisation does not meet the 
specified criteria, assign a zero (0).  Where the organisation partially meets the 
assessment criteria, where appropriate and at the discretion of the assessor, 
assign a score of between three (3) and zero point five (0.5). 
- Transfer sub-total of score attained under Appraisal diagram 1.2 to the 
appropriate block in Appraisal Form 1. 
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 7.2.3 Roles and responsibilities of executive management 
An executive management team5, the operational arm of the organisation, that 
typically includes the CEO of the organisation, with clearly assigned roles, functions 
and responsibilities, should manage an NGO.  How these roles and responsibilities are 
defined and executed determine the power relations, balance of authority and the 
extent to which an organisation will be run smoothly, effectively and professionally 
(See for example also Camay and Gordon, 2002; The National Association of Non-
governmental Organizations in Zimbabwe, 2005). 
 
Essentially, the executive management team combines human resources, material 
resources and financial resources into a productive system in which organisational 
objectives are attained (Odgers and Keeling, 2000).  This requires an organisational 
structure, policies, systems and qualified and committed staff together with a 
facilitating institutional environment6.  
 
The lack of skills or insufficient management capacity to oversee and ensure the 
successful implementation of NGO projects and the delivery of services was quoted 
as a key factor contributing to the problems faced by many NGOs (Saldanha, 2002). 
Refer to Section 3.4.5 of Chapter Three for further discussion.  
 
The above suggests that it is imperative for the executive management structure of the 
organisation to have clearly defined roles and responsibilities.  It is in this context that 
the following assessment criteria have been developed.  
 
Under the assessment criteria “Roles and responsibilities of executive management” 
the following scores can be assigned: 
                                                 
5 Also see Section 3.4.2 of Chapter Three. 
6 Also see Section 3.4.5 of Chapter Three. 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.3 
 
 
GOVERNANCE APPRAISAL 
 
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT  
 
Assessment criteria 
 
Possible 
Score 
 
Score 
Assigned 
The NGO meets ALL the assessment criteria, as 
stated in this diagram, pertaining to the roles and 
responsibilities of the executive management 
structure.  (First complete the sections below before 
assigning a score in this block.) 
 
/4 
 
The executive management team clearly understands 
its roles and functions 
 
 
/1 
 
The executive management team has clearly assigned  
responsibilities 
 
/1  
 
A cohesive management structure exists 
 
 
/1 
 
 
Executive management effectively and efficiently 
manages the NGO’s resources 
 
 
/1 
 
Executive management upholds the NGO’s vision, 
mission and strategic objectives as displayed in its 
constitution  
 
/1  
A sound strategic and business plan exists.  Executive 
management assisted in its formulation and oversees 
its implementation  
/1  
 
Sub-total 
 
 
/10 
 
 
How to assign scores: 
 
- Insert a score in each column.  Where the organisation does not meet the 
specified criteria, assign a zero (0).  Where the organisation partially meets the 
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assessment criteria, where appropriate and at the discretion of the assessor, 
assign a score of between four (4) and zero point five (0.5).  
- Transfer sub-total of score attained under Appraisal Diagram 1.3 to the 
appropriate block in Appraisal Form 1. 
 
7.2.4 Composition and skills of the board 
The separation of governance and management involves a division of both duties and 
personnel.  The usual rule is that management runs the organisation from day to day, 
while the board sets policy, oversight and strategically guides the organisation (Wyatt, 
2004; Centre for African Family Studies, 2001; Block, 2001).   
 
The King II Report (2002) suggests that the governing board seeks to ensure an 
adequate mix of skills, experience and diversity in demographics to enable them to 
operate effectively and efficiently.  NGO governing boards may delegate 
responsibility to others including paid staff, but must accept ultimate responsibility for 
the governance of the NGO.   Preconditions for the recruitment of new board 
members include identifying the governance needs of NGOs and discovering the 
characteristics, qualities and skills of potential board members commensurate with the 
needs of the organisation (Block, 2001; Camay and Gordon, 2002). 
 
The Centre for Family Studies (2001) reports that where board members are friends 
and family, or intrinsically linked to the organisation, for example, board members are 
also founder members of the NGO, they cannot always act independently and in an 
unbiased fashion.   Therefore, development theorists7 suggest that the governing 
board  be composed of 50% internal membership and 50% external membership.  In 
this way, an equitable distribution of power is ensured.  See Section 2.4.1 for further 
discussions. 
 
Under the assessment criteria “composition of the board”, the following scores may 
be assigned: 
 
 
                                                 
7 The National Director, Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust (2008) 
See the writings of Loukas Spanos (2005) on governing boards in the Greek context. 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.4 
 
GOVERNANCE APPRAISAL 
 
COMPOSITION AND SKILLS OF THE BOARD 
 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
assigned 
Existence of a governing board. /4  
Diversity of the board.  The board consists of 
representatives from the NGO sector, community, 
government and private sector. 
 
 
/2  
The board consists of more than 50% of external 
membership. 
/2  
 
The board reflects diversity in terms of technical skills, 
community engagement skills, management skills, 
fundraising skills, financial skills and legal skills, 
commensurate with the business of the NGO. 
/2  
   
Sub-total /10 
 
 
 
How to assign scores: 
 
- Insert a score in each column.  Where the organisation does not meet the 
specified criteria, assign a zero (0).  Where the organisation partially meets the 
assessment criteria, where appropriate and at the discretion of the assessor, 
assign a score of between four (4) and zero point five (0.5). 
- Transfer sub-total of score attained under Appraisal Diagram 1.4 to the 
appropriate block in Appraisal Form 1. 
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7.2.5 Extent to which principles of good governance  are practiced 
NGOs have the responsibility to think about governance practices.  Good governance 
established at the outset encourages organisational stability and balanced decision-
making.   
 
Good governance consists of a number of characteristics, which forms the core of the 
next appraisal diagram.  These characteristics according to Van der Walt (2004) are: 
participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus-orientated, equity 
and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability (Also see Section 
3.2.4 for discussion). 
 
According to Van der Walt (2004), participation in the context of an NGO can be 
direct where staff provides feedback on the formulation and implementation of 
organisational policies.   Good governance further requires fair organisational policy 
frameworks that are enforced impartially.  Transparency in turn implies that decisions 
are taken and their enforcement is done in a manner that follows rules and regulations.  
Information pertaining to the organisation should be available and directly accessible 
by stakeholders.  Responsiveness requires that the organisation serve all parties 
(internal and external to the organisation) fairly and within an appropriate timeframe.  
Consensus-orientated decision-making requires recognition by the organisation of 
community needs.   Accordingly, broad and long-term perspectives on how these 
needs could be addressed towards the attainment of sustainable human development 
should be formulated.  Equity is paramount in the appointment of human resources 
and when services and resources are acquired externally.  When it comes to 
accountability, civil society organisations must be accountable to the public and to 
their respective institutional stakeholders.  For further discussion around the 
principles of good governance, refer to Section 3.2.4.  
 
In line with the above assertions around good governance, the following appraisal 
diagram has been devised.
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.5 
 
 
GOVERNANCE APPRAISAL 
 
THE EXTENT TO WHICH PRINCIPLES OF GOOD 
GOVERNANCE  ARE PRACTICED 
 
Appraisal criteria 
 
Possible 
Score 
 
Score 
Assigned 
 
ALL of the following characteristics of good governance are 
present within the organisation. 
- Staff participation in policy formulation and 
implementation 
- Transparency of decisions by management 
- Responsiveness to clients 
- Consensus-oriented decision-making 
- Equity with regard to human resource appointments 
- Equity with regard to the procurement of external 
services and resources 
- Effectiveness and efficiency in responding to client needs 
- Accountability to stakeholders 
- Legal frameworks are enforced impartially 
(Refer to Section 3.2.4 for discussion). 
/1  
Staff participation, where staff comments on the practicality 
around the implementation of policy frameworks 
/1  
Transparency of decisions by management 
 
/1  
The organisation’s responsiveness to clients 
 
/1  
Consensus-oriented decision-making /1  
Equity with regard to human resource appointments /1  
Equity with regard to the procurement of external services and 
resources 
 
/1  
Effectiveness and efficiency in responding to client needs 
 
/1  
Accountability to stakeholders 
 
/1  
Legal frameworks are enforced impartially /1  
 
Sub-total 
  
/10 
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How to assign a score: 
- Insert a score in each column.  Where the organisation does not meet the 
specified criteria, assign a zero (0).  Where the organisation partially meets the 
assessment criteria, where appropriate and at the discretion of the assessor, 
assign a score of between one (1) and zero point five (0.5). 
- Transfer sub-total of score attained under Appraisal Diagram 1.5 to the 
appropriate block in Appraisal Form 1. 
 
 
7.2.6 Sources of NGO funding 
 
NGOs have generally been able to raise revenue through a variety of sources.  Before 
1994, South African NGOs had a multitude of funding options.  The arrival of 
democracy saw the redirecting of funding away from NGOs to a new legitimate 
democratic government.  Organisations such as the National Funding Agency (NDA), 
the National Lottery and the Umsobomvu Fund were created in an attempt by 
government to fill the funding gap.  These organisations operated with little success.  
NGOs, accustomed to traditional sources of funding, struggled to diversify their 
funding base (Camay and Gordon, 2004; Farouk, 2004)8.  
 
The challenge, therefore, for South African NGOs is to devise a sustainable 
framework for financial resource mobilisation.  It is within this context that the 
following assessment criteria become imperative.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 See Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 in Chapter Four for detailed discussions on NGO sources of 
funding. 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.6 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
SOURCE OF NGO FUNDING 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
assigned
The organisation has multiple funding sources which may 
include  funding from government, the private sector, other 
donors or several from the same category 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from 9international foreign 
aid grants 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from national/local 
government grants 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from bilateral and 
multilateral grant aid 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from international 
foundation grants 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from national/local 
foundation grants 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from international, national 
and local corporate grants 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from international charitable 
donations 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from local individual 
donations 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from internal self-financing 
strategies 
/1  
 
Sub-total 
  
/10 
 
 
How to assign a score: 
- Insert a score in each column.  Where the organisation does not meet the 
specified criteria, assign a zero (0).  Where the organisation partially meets the 
assessment criteria, where appropriate and at the discretion of the assessor, 
assign a score of between one (1) and zero point five (0.5). 
- Transfer sub-total of score attained under Appraisal Diagram 1.6 to the 
appropriate block in Appraisal Form 1. 
 
7.2.7 Self-financing strategies 
Self-financing is an alternative to the more traditional fundraising approaches used by 
non-profit organisations.  Donor agencies such as  German Agro Action, Enterprise 
                                                 
9 Refer to Section 4.3.1.1 for a discussion on international aid. 
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Works Worldwide, the Roberts Enterprise Development Fund, the Aspen Institute and 
a number of other private foundations encourage NGO self-financing initiatives 
(Viravaidya and Hayssen, 2001).  A number of self-financing methods or strategies 
exist which could be used by the NGOs to sustain themselves.  These include, for 
example, fees-for-services, various loans and credit arrangements, membership fees, 
product sales and so on (Viravaidya and Hayssen, 2001).    
 
Williams (2008) warns that South African NPOs should not generate more than 25% 
of their income from “service provision” in which they compete with the private 
sector for contracts10.  TRAC, a non-profit organisation of which Williams is a 
director, reports in their fundraising proposal11  that in an attempt to develop capital 
reserves, a percentage of the income derived from the contract work, which TRAC-
MP undertakes on occasion on behalf of the government, higher education institutions 
or the private sector, accrues to a capital reserve fund.  Williams (2008) suggests that 
it is important for an NGO to build up capital reserves, particularly where delays in 
donor contributions may cripple the organisation financially.   
 
It is the researcher’s view, contrary to Williams’ warnings,  that South African NGOs 
should be allowed to generate 50% of their own income.   In line with this 
proposition,  assessment criteria have been devised.  See appraisal diagram 1.7. 
 
The reader is cautioned that self-financing strategies may differ from country to 
country and even between different communities (Academy for Educational 
Development, 2004).   
 
To assess the presence of self-financing strategies within an NGO, the following 
assessment diagram has been developed.   
 
 
 
                                                 
10 A developmental theorist, who wants to remain anonymous, contends that an NGO should 
be allowed to generate 50% of its funding from self-financing strategies.  In this way, the 
commentator argues, NGOs will be less dependent on funding from external sources, 
particularly in instances where terms and conditions are attached to the funds. 
 
11 See http://www.trac.org.za/content/Fund-Raising.asp 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.7 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
SELF-FINANCING STRATEGIES 
Assessment Criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
Assigned
Self-financing strategies or methods are present and in use 
within the organisation. 
 
/5  
Not more than 50% of the organisation’s overall income is 
generated through: 
- Membership fees 
- Fees for services 
- Product sales 
- Use of hard assets, for example, equipment rental 
- Use of soft assets, for example, patents, copyrights 
- Ancillary business ventures 
- Investment dividends 
- Gift of time (time spent by volunteers) 
- Gift of product (donations given by the public) 
 
/3  
The organisation has capital reserves to be used at the board’s 
discretion. 
/2  
Sub-total /10  
 
How to assign a score: 
- Insert a score in each column.  Where the organisation does not meet the 
specified criteria, assign a zero (0).  Where the organisation partially meets the 
assessment criteria, where appropriate and at the discretion of the assessor, 
assign a score of between five (5) and zero point five (0.5). 
- Transfer sub-total of score attained under Appraisal diagram 1.7 to the 
appropriate block in Appraisal Form 1. 
 
7.2.8 Good practice in financial management 
For NGOs to survive in a changing and competitive environment, managers need to 
develop the necessary understanding and confidence to make full use of financial 
information.  Whilst there is no one financial model that suits all NGOs, good practice 
in financial management is achieved by designing appropriate systems and 
procedures. 
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Organisations should be committed to the practice of good governance and should in 
every instance adhere to the recommendations of the King Commission Report?.  An 
NGO’s management of funds should comply with the highest professional and ethical 
standards.   It is thus essential for financial management systems to be in place to 
instil confidence in donor partners on how their funding contributions are being 
managed and expended within the NGO.  South African NGOs, in particular, in 
accordance with South African statutes, should have a financial year ending in March.  
Audits should be conducted in an appropriate period of time.   Reports to donor 
agencies are presented based on respective agreements either quarterly, every six 
months, biannually or annually12. 
 
Refer to Section 4.2 for a discussion on financial management arrangements in 
general.  Authors such as Narayan, Godden, Reid, Ortega, Ott and Alin have written 
extensively on good practice in financial management.  Section 4.2 gives an 
exposition of their views. 
 
The following assessment criterion has been devised in the context of the above 
discussion. 
                                                 
12 See http://www.trac.org.za/content/Fund-Raising.asp
Allan Roman, an NGO financial management expert, interviewed in May 2008, concurred with 
a number of the views expressed by Williams, 2008. 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.8 
 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
GOOD PRACTICE IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
Assigned 
In terms of good practice in financial management, the 
organisation: 
- Keeps an accurate record of all financial 
transactions (accounting records) 
 
/2 
 
In terms of good practice in financial management, the 
organisation: 
- Links the budget to the organisation’s strategic and 
operational plan  (financial planning) 
 
/2 
 
In terms of good practice in financial management, the 
organisation:  
- Produces management accounts so that managers 
can compare the organisation’s progress against the 
budget and then make decisions about the future 
(financial monitoring) 
- Produces financial statements for outside scrutiny 
to demonstrate how funds have been applied in the 
past  (financial monitoring) 
 
/2 
 
In terms of good practice in financial management, the 
organisation: 
- Has internal controls (checks and balances) in place 
to safeguard the organisation’s assets and manage 
risk  (internal controls) 
 
/2 
 
In terms of good practice in financial management, the 
organisation: 
- Has an audit committee/auditor to assist in the 
quality and reliability of financial and other 
performance information issued. 
 
 
/2 
 
 
Sub-total 
  
/10 
 
 
How to assign a score: 
- Insert a score in each column.  Where the organisation does not meet the 
specified criteria, assign a zero (0).  Where the organisation partially meets the 
assessment criteria, where appropriate and at the discretion of the assessor, 
assign a score of between two (2) and zero point five (0.5). 
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- Transfer sub-total of score attained under Appraisal diagram 1.8 to the 
appropriate block in Appraisal Form 1. 
 
7.2.9 Financial control 
Financial control13 is at the heart of financial management.  Effective financial 
accounting and managerial control practices are as important to NGOs at they are to 
the private sector.  Without properly executed financial control, the organisation’s 
assets and resources are at risk, funds may not be spent in accordance with the 
organisation’s strategic objectives or the wishes of funders, and the competence of 
managers and the integrity of the NGO may be called into question (Alin et.al. 2006; 
Herzlinger and Nitterhouse, 2001). 
 
Designing systems and procedures to suit the particular needs of the NGO enforce 
financial control.   Accordingly, an overall financial policy should be formulated and 
implemented which pertains to donors, income, budgeting, expenditure, travel, 
auditing, petty cash, assets, salaries, staff loans and the opening and operation of bank 
accounts (Shapiro, n.d.). 
 
To test the above assertions, the following assessment criteria have been formulated. 
                                                 
13 See Section 4.2.2 of Chapter Four 
See Section 4.2.3 of Chapter Four 
Allan Roman, a financial expert, asserts that not only is the existence of financial policies in 
NGOs extremely crucial, but - he contends - the implementation and the monitoring of these 
policies is even more imperative.  He argues that, in this way, the organisation’s financial 
resources will be protected.  
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.9  
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
FINANCIAL CONTROL 
 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
Assigned 
The organisation has fiscal policies that protect it from 
intentional or unintentional misuse of resources 
/1  
Financial policy and implementation of procedures and systems 
relevant to South African company and tax law are in place.  The 
financial reporting requirements of donors/funders are also 
recognised in this policy. 
/1  
Financial policy exists around staff salaries, staff loans and the 
opening and the operating of bank accounts.  Implementation 
procedures and systems around this policy are in place within the 
organisation 
/1  
Financial policy exists around how money is received and 
recorded.  Implementation procedures and systems pertaining to 
this policy are in place. 
/1  
Financial policy, implementation procedures and systems exist 
around how money is spent. 
/1  
Tasks such as the receipt of cash, the preparation of financial 
statements and the expenditure of funds are assigned to more 
than one staff member to ensure adequate financial control. 
/1  
Rules exist around how the budget should be monitored and 
amended. 
/1  
Rules exist around the writing of cheques. /1  
The organisation has insurance in place to cover financial losses. /1  
Auditing procedures are in place. /1  
Sub-total /10  
 
 
 
How to assign a score: 
- Insert a score in each column.  Where the organisation does not meet the 
specified criteria, assign a zero (0).  Where the organisation partially meets the 
assessment criteria, where appropriate and at the discretion of the assessor, 
assign a score of between one (1) and zero point five (0.5). 
- Transfer sub-total of score attained under Appraisal diagram 1.9 to the 
appropriate block in Appraisal Form 1. 
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7.2.10 Fundraising strategies 
 
Fundraising14 is proactive and should be conceptualised and designed as a long-range 
programme.  Very few NGOs have dedicated professional fundraising human 
resource capacity and a coherent fundraising strategy.  Building NGO fundraising 
capacity requires the development of a fundraising policy and regulations, and a 
fundraising committee with clear job descriptions and mechanisms monitoring 
fundraising activities (Kraak, 2001; Alin et.al., 2006).  Williams (2008) notes that 
externally appointed fundraisers require a commission on the funds they raise on 
behalf of organisations.  Many donors may refuse to pay such commissions. The latter 
commentator contends that, in many instances, funders may argue that if the NGO 
does not even have the internal capacity to draft a funding proposal, they may also 
lack the capacity to manage the financial resources of the organisation.   
 
It is the researcher’s view that a fundraiser is essential within an NGO and that the 
cost to the organisation of such an incumbent should be recovered from the 
administrative categories of budgets of individual projects or programmes.  
 
All donor agencies have a limit to their resources and have to make decisions around 
what they are prepared to fund.  Once a decision has been taken by a particular funder 
around what activities/programmes they will fund, a relationship between the receiver 
of funding and the donor begins to develop.  Donor agencies emphasise the fact that 
this is a mutually beneficial relationship, with both parties aware of the expectations 
of the other (Ndlovu, 2004).   The researcher contends that the funding agency still 
holds the dominant power in this relationship which inevitably proves uneven. 
 
A well-executed fundraising strategy remains imperative within organisations and, as 
such, the following assessment criteria have been devised. 
                                                 
14 See Section 4.2.4 of Chapter Four 
See Section 4.3 of Chapter Four 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.10 
 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
FUNDRAISING STRATEGY 
 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
Attained 
The organisation has a well-executed fundraising strategy that 
contains ALL of the following elements present in this diagram. 
/2  
Diversification:  Diversified fundraising means that an NGO has 
several sources of funding from several different types of fundraising 
activities 
/2  
Sustainability:  Sustainability is about developing self-reliance. The 
more self-reliant an NGO is, the more control it can maintain over its 
resources, as well as the decisions around resource management and 
use 
/2  
Creativity:  Being creative means utilising available resources and 
taking advantage of opportunities as they emerge 
/2  
Inclusiveness:  Taking an inclusive approach means finding a role for 
supportive people to play.  In this way, the boundaries of the NGO 
will be expanded beyond its present scope. 
/2  
 
Sub-Total 
  
/10 
 
 
How to assign a score: 
- Insert a score in each column.  Where the organisation does not meet the 
specified criteria, assign a zero (0).  Where the organisation partially meets the 
assessment criteria, where appropriate and at the discretion of the assessor, 
assign a score of between two (2) and zero point five (0.5). 
-  Transfer sub-total of score attained under Appraisal Diagram 1.10 to the 
appropriate block in Appraisal Form 1. 
 
7.3 FRAMEWORK APPLICATION GUIDELINES 
The following section will forward a discussion on the structure and content of the 
appraisal framework, how documentation should be assimilated, who should appraise 
and how final scores should be calculated. 
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7.3.1 Structure and content of the appraisal framework 
This appraisal framework consists of 10 assessment criteria.  Each criterion is 
intended to capture a separate dimension of governance and financial sustainability as 
informed by theoretical and empirical evidence. 
 
The scope and purpose of this appraisal instrument is to provide a framework for 
assessing the governance and financial sustainability of NGOs as alluded to in section 
7.2 of this chapter. 
 
7.3.2 Documentation/Information 
The assessor should attempt to identify all information pertaining to the organisation 
prior to the start of the appraisal exercise.  Information can be collated through 
consulting, for example, the organisation’s annual reports and other relevant 
documentation, or through site visits, interviews, questionnaires and focus groups.   
 
7.3.3 Who should appraise 
It is recommended that the appraisal instrument be facilitated by an assessor 
experienced in the area of NGOs in order to increase the reliability of the assessment 
outcomes.  The assessor may be assisted by a moderator.  Focus groups can be 
utilised to deliberate the outcomes of the appraisal exercise 
 
7.3.4 Score scale/overall assessment 
A cumulative scoring system has been devised.  Each item within the assessment 
criteria has been awarded a possible score.  The assigned score measures the extent to 
which a criterion has been fulfilled. 
• If the assessor is confident that the criterion has been fully met, then the full 
possible score can be assigned. 
• If the assessor is confident that the criterion has partially been fulfilled, a 
portion of the possible score, at the discretion of the assessor, may be assigned.  
However, if a possible score equals one, a score of zero (0), at the discretion of 
the assessor, may be assigned. 
• If the assessor is sure that a criterion has not been fulfilled, due to a lack of 
corroborating evidence, a score of zero (0) may be assigned. 
 225
• Sub-totals attained in each appraisal diagram should be transferred to Appraisal 
Form 1, whereafter a final score and a percentage score should be calculated. 
• The percentage score should be compared to the Sustainability Indicator 
presented in Section 7.2. 
 
7.4 APPLICATION OF THE APPRAISAL FRAMEWORK 
Chapters Two, Three and Four of this study, together with the case studies, formed 
the conceptual underpinning of this appraisal framework.  This appraisal instrument, 
formulated for the South African NGO sector specifically, as alluded to earlier, has 
been applied to the case studies as presented in Chapter One, Section 1.6.  The 
purpose of the following section is to present the results of this pilot study15 where the 
areas for future improvement of the appraisal framework will be highlighted. 
 
This section will report on the results of the application of the appraisal framework 
with regards to the governance arrangements within Oxfam GB, the Centre for the 
Study of Higher Education and the Sustainability Institute.  With regard to legal 
status, Oxfam GB is registered as a charity.  The Sustainability Institute operates as a 
Trust, and is registered under the Trust Property Control Act of 1988.  The Centre for 
the Study of Higher Education reflects no record of formal registration as a non-profit 
organisation.  Accordingly, the latter organisation scored zero (0) under the NGO 
legal status appraisal criteria.  The other two organisations scored  (ten) 10 
respectively. 
 
Under NGO leadership, in the case of Oxfam GB, its Council holds overall leadership 
responsibility and delegates the management of the organisation to the senior 
executive staff such as the Director and Corporate Management Team.  This 
organisation scored eight (8) under this appraisal criterion.  In the context of the 
Sustainability Institute, the founder members of the organisation are regarded as 
charismatic leaders who took responsibility for the organisation’s processes and 
activities.  Accordingly, a score of ten (10) was justified under the NGO leadership 
appraisal criterion.  The Centre for the Study of Higher Education, however, struggled 
to secure sustained leadership.  Therefore a score of six (6) was assigned.   
                                                 
15 See Appendix B for the results of the pilot study conducted. 
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 With regard to the roles and responsibilities of the executive management team, 
Oxfam’s executive management structure has clear responsibilities and roles.  The 
same can be concluded for the Sustainability Institute.  The EPU/CSHE management 
structure proved complex and peculiar.  Various cumbersome reporting lines exist.  
The EPU/CSHE scored three (3) under the appraisal criterion, roles and 
responsibilities of the executive management, whilst Oxfam and the Sustainability 
Institute scored eight (8) respectively. 
 
The types of knowledge and skills within the board, as reported by the Oxfam GB and 
Sustainability Institute, ranged from technical skills, community engagement skills 
and management skills to fundraising skills.  Oxfam GB’s board showed the most 
diversity in terms of skills and composition.  The composition of the EPU/CSHE 
board represented diversity in relation to the education sectors the individual board 
members emanated from.  Board members did not necessarily bring specific skills to 
the organisation.   Accordingly, the EPU/CSHE scored three (3) in this assessment 
category, the Sustainability Institute scored eight (8) points and Oxfam GB scored ten 
(10).  It should be noted that the three cases studied support the notion of the 
separation of power between the CEO of the organisation and the chairperson of the 
board where each entity has clearly assigned roles and responsibilities. 
 
It was found that the EPU/CSHE, to a lesser degree, applied the principles of good 
governance and scored seven (7) in the category “The extent to which principles of 
good governance are practiced”.   The Sustainability Institute scored ten (10) and 
Oxfam GB scored seven and a half (7.5), reflecting their effective and efficient 
application of the principles of good governance. 
 
The next section will report on the results of the financial sustainability practices 
within Oxfam, the EPU/CSHE and the Sustainability Institute.   
 
With regard to the appraisal criteria ‘Sources of NGO funding’, the CSHE derived 
80% of its overall funding, in particular its core funding, from international sources.  
The Sustainability Institute has been able to garner funding from local corporate 
social investment, which forms the biggest portion of its income.  Oxfam GB sources 
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approximately equal percentages of funding from donations and its shops and trading 
respectively.  Both the CSHE and the Sustainability Institute was awarded a score of 
six (6) and Oxfam GB received a score of ten (10). 
 
In relation to self-financing strategies, both the CSHE and the Sustainability Institute 
scored three (3) respectively.  Oxfam GB scored nine (9) as their self-financing 
strategies proved highly developed and successful. 
 
In terms of good financial management practices, Oxfam GB, the Sustainability 
Institute and the Centre for the Study of Higher Education keep an accurate record of 
all financial transactions.  Each organisation produces management accounts, 
financial statements, and has auditors in place to assist in the quality and reliability of 
financial and other performance information produced.  The CSHE, it was found, 
despite institutional procedures and practices around financial management control 
mechanisms, displayed inappropriate use and reporting of donor funds.   In the 
appraisal category ‘good practices in financial management’, the Sustainability 
Institute and Oxfam GB scored ten (10) whilst the CSHE scored six (6). 
 
When it comes to financial control, Oxfam GB has an intricate financial control 
system which proved very effective.  The same could be said for the Sustainability 
Institute.  The CSHE, in the presence of rules and procedures applicable to 
organisations operating within the university setting, persisted with its own form of 
financial control.  This proved problematic.  As a consequence of ineffective financial 
control, a score of five point five (5.5) was assigned in the financial control measures 
category, whilst both the Sustainability Institute and Oxfam GB scored ten (10). 
 
With regard to fundraising strategies, which concludes the appraisal process, it would 
appear that fundraising formed part of the job description of every staff member of the 
CSHE.  The director was tasked with sourcing core funding.  Funds for specific 
projects were sourced by individual researchers.  The Sustainability Institute, on the 
other hand, has highly charismatic leadership and is able to attract funding for projects 
they perceive as crucial.  Oxfam GB, as an established organisation, has very specific 
income-generating endeavours in place.  The latter organisation appeared the most 
financially secure.  In the appraisal criteria category ‘fundraising strategies’, the 
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CSHE scored four (4), the Sustainability Institute scored eight (8) and Oxfam scored 
ten (10). 
 
In tallying the percentage scores, the CSHE’s overall percentage score was 45%.  The 
Sustainability Institute scored 83%.  Oxfam GB had a score of  93%.  Looking at the 
Sustainability Indicator forwarded in this chapter, Oxfam GB falls within the green 
category which implies that the organisation is sustainable.  The same applies for the 
Sustainability Institute.  CSHE falls within the orange category which implies that the 
organisation needs to strengthen its governance and financial management practices.  
See Appendix C for another way of illustrating the results of applying the appraisal 
framework to the three case studies. 
 
In light of the foregoing, the next section will highlight the limitations of the appraisal 
instrument. 
 
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE APPRAISAL INSTRUMENT 
The success and the sustainability of a particular NGO sector depend on the sector’s 
ability to deliver and meet the expectations of its constituency, and to retain 
credibility in the eyes of that constituency.  This particular instrument is not results-
orientated, which implies that it does not measure output or outcomes of a particular 
NGO/CSO/CBO.  This appraisal framework can only be applied by an assessor who 
is regarded as an expert in the area of NGOs with specific reference to institutional, 
financial and governance matters. 
 
This appraisal framework has been developed for the South African context 
specifically and should be revised as the economic, social, political and technological 
conditions of the country changes.  It is not necessarily applicable to NGOs in other 
developing countries in Eastern Europe or East Asia, for example.  
 
The appraisal criteria could be revised in the future should a researcher find evidence 
of alternative criteria more applicable to the sustainability of NGOs. Assessment 
categories forwarded within the appraisal diagrams may also require refinement 
should the need arise in the future.  Whereas this doctoral thesis attempted to develop 
(and test) an appraisal framework for NGOs, it is recommended that research agencies 
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may further develop this framework and test the instrument more comprehensively 
and that researchers may further refine the specific categories and considerations for 
it’s measurement. 
 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
South African NGOs undeniably have a critical role to play in the provision of 
welfare, basic and other services to those disadvantaged by the socio-political system 
which prevailed. The challenge is thus to create an environment in which NGOs can 
flourish.  
 
It is concluded that this study has provided an opportunity to develop an appraisal 
framework for the sustainability of NGOs. The pilot application of the appraisal 
framework to the three selected cases have shown that the instrument may be used to 
ascertain the sustainability of NGOs.   It is the researcher’s view that this appraisal 
framework will assist in the creation of a sustainable South African NGO sector.  It 
will prove invaluable to all stakeholders dealing with NGOs, CBOs, CSOs and non-
profit organisations, testing the organisation’s long-term prospects for sustainability. 
 
The following chapter will elaborate on the above debate and draw specific 
conclusions, make recommendations and identify further areas for research. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study traced governance and the financial sustainability of South African non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) with the intention of developing improved options 
for the future regarding the sustainability of the NGO sector in South Africa, especially 
with regard to financial management and governance.   
 
The importance of NGOs can perhaps best be summarised by citing Stone (2004: 545) 
who contends that: 
Globalisation during the 20th century gave rise to the importance 
of NGOs.  Many problems could not be solved within a nation.  
International treaties and international organizations such as the 
World Trade Organization were perceived as being too centred on 
the interests of capitalist enterprises.  Some argued that in an 
attempt to counterbalance this trend, NGOs have developed to 
emphasise humanitarian issues, developmental aid and sustainable 
development.   
 
A predetermined research structure was devised.  The structure commenced with chapter 
one in which an introduction and background to the study were provided.    The basic 
points of departure were elucidated and included aspects such as the problem statement, 
research objectives, a literature review and the significance of the study.  It provided a 
brief explanation of the research methodology employed in the study and explained how 
the study would be composed. 
 
Whilst the first chapter introduced the study, the purpose of this chapter is to provide 
conclusions on theoretical assumptions forwarded in the study particularly around 
governance and financial sustainability of NGOs.  Conclusions will be forwarded on 
historical trends and tendencies of governance and financial arrangements of NGOs; 
governance and sustainability arrangements of NGOs in general; financial management 
and financial sustainability practices within NGOs specifically; the case studies presented 
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in the study and, lastly, conclusions on the appraisal framework for the sustainability of 
NGOs will be presented.   
 
Concluding remarks on the aforementioned themes, recommendations and an overall 
conclusion to the study will follow. 
 
8.2 CONCLUSIONS 
8.2.1 Historical trends and tendencies of governance and financial arrangements 
of NGOs 
An overview of the historical trends and tendencies of governance and financial 
arrangements of NGOs over the last ten years was forwarded.  Particular attention was 
devoted to sustainable aspects of financial arrangements and assistance received by 
NGOs from international and other donors.  Historical trends, such as the decline in 
international funding to South African NGOs, were analysed in detail.  A study was made 
of the survival strategies employed by NGOs to ensure their sustainability.  This 
historical theoretical exposition provided valuable lessons of NGO experiences.  The 
discussion concluded inter alia that internal governance structures such as NGO 
governing boards, with clear roles and responsibilities, were imperative to the survival of 
an NGO.   Commercialised activities undertaken by NGOs adopted the form of, for 
example, consultations, contracts, the selling of services and products and the 
introduction of user charges for services delivered to the poor.  Donors, it was reported, 
took a stricter stance towards financial accounting and programme reporting requirements 
for NGOs and, accordingly, the NGO sector adopted terms such as professionalism and 
commercialisation where concepts such as efficiency, strategic planning, cost-
effectiveness and results-based management were embraced. 
 
8.2.2 Governance and the sustainability arrangements of NGOs 
An overview of theories and paradigms that regulate the governance of international 
institutions and NGOs was provided.  The study concluded that corporate governance, of 
which the main components include direction, executive action, supervision and 
accountability of the organisation, has permeated the non-profit sector where an NGO is 
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now required to take a particularly disciplined approach to the structuring and managing 
of its organisation.   The lack of skills and insufficient management capacity to oversee 
the successful implementation of NGO projects and the delivery of services was quoted 
as contributing to the problems faced by NGOs.  The study further concluded that 
functions such as accountability, participation, predictability and transparency, the four 
basic elements of good governance, should be activated and promoted within NGOs. 
 
8.2.3 Financial management and financial sustainability practices within NGOs 
It is concluded that useful literature and theoretical material existed to provide a 
conceptual basis and analytical framework for this study. Although limited material 
existed on specific instruments to ascertain the sustainability of NGOs, useful theoretical 
frameworks were accessed, selected and applied to the field of study concerning the 
various areas of financial and governance sustainability. These principles and key 
considerations allowed the development of an appraisal framework and informed the 
research design for the development of such an instrument. 
 
The study explored financial management and financial sustainability practices within 
NGOs in general.  Various factors pertaining to funding arrangements were explained.  
Academic literature on the principles of financial arrangements for NGOs was assessed 
and deliberated on.   The study further investigated issues pertaining to income and 
expenditure of NGOs with the view to establishing whether global funding mobilisation 
practices could be replicated in South Africa.  In terms of financial management, the 
study concluded that budgeting, accounting, financial reporting and management control 
were the salient tools for governance, accountability, planning and management in non-
profit organisations. Accordingly, NGOs are now required to develop an appropriate 
financial management system.  Best practice in NGO financial management was called 
upon where accounting records, financial planning, financial monitoring and internal 
control proved to be key components of the management processes.  In terms of funding 
mobilisation, the study concluded that non-profit funding sources vary in predictability, 
controllability, linkage to organisational activities, and the range and amount of 
management effort they require.  To source adequate funding, the NGO sector is required 
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to construct a well-executed fundraising strategy, which contains elements such as 
diversification, sustainability, creativity and inclusivity.  NGO managers should pay the 
same attention to finding funds as they do to using funds. 
 
8.2.4 Case studies 
The case studies re-emphasised the key empirical assertions and the theoretical 
expositions around governance and financial sustainability of NGOs in South Africa and 
NGOs in general.  A set of specific financial and governance issues was identified and 
investigated in the case of each NGO.  Three specific cases were explored   - the Centre 
for the Study of Higher Education (University of the Western Cape, South Africa), 
Oxfam Great Britain as an example of an international NGO, and the Sustainability 
Institute on the outskirts of Stellenbosch, South Africa, that has a developmental 
orientation. 
 
The qualitative research conducted in order to meet the study’s research objectives 
provided an analysis of governance and financial sustainability of NGOs by positing 
theoretical knowledge against empirical evidence attained (See Chapter Six).   
 
8.2.5 An appraisal framework for the sustainability of NGOs 
It is concluded that a set of key requirements for the sustainability of NGOs regarding 
financial management and governance arrangements  has emerged from this study, and 
that a specific instrument has been developed to assist in the appraisal of NGOs in this 
respect. The study provided a motivation for the appraisal framework, motivated the key 
criteria, focus areas and key considerations for such an instrument, and consulted with 
practitioners and researchers on the relevance of this framework. It is also concluded that 
this study has tested the instrument by applying it to the three chosen cases, and it was 
found that the instrument provided an accurate rating of the sustainability factors of these 
NGOs, as confirmed by the parallel fieldwork discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
A description of the development of a practical appraisal framework for the sustainability 
of NGOs was provided.  The study concluded that NGOs have a critical role to play in 
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the provision of various services in South Africa.   In this context, NGOs require an 
environment within which they can flourish.  The appraisal framework forwarded in the 
study (See Chapter Seven) can contribute to the long-term sustainability of the South 
African NGO sector. 
 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this section is to provide a range of recommendations for consideration by 
NGOs, CBOs, CSOs, NPOs, governments and funding organisations.  These 
recommendations are proposed to improve structural, organisational and management 
characteristics of NGOs in general and their role in the community in particular. 
 
Recommendation 1:  
It is recommended that the proposed appraisal framework for the sustainability of NGOs 
(see Chapter Seven) in conjunction with the recommendations mentioned in Section 8.3 
be considered as a framework for use by relevant authorities and interested parties.  
 
This may include the South African Revenue Service (SARS), Master of the High Court, 
the Minister of Social Development, the Registrar of Companies in terms of Section 21 
companies, the NGO/CBO/CSO sector, government, donors, private social responsibility 
funders, the National Development Agency (NDA) and development banks.  The 
proposed appraisal framework for the sustainability of NGOs in conjunction with the 
recommendations forwarded in the study should be regarded as imperative for improved 
governance and financial sustainability of NGOs in South Africa.   
 
Recommendation 2: 
It is recommended that the appraisal instrument proposed in Chapter Seven be tested and 
developed further through research and application.  It is the intention of the researcher to 
further refine the appraisal instrument in future research.   Research output will be 
presented at conferences for further refinement and discussion. 
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 Recommendation 3: 
It is recommended that NGOs with a successful track record in governance and financial 
management, higher education institutions and the private sector with specialist NGO 
human resource capacity train NGO management, staff and the governing board in areas 
of governance and financial management. 
 
Recommendation 4: 
It is recommended that NGO board members be appointed on the basis of skills they 
possess commensurate with the business of the NGOs and, also, a hybrid mix of skills 
such as legal skills, technical skills, community engagement skills, management skills, 
accounting skills and fundraising skills should be represented on the governing board. 
 
Recommendation 5: 
It is recommended that NGO self-financing strategists/specialists, within the confines of 
South Africa’s legal and tax legislation, train NGOs, CBOs, CSOs and NPOs in the area 
of self-financing initiatives to enable and assist these organisations with the generation of 
a sustained income.   
 
Recommendation 6: 
Every non-profit organisation that is dependent on external funding for its sustained 
existence should continue to pursue increasingly its own sources of funding and should 
have dedicated professional fundraising human resource capacity.  It is recommended 
that the cost of this position be absorbed proportionally within the budget of every project 
that the organisation is implementing. 
 
Recommendation 7: 
NGOs in South Africa have a pertinent role to play.  It is recommended that South 
African NGOs set the development agenda by linking their core business to one or more 
of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals, in particular, poverty 
eradication, primary education, gender equality, child mortality, maternal health and 
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other diseases.  Many donor agencies link their financial assistance to policies and 
programmes designed to address the aforementioned goals.  In this way, the business of 
the NGO will remain relevant to the socio-economic context of the country and the globe, 
and the NGO will be able to attract funding which in turn will impact on its continued 
existence. 
 
Recommendation 8: 
The role of the NGO board is to steer the organisation towards a sustainable future.  
Accordingly, the board is required to formulate the vision, mission, strategic objectives 
and organisational policy for the NGO to contribute towards such sustainability.  NGO 
management is required to implement organisational policy.  It is recommended that the 
NGO governing board not micro-manage the organisation, particularly in the case of 
founder members that display a misplaced sense of ownership. 
 
Recommendation 9: 
The policy formulators of the National Lotteries Act (Act 57 of 1997), and similar 
institutions, should review the categories for which money is allocated, in particular the 
sports and recreation category.  Research has shown that this category does not benefit a 
large number of NGOs and previously disadvantaged communities. The NGOs’ 
sustainability is impacted upon negatively.  The selection process of beneficiaries and the 
initial payment timeframes, in the context of aforementioned legislation, should be 
revised. 
 
Recommendation 10: 
Whilst the South African government maintains high levels of funding, many NGOs are 
unable to access such funds via the National Development Agency in the Department of 
Social Development.  It is recommended that the National Development Agency evaluate 
how funds are disbursed with the intention of improving this particular aspect of the 
agency’s tasks. 
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Recommendation 11: 
It is recommended that NGOs be allowed to generate more than 50% of their own income 
through self-financing strategies. NGOs will be less dependent on funding from external 
sources which inevitably have terms and conditions attached. In this context, the South 
African tax legislation will require revision 
 
Recommendation 12: 
It is recommended that a number of South African NGOs/CBOs/CSOs and NPOs link the 
core business of their organisation with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) goals and priorities in particular in the following areas: sustained sources of 
energy, integrated transport systems, the provision of water to rural communities and 
developing sanitation infrastructure.  As with the UN Millennium Development Goals 
alluded to in an earlier recommendation, funders will be prepared to fund NGO 
endeavours that are linked to the overall improvement of the physical infrastructure of the 
African continent.   
 
Recommendation 13: 
It is recommended that funders recognise the important role played by NGOs in human 
development.  In terms of aid provided, donors should contribute to the sustained 
existence of NGOs, instead of contributing to the organisations’ early demise through late 
disbursement of funding or requesting tedious, complex and irrelevant material from 
organisations.  Donors should assist NGOs through training in fundraising endeavours 
and financial management practices. 
 
 
8.4 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The following section proposes areas for future research. 
 
8.4.1 NGO governing boards 
The role of South African NGO governing boards in the organisation’s governance, 
financial management and fundraising practices in particular, and an assessment of the 
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board members’ skills capacity requires further research.  Current research revealed that a 
large number of NGO boards lack the capacity to conceptualise the organisation’s 
strategic direction.  Boards interfere in the day-to-day running of the NGO instead of 
steering the organisation in a particular direction.  Board members are unable to identify 
and secure funds on behalf of the organisation.  The board should assist in the 
formulation of clear, effective and efficient financial management policies.  Future 
research in these areas should influence the formulation of clear guidelines and strategies 
on the board’s role and assistance in the aforementioned areas.   Research should also 
advise on the skills required by a board member commensurate with the work of the 
organisation and how these should be identified.  
 
8.4.2 Role of NGOs in post-apartheid South Africa 
The role of NGOs in post-apartheid South Africa should be revisited by the South 
African government, in particular policy-makers and policy implementers.  The NGO 
sector should also revisit its relationship with government specifically in the area of 
service delivery.  It is important to investigate whether NGOs operate as envisaged in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996).  Parliament must 
undertake this particular study.  
 
8.4.3 NGO self-assessment strategies 
Self-assessment strategies for NGOs should be devised by the NGO sector in conjunction 
with legislative bodies and donors.  The aim of this assessment tool will be to measure 
the organisation’s output, governance and financial management practices with the view 
to influencing the organisation’s sustained existence in an evolving political, social, 
economic, cultural and technological environment.  As the external environment in which 
NGOs function changes all the time, new knowledge and information should be 
generated continuously to inform the NGO’s internal management practices. 
 
8.4.4 NGOs meeting an early demise 
A study should be made into the reasons why a large number of NGOs across different 
NGO sectors, met an early demise post-1994.  Information derived from this study can 
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serve as a lesson of experience for prospective NGOs envisioning operation in a 
particular NGO sector.   The research should highlight shortcomings and areas where 
operational improvements, for example, can be made. 
 
8.4.5 NGO fundraising practices 
A study should be made of NGO fundraising practices commensurate with the business 
of the NGO.  The research should forward recommendations on what fundraising 
practices are suited to which NGO sector and what makes certain fundraising endeavours 
more successful than others.  Sufficient literature is available on how to fundraise. There 
is a lack of literature on successful NGO cases.  Practical information on NGO 
fundraising practices may impact on the sustained existence of an NGO.   
 
8.4.6 National Development Agency 
The role of the National Development Agency in post-apartheid South Africa should be 
revisited.  Research should investigate whether the categories of beneficiaries are still 
relevant in South Africa’s current socio-economic context or whether they should be 
revised.  At the same time, the National Development Agency should evaluate whether 
its current funding disbursement mechanisms are effective and efficient or whether 
current practices have led to the demise of NGOs for lack of funding. 
 
8.4.7 Testing and refinement of the appraisal instrument 
The appraisal instrument proposed in Chapter Seven can be further refined.  Appropriate 
guidelines (See Section 7.3) tailor-made to specific types of organisations such as donor 
agencies, development banks, parastatal bodies and specific NGO sectors should also be 
developed.  As socio-economic, political and technological changes occur in South 
Africa, changes will be required to the assessment categories within the appraisal 
diagrams (See Chapter Seven).   
 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
This study met its primary objective which was to evaluate existing governance and 
financial arrangements of NGOs, CBOs and CSOs with the view to developing 
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alternative approaches to governance and financial arrangements with specific reference 
to lessons of experiences of South African NGOs. 
 
This study has augmented current literature available on the subject ‘governance and 
financial sustainability of NGOs in South Africa’, enhancing the future prospects for 
policy formulation, thereby making a contribution to the existing body of knowledge on 
the research topic.   
 
NGOs worldwide have a significant role to play in the delivery of services.  Reflecting on 
the current May 2008 xenophobic attacks, where “black” on “black” violence has been 
recorded over a period of two weeks in South Africa, NGOs instead of the South African 
government (to name but one example of an area in which NGOs deliver particular 
services) assisted in the delivery of numerous services such as the provision of shelter, 
food, advocacy and so on to a large number of displaced foreign nationals.  Research has 
confirmed that there is a role for South African NGOs in service delivery where 
collaboration, not competition, between the state and the non-profit sector is the key to 
sustained human development. 
 
It is concluded that the sustainability of NGOs should be regarded as being of strategic 
importance in the quest for development and reconstruction in South Africa and that the 
developmental state, through pursuing its objectives inter alia through cooperative 
governance, should regard sustainable NGOs as key partners in the development effort. 
Furthermore, the role and sustainability of NGOs is regarded as a key ingredient to the 
vision of an African Renaissance on the continent, and that global visions, such as the 
Millennium Development Goals, will only be reached if civil society and NGOs are 
regarded as key partners and players in this respect. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Structured questionnaire 
 
SECTION 1: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
Please mark the appropriate box with an X or provide the necessary information 
 
1.1 Name of organisation 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
1.2 In which year was the organisation established?:………….…………...……… 
 
1.3 Indicate the legal status of the organisation 
 
Legal Status X 
Non-profit organisation (under NPO 
Act of 1997) 
 
Trust (Trust Property Control Act of 
1988) 
 
Section 21 not-for-gain (Companies 
Act of 1973) 
 
Voluntary Organisation  
*Other  
  
 *Please specify: ………………………………………………………………... 
 
1.4 Indicate the number of employees at establishment and currently 
 
Number of employees Establishment Now 
Fulltime   
Part-time   
Volunteers   
 
 
1.5 Describe your organisation’s executive management structure. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
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SECTION 2:  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS 
 
Please provide the necessary information 
 
 
2.1 What is the mission of the organisation? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
2.2 In terms of your organisation’s operations, what sector(s) of civil society does 
your organisation represent? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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2.3 Indicate the geographical area of operation 
Geographical area of operation X 
International  
Southern Africa  
National  
Provincial  
*Local  
Note: *local may refer to region, metropolitan area or community 
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SECTION 3:  GOVERNANCE 
 
Please mark the appropriate box with an X or provide the necessary information 
 
 
3.1 Does your organisation have a governing board/board of directors/board of 
trustees? 
 
Yes No 
 
If YES: 
 
a) How many board members do you have? …………………………….. 
 
 
3.2 Indicate the overall length of service of all board members. 
 
Number of years X 
> 3  
4 – 7  
8 – 10  
11+  
 
 
3.3 Indicate the types of knowledge and skills available within your board relevant 
to the work of your organisation. 
 
Type of knowledge/skill X 
Legal  
Technical  
Community  
Management  
Accounting  
Fundraising  
 
 
3.4 (Accountability) Does the governing board undertake a process of self-
evaluation? 
 
Yes No 
 
If YES: 
 
a) List the evaluation method(s) utilised. 
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
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…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………… 
 
b) How often, per year, does self-evaluation take place? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
3.5 Good organisational governance depends on the board members having a clear 
understanding of their roles and responsibilities.  Does your organisation have 
a clear policy governing the roles and responsibilities of board members? 
 
   
Yes No 
 
3.6 List the written organisational policies your organisation has in place. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
3.7 Explain the board’s participation in the formulation and adaptation of a 
formal, documented and measurable long-range or strategic plan. 
  
 …………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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 …………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3.7 Are your organisation’s procedures for evaluating your projects and activities 
determined by donors or your organisation? 
 
 X 
Do not conduct evaluations  
Determined by donors  
Determined by organisation  
Determined by both donors and organisation  
 
 
3.8 Describe when and how self-assessment of the organisation, against 
measurable specified criteria, takes place. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
3.9 Is there a clear distinction between the role of the organisation’s CEO and the 
chairperson of the governing board? 
 
Yes No 
 
If YES: 
 
a) Describe this distinction. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
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…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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SECTION 4:  FINANCE 
 
Please mark the appropriate box with an X or provide the necessary information 
 
 
4.1 Indicate your organisation’s sources of funding: 
 
 
Sources of Income 
 
X 
Indicate the 
approximate % of 
funding received 
from each source 
Individual giving   
Corporate social investment   
Government funding   
Foreign donors (International Development 
Assistance) 
  
Grant-making foundations   
National Funding Agencies   
Community philanthropic organisations   
Fees (membership/service provision)   
*Other   
 
*Please specify: 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………….…… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………...……. 
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4.2 How would you characterise your organisation in terms of financial 
sustainability. 
 
 X 
Permanently sustainable  
(eg. With an endowment) 
 
Good prospects for long-term sustainaibility 
(eg. With good balance of fees for service and diversified 
donor base.) 
 
Average prospects for medium-term sustainability 
(eg. With some income-generating activity and likely donor 
support for at least five years) 
 
Fair prospects for short-term sustainability  
(eg. With donor funding for up to three years but uncertain 
beyond) 
 
Existing from hand to mouth  
(eg. From short-term contributions) 
 
Presently not funded  
On the verge of closing  
*Other  
 
*Please specify:   
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4.3 In your opinion, does a diversity of financial sources of income, impact on 
financial sustainability? 
 
Yes No 
 
a) If YES, describe how. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
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…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4.4 List your organisation’s categories of expenditure. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4.5 Approximately what percentage of your organisations overall budget is spent 
on capital expenditures? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
4.6 Approximately what percentage of your organisation’s overall budget is spent 
on recurrent expenditure? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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4.7 In terms of good practice in financial management, does your organisation:  
 
 YES NO 
Keep an accurate record of all financial transactions? 
(accounting records) 
  
Link the budget to the organisation’s strategic and 
operational plans? 
(financial planning) 
  
Produce management accounts so that managers can 
compare the organisation’s progress against the 
budget and then make decisions about the future? 
(financial monitoring) 
  
Produce financial statements for outside scrutiny to 
demonstrate how funds have been applied in the 
past? 
(financial monitoring) 
  
Have internal controls (checks and balances) in place 
to safeguard your organisation’s assets and manage 
risk? 
(internal controls) 
  
Have an audit committee/auditor to assist in the 
quality and reliability of financial and other 
performance information issued? 
  
 
 
4.8 Name and describe the financial policies, rules and procedures that exist in 
your organisation. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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4.9 Describe your organisation’s financial control endeavours with particular 
reference to: 
- Planning 
- Programming 
- Reporting 
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SECTION 5:  GENERAL 
 
Please mark the appropriate box with an X or provide the necessary information 
 
 
5.1 Indicate who are actively involved in PLANNING your organisation’s 
programmes and projects. 
 
  
 Planning Designing Implementing Evaluating 
Donors/Funders     
Board of directors/trustees     
Executive leadership     
Senior Staff     
Junior Staff     
Beneficiaries/target groups     
Other NGOs/CSOs/CBOs     
Membership     
Ordinary Citizens     
 
 
5.2 How well would you say your organisation is handling the following matters?  
Would you say very well, fairly well, not very well or not at all well? 
 
 Very well Fairly well Not very well Not at all well 
Organisational governance     
Management of the 
organisation  
    
Administrative matters/day 
to day running 
    
Controlling/monitoring 
expenses 
    
Adhering to ethical 
principles 
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Rozenda Hendrickse 
23 Luckhoff Street 
Idas Valley 
Stellenbosch 
7600 
Email:  hendrickseR@cput.ac.za
Tel: 021 – 460 3929 
 
12 March 2007 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE:  GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT OF NGOS 
 
I am a Ph.D candidate at the School of Government, University of the Western Cape.  My 
Ph.D research title is:  Governance and financial sustainability of NGOs in South Africa. 
After deliberations with the proposal committee of the School of Government, three 
specific cases were decided upon, these include the Centre for the Study of Higher 
Education (UWC), Oxfam as an example of an international NGO and the Sustainability 
Institute (Stellenbosch). The study will also use comparative case methodologies and will 
consider the application of funding frameworks as a result of theoretical assessment. 
 
The central problem addressed in this research investigation is the lack of adequate 
governance arrangements and financial funding to ensure the sustainability of NGOs in 
general and South African NGOs specifically. Attached to this letter is a survey 
questionnaire which is aimed at evaluating governance and financial sustainability of 
your NGO.   
 
Following the processing of this information I will be able to develop alternative 
approaches to governance and financial arrangements with specific reference to lessons 
of experiences for South African NGOs. 
 
I would like to appeal to you to complete the accompanying questionnaire as thoroughly 
as possible.    If you encounter any problems or questions in this regard you may contact 
me personally at (+27 – 21 - 83 744 1629 – International) or (083 744 1629 – South 
Africa).  Please return the completed questionnaire by the 31st of March 2007. Following 
the completion of this study I will provide feedback to your organisation. 
 
Thank you for your willingness to devote some of your valued time to this study.       
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
ROZENDA HENDRICKSE
APPENDIX B 
 
An application of the appraisal framework for the sustainability of NGOs 
 
  
 
 
 
 
APPRAISAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF NGOs 
 
 
 
 
NAME OF ORGANISATION:………………………………………………………. 
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APPRAISAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF NGOs 
 
 
 
Education Policy Unit/Centre for the Study of Higher Education 
 
Appraisal date:  20 May 2008 
 
APPRAISAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF NGOs 
 
 
Sustainability Institute 
 
Appraisal date:  20 May 2008 
 
APPRAISAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUSTAINABILITY OF NGOs 
 
 
Oxfam Great Britain 
 
Appraisal date:  20 May 2008 
 
 APPRAISAL FORM 1: APPRAISAL INSTRUMENT FOR THE 
SUSTAINABILITY OF NGOs 
 
 
APPRAISAL CRITERIA 
 
MAXIMUM 
SCORE 
 
SCORE 
ATTAINED
 
NGO legal status 
 
10 
  
 
 
NGO leadership (Chief Executive 
Officer/Director/Manager)  
 
 
10 
 
 
 
Roles and responsibilities of the executive 
management  
10  
 
 
NGO Board 
 
10 
 
 
The extent to which principles of good 
governance is practiced 
 
10 
 
 
G
O
V
ER
N
A
N
C
E 
 
Score:  Sub-Total 
 
50 
 
 
 
Sources of NGO funding 
 
10 
 
 
 
Self-financing strategies 
 
10 
 
 
 
Good practices in financial management 
 
10 
 
 
 
Financial control measures 
 
10 
 
 
 
Fundraising strategies 
 
10 
 
 
 
FI
N
A
N
C
IA
L 
SU
ST
A
IN
A
BI
LI
TY
 
 
Score:  Sub-Total 
 
50 
 
 
 
TOTAL SCORE: 
 
100 
 
 
 
PERCENTAGE SCORE: 
                               
                                  %  
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.1 
 
 
GOVERNANCE APPRAISAL 
 
NGO LEGAL STATUS 
Assessment Criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
Assigned
 
 
Existence of a legal entity 
 
/5 
 
 
Registered as one of the following: 
 
• NGO registered as a non-profit organisation under the 
NPO Act of 1997  
• Registered as PBO 
• Non-profit trust registered under the Trust Property 
Control Act 1998 
• Section 21 not-for-profit gain organisation as per the 
Companies Act of 1973 
 
 
/4 
 
 
 
 
Registered for value added tax (VAT) 
 
 
/1 
 
 
 
 
Sub-Total 
 
/10 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.2 
 
 
GOVERNANCE APPRAISAL 
NGO LEADERSHIP 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
assigned 
The NGO displays ALL of the following leadership criteria 
 
/3 
 
 
NGO manager/director displays transparent and accountable 
leadership in line with the organisation’s constitution 
 
/1 
 
 
NGO leadership (manager/director) is not centred on a particular 
individual where the manager is also the chairperson of the 
governing board.  Clear separation of powers exist between the 
two entities 
 
/1 
 
NGO has a charismatic leader (director/manager) /1  
NGO manager/director delegates the management of the 
organisation to senior executive staff (where subordinates exist) 
 
/1  
NGO manager/director served for 3 years or more as managing 
director or director 
/1  
NGO manager/director effectively manages the operational arm 
of the organisation, and the chairperson of the governing board 
and/or governing board does not intervene in administrative 
issues of the organisation except in the formulation of 
operational policies 
/1  
 
 
 
There is regular supervision of the 
director/manager/management by the chairperson of the 
governing board 
/1  
 
Sub-total 
 
 
/10 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.3 
 
 
GOVERNANCE APPRAISAL 
 
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT  
 
Assessment criteria 
 
Possible 
Score 
 
Score 
Assigned 
The NGO meets ALL the assessment criteria, as 
stated in this diagram, pertaining to the roles and 
responsibilities of the executive management 
structure 
 
/4 
 
Executive management team clearly understands its 
roles and functions 
 
 
/1 
 
Executive management team has clear 
responsibilities 
 
/1  
 
A cohesive management structure exist 
 
 
/1 
 
 
Executive management effectively and efficiently 
manages the NGO’s resources 
 
 
/1 
 
Executive management upholds the NGO’s vision, 
mission and strategic objectives as displayed in its 
constitution  
 
/1  
A sound strategic and business plan exists.  Executive 
management assisted in its formulation and oversee 
its implementation  
/1  
 
Sub-total 
 
 
/10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
 APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.4 
 
GOVERNANCE APPRAISAL 
 
COMPOSITION AND SKILLS OF THE BOARD 
 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
assigned 
Existence of a governing board. /4  
Diversity of the board.  The board consists of 
representatives from the NGO sector, community, 
government and private sector. 
 
 
/2  
The board consist of more than 50% of external 
membership. 
/2  
 
The board reflects diversity in terms of technical skills, 
community engagements skills, management skills, 
fundraising skills, financial skills and legal skills, 
commensurate with the business of the NGO. 
/2  
   
Sub-total /10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6
APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.5 
 
GOVERNANCE APPRAISAL 
 
THE EXTENT TO WHICH PRINCIPLES OF GOOD 
GOVERNANCE IS PRACTICED 
 
Appraisal criteria 
 
Possible 
Score 
 
Score 
Assigned 
 
ALL of the following characteristics of good governance are 
present within the organisation. 
- Staff participation in policy formulation and 
implementation 
- Transparency of decisions by management 
- Responsiveness to clients 
- Consensus oriented decision-making 
- Equity with regard to human resource appointments 
- Equity with regard to the procurement of external 
services and resources 
- Effectiveness and Efficiency in responding to client 
needs 
- Accountability to stakeholders 
- Legal frameworks are enforced impartially 
(Refer to Section 3.2.4 for discussion). 
/1  
Staff participation, where staff comments on the practicality 
around the implementation of policy frameworks. 
/1  
Transparency of decisions by management 
 
/1  
The organisation’s responsiveness to clients 
 
/1  
Consensus oriented decision-making /1  
Equity with regard to human resource appointments /1  
Equity with regard to the procurement of external services and 
resources 
 
/1  
Effectiveness and efficiency in responding to client needs 
 
/1  
Accountability to stakeholders 
 
/1  
Legal frameworks are enforced impartially /1  
 
Sub-total 
  
/10 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.6 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
SOURCE OF NGO FUNDING 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
assigned
The organisation has multiple funding sources which may 
include  funding from government, the private sector, other 
donors or several from the same category 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from international foreign 
aid grants 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from national/local 
government grants 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from bi-lateral and multi-
lateral grant aid 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from international 
foundation grants 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from national/local 
foundation grants 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from international, national 
and local corporate grants 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from international charitable 
donations 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from local individual 
donations 
/1  
The organisation receives funding from internal self-financing 
strategies 
/1  
 
Sub-total 
  
/10 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.7 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
SELF-FINANCING STRATEGIES 
Assessment Criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
Assigned
Self-financing strategies or methods are present within the 
organisation. 
 
/5  
Not more than 50% of the organisation’s overall income is 
generated through: 
- Membership fees 
- Fees for services 
- Product sales 
- Use of hard assets for example: equipment rental 
- Use of soft assets for example:  patents, copyrights 
- Ancillary business ventures 
- Investment dividend 
- Gift of time (time spent by volunteers) 
- Gift of product (donations given by the public) 
 
/3  
The organisation has capital reserves to be used at the board’s 
discretion. 
/2  
Sub-total /10  
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.8 
 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
GOOD PRACTICE IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
Assigned 
In terms of good practice in financial management the 
organisation: 
- Keeps an accurate record of all financial 
transactions (accounting records) 
 
/2 
 
In terms of good practice in financial management the 
organisation: 
- Link the budget to the organisation’s strategic and 
operational plan  (financial planning) 
 
/2 
 
In terms of good practice in financial management the 
organisation:  
- Produce management accounts so that managers 
can compare the organisation’s progress against the 
budget and then make decisions about the future 
(financial monitoring) 
- Produce financial statements for outside scrutiny to 
demonstrate how funds have been applied in the 
past  (financial monitoring) 
 
/2 
 
In terms of good practice in financial management the 
organisation: 
- Have internal controls (checks and balances) in 
place to safeguard your organisation’s assets and 
manage risk  (internal controls) 
 
/2 
 
In terms of good practice in financial management the 
organisation: 
- Have an audit committee/auditor to assist in the 
quality and reliability of financial and other 
performance information issued. 
 
 
/2 
 
 
Sub-total 
 
/10 
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.9  
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
FINANCIAL CONTROL 
 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
Assigned 
The organisation has fiscal policies that protect it from 
intentional or unintentional misuse of resources 
/1  
Financial policy and its implementation procedures and systems 
are in place relevant to South African company and tax law.  The 
financial reporting requirements of donors/funders are also 
recognised in this policy. 
/1  
Financial policy exists around staff salaries, staff loans and the 
opening and the operating of bank accounts.  Implementation 
procedures and systems around this policy are in place within the 
organisation 
/1  
Financial policy exists around how money is received and 
recorded.  Implementation procedures and systems pertaining to 
this policy are in place. 
/1  
Financial policy, implementation procedures and systems exist 
around how money is spent. 
/1  
Tasks such as the receipt of cash, the preparation of financial 
statements and the expenditure of funds are assigned to more 
than one staff member to ensure adequate financial control. 
/1  
Rules exist around how the budget should be monitored and 
amended. 
/1  
Rules exist around the writing of cheques. /1  
Insurance are in place to cover financial losses. /1  
Auditing procedures are in place. /1  
Sub-total /10  
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APPRAISAL DIAGRAM 1.10 
 
 
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
FUNDRAISING STRATEGY 
 
Assessment criteria 
Possible 
Score 
Score 
Attained 
The organisation has a well-executed fundraising strategy that 
contains ALL of the  following elements present in this diagram. 
/2  
Diversification:  Diversified fundraising means that an NGO has 
several sources of funding from several different types of fundraising 
activities 
/2  
Sustainability:  Sustainability is about developing self-reliance. The 
more self-reliant an NGO is, the more control it can maintain over its 
resources, as well as the decisions around resource management and 
use 
/2  
Creativity:  Being creative means utilising available resources and 
taking advantage of opportunities as they emerge 
/2  
Inclusiveness:  Taking an inclusive approach means finding a role for 
supportive people to play.  In this way the boundaries of the NGO will 
be expanded beyond its present scope. 
/2  
 
Sub-Total 
  
/10 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Appraisal framework – Sustainability Indicator 
 
 
SUSTAINABILITY INDICATOR 
 
 
SCORE CATEGORY 
 
 
FINAL SCORE 
 
 
SUSTAINABILITY 
INDICATOR 
 
 
GREEN CATEGORY 
 
 
60% + 
 
Sustainable 
 
ORANGE CATEGORY 
 
41% - 59% 
Strengthen governance 
and financial 
management practices 
  Drastic action required 
with regard to 
governance and financial 
management practices 
RED CATEGORY 0% - 40% 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Ethical statement 
 
Ph.D Candidate:  Rozenda Hendrickse 
School of Government 
University of the Western Cape 
 
Description of research project  and ethics clearance 
 
 
Project title:  Governance and financial sustainability of NGOs in South Africa 
 
 
1. BACKGROUND AND RATIONAL 
 
A Government of National Unity, elected by South Africans, under the leadership of the 
African National Congress, came into power in 1994 (Dangor, 1995).  As a consequence, 
the 1990s saw new priorities being placed on the state’s development agenda, especially 
those driven by the needs of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).  
The government was now required to take up the space that non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) occupied in communities, previously denied resources by an 
oppressive government (Harding, 1994).  The role and identity of NGOs became a 
critical issue beyond 1994 where NGOs were required to position themselves at the 
cutting edge of development thinking and practice in their field if they were to stay active 
(Hollowes, 1999).   Former comrades-in-arms, having moved from positions in the NGO 
sector into government, were questioning the role of NGOs and were requesting them to 
redefine themselves (Financial Mail, 1994).   In addition to this state of uncertainty, 
foreign governments and international donors were increasingly channelling funding 
through the state further weakening the position of South African NGOs (Hollowes, 
1999; Pereira, 1999).  
 
This study proposes to trace governance and the financial sustainability of South African 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for the period 1990 to 2002 with the intention to 
develop improved options for the future regarding the sustainability of the NGO sector in 
South Africa, especially with regards to financial management and governance.   
 
 
2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
This research investigation will focus in particular on options for funding and governance 
of NGOs in South Africa.  The primary and secondary objectives of the study are: 
 
2.1 Primary objective: 
 
It is the primary objective of this research study to evaluate existing governance and 
financial arrangements of NGOs, CBOs and CSOs with the view to develop alternative 
approaches to governance and financial arrangements with specific reference to lessons 
of experiences for South African NGOs. 
 
 1
 
 
2.2 Secondary objectives: 
 
The secondary objectives of this research study are to: 
 
• develop a historical perspective on trends and tendencies of NGO funding in 
South Africa 
• provide a theoretical overview of the financial management and governance 
arrangements of NGOs 
• examine options for funding arrangements for NGOs in South Africa 
• provide a comparative case assessment of selected NGOs in South Africa 
• develop research findings and to apply the preferred financial arrangements to the 
case studies 
• develop a set of conclusions and recommendations for the improved funding of 
NGOs in South Africa 
 
It should be noted that all secondary objectives have been formulated in support of the 
primary objective and that these have been directly linked to the composition of the 
chapters in the study.   
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study will largely employ qualitative evaluation as this research tool encompasses a 
broad variety of approaches to interpretive research.  The study will also use comparative 
case assessment and the application of a funding model as a result of theoretical 
assessment.  Qualitative research can be historical, sociological, political, educational, 
and much more, providing an apt tool for a study of this nature (Leedy, 1997).  A 
qualitative approach will provide a theoretical assessment of governance and financial 
arrangements of NGOs.   A further reason for choosing “evaluation” as a research 
method is that it allows for “…[t]he systematic acquisition and assessment of information 
to provide useful feedback about some object be it a programme, policy, technology, 
person, need or activity.  (Introduction to Evaluation, s.c found at:  
http://trochim.human.cornell.edu/kb/intreval.htm).  Another reason for this method of 
research is that the researcher will be allowed to use her judgment and experience to 
ultimately select a preferred governance and financial model for NGOs. 
 
This research study makes use of multiple-case studies. A case study is characterised by: 
- ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions; 
- more than one case study is investigated, but the total number is limited; 
- A contemporary phenomenon over which the researcher does not have 
direct control is studied within its real-life context;  
- It aims at collecting qualitative data and in-depth knowledge about a 
phenomenon, not at collecting quantitative data to generalize on one 
aspect of the phenomenon; 
- Multiple sources of evidence is used and  
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- Fieldwork is included (Arts, 1998:  37). 
 
Swanborn in Arts (1998: 38) contends that the study of two cases instead of one, would 
yield knowledge through comparison.  However, whilst this research seeks to trace and 
compare governance and the financial sustainability of South African NGOs for the 
period 1990 to 2002, four NGOs were selected namely the Centre for the Study of Higher 
Education at the University of the Western Cape formerly known as the Education Policy 
Unit, Oxfam, the Sustainability Institute and the Treatment Action Campaign.  Though 
they differ fundamentally in terms of service sectors, two of the NGOs existed pre the 
1994 democratic elections and all are, and had been, recipients of international and 
domestic aid.   A brief description of each NGO follows. 
 
The Centre for the Study of Higher Education, formerly known as the Education Policy 
Unit, began operations in January 1992.  Its immediate function was to provide support to 
the democratic movement and to the African National Congress government-in-waiting 
in formulating a post-secondary education policy framework for the new South Africa.  
During 2001, it was decided to change the name of the Education Policy Unit to the 
Centre for the Study of Higher Education in order to reflect its focus on higher education 
and its function as a centre for scholarly research, analysis and teaching in this field 
(Centre for the Study of Higher Education, 2005).  
 
Oxfam has characterized itself as “a development and relief agency working to put an end 
to poverty world-wide,” a grand project based on the belief that poverty is not inevitable,  
it can be tackled and must be ended.  Using its trademark approach to development of 
working with poor people, to help them, help themselves.  Oxfam’s strategy of 
responsively helping people empower themselves has important implications for the 
development and maintenance of global civil society.  In its efforts to relieve poverty, 
distress and suffering in any part of the world, Oxfam supports a variety of social 
development, health, agricultural, and humanitarian projects, and emergency programs.  
It also aims to educate the public concerning the nature, causes, and effects of poverty, 
and engages in advocacy, education and campaigning work on issues that are central to 
the achievement of Oxfam’s charitable objectives (Kalema, 2001).   
 
The Sustainability Institute at Spier is an international living and learning centre, situated 
on the outskirts of Stellenbosch.  Founded in 1999, the Sustainability Institute, according 
to its website, provides a space for people to explore an approach to creating a more 
equitable society that lives in a way that sustains rather than destroys the eco-system 
within which all society is embedded.  It provides residential accommodation for visiting 
writers, artists, activists, volunteers and scholars, and a learning space for participants in 
the Institute’s various educational programmes (www.sustainabilityinstitute.net). 
 
To be able to meet the research objectives on the basis of a multiple-case study, specific 
information and knowledge should be collected, for example on the historical trends and 
tendencies of NGO funding in South Africa for the period 1990 to 2002; and the financial 
management of NGOs in particular.  Therefore relevant and multiple sources of 
information and knowledge will be selected and perused.  Some of the main primary and 
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secondary sources of information for this study are people and documents specifically 
NGO and government role-players, international donors, policy documents, internet 
searches, annual reports, legislation and numerous ‘other’ relevant literature.   
 
 
4. ETHICAL STATEMENT 
The following statements were examined: The draft Code of Conduct for Research 
Involving Humans, sponsored by the Medical Research, Natural Sciences and 
Engineering Research, and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 
2007),  The Social Research Association’s Ethical Guidelines (2007).  Having read and 
understood the codes of conduct, I commit to:  
• Obtain the consent of the participants before research is undertaken; 
• Ensure that the well being of the participants takes precedence over the expected 
benefits to knowledge. 
• Inform participants of their right of refusal and of the degree of confidentiality 
with which the material that they provide will be handled. 
• Ensure that participants have the right to remain anonymous and to have their 
rights to privacy and confidentiality respected; permitting no release of 
information about individual persons that has been guaranteed as confidential, to 
any person inside or outside the institution. 
• Approach the project with an unbiased attitude and strive to gather evidence fairly 
and accurately. 
• Document the sources of information and the process of analysis in each task in 
sufficient detail to enable a technically qualified colleague to understand what 
was done and to verify that the work meets all appropriate standards and 
expectations. 
 
Rozenda Hendrickse 
1 June 2007 
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